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ABSTRACT 
Scholarship tells the story of the history of rhetoric whereby the study of rhetoric declines 
first in the “Silver Age of Rome,” then loses any bearings or progress during first the Patristic 
period of the formation of the early Christian Church in the third through fifth century CE, and 
undergoes a second decline during the Germanic invasions starting in the fifth century. My task 
is defining and recovering new sources for rhetoric to spark more creative and in-depth analysis 
of this period in the history of rhetoric. 
Rather than simply move through a bibliographical list chronologically, I narrow in on 
the evolution of rhetorical appeals at specific points in history when a shift in control and usage 
of such appeals can be perceived, as the focus moves from static or well-established sources to 
fluid peripheral centers. Chapter 1 explains the exigence and methods for this study, and a 
recounting of the traditional histories I seek to expand. Set in Classical Athens, and grounded in 
the species of forensic rhetoric, Chapter 2 discusses how rhetoric, as an institution of the 
empowered elite, one that enforces societal cohesion, uses rules placed on behavior, thoughts, 
and identity through logical appeals.  
Chapter 3 moves geographically and politically from Greece to the late Roman Empire, 
and examines how authoritarian political dominance forces rhetors to shift to ethical appeals in 
order to avoid persecution. Chapter 4 investigates fourth and fifth century Alexandrian culture to 
trace how early Christian factions moved the focus of ethos from a person to a singular text in 
order to gain prominence over their theological (and thus their political) adversaries. Chapter 5 
visits eighth century Carolingian France to discuss how the authors of empirical legitimacy in 
peripheral kingdoms used rhetoric to promote access to the authoritative ethical text, while 
further expanding options for other textual ethical authorities. Chapter 6 illustrates how in ninth 
century England, non-traditional sources such as hagiography expose contemporary rhetorical 
strategies. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
The title of this study refers to the Tyranny of Custom, a phrase borrowed from the 
philosopher Bertrand Russell. He described custom as a helpful set of practices and beliefs that 
hold a society together and give people a sense of identity and belonging. In this way, customary 
ways of living and acting provide societal cohesion. They prevent strife by proscribing actions 
that will prevent conflict and by creating avenues for the settlement of conflict. Russell saw 
customs as tyrannical, subjugating the desire and will of the individual, outdated and no longer 
serving their purpose. In other words, they had simply transitioned into non-productive cultural 
traditions and norms. Rhetoric, too, especially forensic rhetoric, is a deprecated custom, but it 
holds the potential to be of greater value to society. While Russell saw philosophy as a way of 
freeing the mind from chains of custom by making one question the nature of things and 
systems, in my view, rhetoric, in addition to philosophy, could and should be used to free legal 
actors from bondage, to make rhetoric a tool of inspiration and innovation. A better 
understanding of the history of rhetoric bolsters capability and inspiration for both scholars and 
students in that field. 
To start, there is a great gap in scholarship in the Medieval history of rhetoric. My 
dissertation attempts to provide a narration to bridge the gap in our published anthologies and 
surveys from late antiquity to the Middle Ages and provides some alternative ways to trace the 
development and continuance of rhetoric in Europe. Rhetoric continued to adapt to cultural 
contexts throughout the so-called Dark Ages. Here I wish to demonstrate two ideas to begin to 
plug the gap: one, the development of innovative rhetorical strategies in the face of various 
challenges to education in, and the practice of, rhetoric; and two, a greater understanding of 
10 
scholars can gain by exploring works outside the established texts of the canon of the Medieval 
history of rhetoric. 
Modern surveys and anthologies of the history of rhetoric do not cover much medieval 
material. College classes on the history of rhetoric largely skip a thousand years in their assigned 
readings. This neglect of medieval rhetoric results largely because our received history tells us 
that rhetoric originates in the classical learning of the Mediterranean world, develops 
progressively from the Greek civilization to the Roman Empire, withers during the Middle Ages, 
and then revives in the Renaissance. For current students of rhetoric, whether they are studying 
rhetoric within programs in English departments or Communication departments, too much 
reliance on the received works of Aristotle, and interpretations of Aristotle’s theories, is 
unfortunate because his rhetorical ideals tend to reflect those of the elite, and not of the Athenian 
democracy (Lanni 4). Also, as Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg note, in The Rhetorical 
Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, “To speak of classical rhetoric is thus 
to speak of Aristotle’s system and its elaboration by Cicero and Quintilian” (2). My research 
seeks to situate the historical tradition of rhetoric within more specific cultural contexts, contexts 
that reveal “native” rhetorics in the middle ages, rather than trying to either recognize classical 
Greek and Roman rhetoric everywhere we look, or overlooking sources and social formations of 
discourse because it is outside Aristotle’s definition of “rhetoric” or Cicero’s “rhetorical 
activities.” Exploration of non-canonical sources exposes the formation, theorizing, and practice 
of forensic rhetoric during the time period other historians had assumed learning was dormant, 
and in peripheral geographical regions often excluded or minimized in the master narratives of 
the history of rhetoric. 
11 
Scholars in rhetoric and legal studies would likely not be able to agree upon what it 
would take to claim the presence of forensic rhetoric as a field in specific times and places, but 
my position is that the existence of laws, courts, and trials is surely enough to show that 
argument was a relevant and important topic to cultures that required rhetorical practice to settle 
community conflicts. Furthermore, the existence of prescriptive advice on law combined with 
demonstrable forms of legal education throughout the early Middle Ages reveals an arena for 
discursive argumentation. For example, even though the ninth century is rarely the focus of study 
on forensic rhetoric, the expected cast and setting for what we can reasonably call forensic 
debate clearly are present in Anglo-Saxon texts. We see words for judge or official (scirman), 
law (laga), witness (aewdas), criminal or civil action (sac), court assembly (folk-moot), and 
teacher of law (aelareow).  
Although classical Hellenistic and Roman authors, following Aristotle, regularly divided 
rhetoric into three species, namely forensic, deliberative, and epideictic, forensic rhetoric stands 
out as a well-systemized field that has partially survived and adapted into modern law courts and 
other realms of persuasive argument, so when possible, forensic rhetoric is my primary focus. 
When certain topics provide value during certain historical periods, I will examine other species 
of rhetoric for clarity of certain ideas that eventually come back, even centuries later, to impact 
forensic rhetoric.  
Forensic rhetoric refers to argument used in judicial systems. Aristotle identifies forensic 
rhetoric as “legal or forensic speech, which takes place in the courtroom, and concerns judgment 
about a past action” (Bizzell/Herzberg 3).  Stemming from the Greek and Hellenic traditions, the 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (disseminated with a purported letter to Alexander of Macedon, 
Aristotle’s pupil, and falsely attributed in later historical periods to Aristotle), “offers no 
12 
definition of forensic rhetoric” but explains, “The oratory of accusation is the recital of errors 
and offences, and that of defense the refutation of errors and offences of which a man is accused 
or suspected” (4.1426b; O’Rourke 19). The ad Alexandrum, now attributed to Anaximenes and 
thought to have been written around the same time as Aristotle’s On Rhetoric, also discusses 
species, topics, subjects, modes of accusation and defense, proofs, and a few other details along 
with a recommended structure for a forensic speech (Bizzell/Herzberg 169; Kennedy 33). 
Aristotle wrote his own review of rhetorical handbooks, the Synagoge Technon, which Cicero 
referred to in his Brutus, but which didn’t survive (Bizzell/Herzberg 169). From the Latin 
tradition, another handbook popular during the Hellenistic period and the Middle Ages, the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium discusses judicial cases and focuses especially on invention and 
techniques of delivery, and forensic rhetoric is defined quite similarly to the Greek tradition: 
“The judicial is based on legal controversy, and comprises criminal prosecution or civil suit, and 
defense” (I.II). Such legal controversy covers crimes, as defined by laws, and lawsuits, to protect 
property, and the strategies used by both sides to pursue their interests in either type. 
However, as George Kennedy points out 
Aristotle’s Synagôgê was understood by later writers to have traced the history of 
one strand of rhetorical instruction from Corax and Tisias in Sicily in the second 
quarter of the fifth century. The conclusion of twentieth-century scholars has been 
that the writing of handbooks of judicial rhetoric began with Corax or Tisias and 
was continued by Theodorus and others. … This tradition now probably needs to 
be modified in a number of ways. (33-34) 
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Thus, Kennedy retells the classic narrative of the origin of forensic, but the story is surely non-
linear. I am answering that call to re-examine these received traditions and see how they limit or 
constrain the definition and recognition of forensic rhetoric in different cultures. 
Although some scholars have begun to point out the continuance of classical rhetoric 
beyond the fifth-century Germanic invasions of Rome into medieval literary works, most 
medieval coverage centers around two arbitrary bookends: Augustine of Hippo’s incorporation 
of rhetoric into Christian homiletics and the humanistic twelfth-century recovery of classical 
rhetoric in the continental cathedral schools. The many centuries between these two periods still 
bear the stigma of the outdated concept of a Dark Age—a term applied retroactively by Italian 
Renaissance poet and scholar Petrarch, and popularized by the humanists throughout the Age of 
Enlightenment. For example, Speculum published Theodor E. Mommsen’s article, “Petrarch’s 
Conception of The Dark Ages,” in 1942, providing a detailed examination of how that phrase 
entered the historical record, and following its impact on scholarship. Mommsen explains that 
during the Renaissance, “Antiquity, so long considered as the 'Dark Age,' now became the time 
of 'light' which had to be 'restored'; the era following Antiquity, on the other hand, was 
submerged in obscurity” (228). Mommsen, the grandson and namesake of the German classical 
scholar and 1902 Nobel Prize Winner, argues that Petrarch, between 1337 and 1341, came up 
with a “new concept of history,” described by the word “tenebrae” or “darkness” (234). First, 
Petrarch wrote, “What else, then, is history, if not the praise of Rome? (237). Mommsen further 
argues that Petrarch’s choice in his own historical account, De viris illustribus (Concerning 
Famous Men), to only write about the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire was “based on a 
judgment of value,” specifically, “the praise of Rome corresponded to the condemnation of the 
‘barbarous’ countries and peoples outside Rome” (237). Moreover, in 1341, Petrarch “drew a 
14 
line of demarcation between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ history … when later on he called the period 
stretching from the fall of the Roman Empire down to his own age a time of ‘darkness.’ In 
Petrarch’s opinion that era was ‘dark’ because it was worthless, not because it was little known” 
(237). Like Plato’s discrimination against Rhetoric, Petrarch set in motion the prejudice against 
the early medieval historical period for later humanists and historians that persists to our own 
generation. Yet enough texts survive in this period to demonstrate that intellectual activity 
continued in old, new, and diverse forms.  There are, however, points of exception in our 
scholarship. 
1.1   The Received Tradition of Rhetoric 
To appreciate the discursive systems that created native rhetorical contributions to the 
medieval continuance of classical rhetoric, we must first examine the monolithic story of the 
history of rhetoric as it was received from tradition. Rhetoric as a pedagogical field endured as a 
legacy of Roman civilization. Although Greek authors first wrote about rhetoric (including Plato, 
Isocrates, and Aristotle), many of the Greek texts were unavailable to medieval authors. 
Aristotle, for instance, because many of his works were lost in the West after the fall of Rome in 
the fifth century, was primarily known as a logician to early medieval Western Europe. What did 
survive into the Middle Ages were the early writings of Cicero and those of Quintilian1. Also, 
                                                
 
1	  Quintilian’s	  major	  work,	  The	  Institutes	  of	  Oratory,	  written	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  long	  teaching	  career,	  has	  been	  hugely	  
influential	  for	  rhetorical	  theory	  and	  history,	  but	  was	  not	  especially	  popular	  in	  antiquity,	  according	  to	  rhetoric	  
historians	  James	  J.	  Murphy,	  Lee	  Honeycutt,	  and	  Olga	  Tellegan-­‐Couperus.	  As	  Tellegan-­‐Couperus	  relates,	  “Only	  from	  
the	  3rd	  to	  5th	  centuries,	  Quintilian	  was	  famous,	  but	  then	  particularly	  for	  his	  writings	  on	  education	  and	  rhetoric,”	  not	  
on	  law	  or	  forensic	  rhetoric.	  “In	  the	  6th	  century,	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Western	  Empire,	  Boethius	  and	  Cassiodorus	  used	  
[Quintilian]	  for	  their	  own	  work,	  and	  so	  did	  Isadore	  of	  Seville	  in	  the	  7th	  century”	  (20).	  However,	  “thanks	  to	  the	  
enthusiasm	  of	  Petrarch,”	  Quintilian’s	  work	  “enjoyed	  great	  popularity,”	  after	  Poggio	  Bracciolini,	  a	  book	  hunter	  and	  
secretary	  to	  a	  deposed	  pope,	  discovered	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  entire	  manuscript	  in	  1416	  in	  a	  German	  monastery	  (Tellegen-­‐
Couperus	  20;	  Honeycutt).	  The	  first	  printed	  edition	  of	  Quintilian’s	  work	  was	  available	  in	  1470	  (Tellegen-­‐Couperus	  
20;	  Honeycutt).	  As	  George	  Kennedy	  points	  out,	  Quintilian	  studied	  with	  Domitius	  Afer,	  and	  “his	  choice	  of	  the	  
15 
rhetorical handbooks of disputed authorship such as the Rhetorica ad Herennium and the 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum were still available and very popular. It was not the strength of these 
works, though, that necessarily allowed rhetoric to survive as a discipline. Rather, it was its 
incorporation into Christianity and the Church’s institutionalization of Latin. The rhetoric of the 
middle ages was not the rhetoric we think of today. 
Craig Smith asserts that classical Roman reliance on deliberative rhetoric was needed to 
increase citizen participation in government. As Augustus Caesar weakened the power of the 
Senate, he lessened the usefulness of deliberative rhetoric. A century later, Diocletian’s reliance 
on informants and an autocratic judicial system further reduced the effectiveness of forensic 
oratory for the populace (154). After weakening two of Cicero’s three divisions of rhetoric in the 
late classical period, Roman society was left with epideictic oratory primarily, which lingered as 
panegyric in the Eastern Roman Empire. 
During the Second Sophistic (the period George Kennedy identifies between Rome’s 
silver age and the fall of Rome), the art of rhetoric became notorious for teaching students how 
to add eloquent but unnecessary embellishments to language. As a result, rhetoric lost some 
reputation as a field of study. In addition, a Pauline desire for a plain style of speech lessened 
rhetoric’s appeal to early medieval Christians. C. F. Kolbert writes that theology attracted the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
practicing	  orator	  Afer	  as	  his	  mentor	  suggests	  that	  he	  hoped	  for	  a	  career	  in	  the	  law	  courts.”	  Quintilian	  did	  have	  
initial	  success	  with	  law	  before	  he	  became	  a	  teacher,	  after	  the	  “apalling	  year	  of	  the	  four	  emperors,”	  in	  68-­‐70,	  
“perhaps	  to	  support	  himself	  when	  there	  were	  few	  opportunities	  in	  the	  courts”	  (177).	  Vespasian	  “emerged	  as	  the	  
victor	  in	  the	  contest	  for	  the	  throne,”	  and	  in	  Spring	  71,	  Vespasian	  appointed	  “Quintilian	  to	  a	  chair	  in	  rhetoric	  
supported	  by	  the	  state	  treasury,	  the	  first	  such	  appointment	  ever	  made”	  (Kennedy	  177;	  Conley	  38).	  Quintilian	  “took	  
Cicero	  as	  his	  model	  in	  oratory,”	  and	  even	  though	  Quintilian	  represented	  “practical	  application	  of	  rhetorical	  skills	  
rather	  than	  [being]	  a	  famous	  declaimer,”	  he	  also	  “occasionally	  undertook	  to	  plead	  legal	  cases”	  while	  he	  was	  a	  
professor	  (Kennedy	  177-­‐178).	  He	  retired	  in	  89	  or	  90,	  and	  spent	  two	  years	  researching	  before	  he	  composed	  his	  
master	  work	  in	  93.	  Quintilian	  and	  Cicero	  thus	  are	  notable	  not	  only	  for	  their	  treatises	  on	  rhetorical	  theory,	  but	  for	  
their	  acumen	  and	  familiarity	  with	  forensic	  rhetoric.	  Quintilian,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  treatise	  in	  Book	  12,	  “catalogues	  the	  
orator’s	  duties:	  to	  protect	  the	  innocent,	  defend	  the	  truth,	  deter	  criminal	  behavior,	  inspire	  the	  military,	  and	  in	  
general	  inspire	  the	  citizen	  body”	  (Conley	  39).	  	  
16 
Roman intellectuals who would have formerly studied to be jurists, in an environment of 
growing imperial absolutism and disintegration of the Pax Romana (32). Augustine of Hippo, in 
the early fifth century, partially salvaged rhetoric’s reputation by applying rhetorical techniques 
to the reading, preaching, and defense of early Christianity. Since then, rhetoric has been both 
loved and despised as a tool of persuasion. While some decried the decay of eloquence, others 
dismissed rhetoric as a type of hollow (yet deceptively beguiling) speech.  
The later medieval period saw the birth of universities and other learning centers, 
including cathedral schools and monasteries. The clerics of this period struggled with what to do 
with rhetoric and other sources of pagan learning. Ironically, a Muslim solved the Christian 
theologians’ dilemma. Averroes, a twelfth-century philosopher from Spain, suggested that Greek 
philosophy was compatible with theology and that where two truths seemed apparently to 
contradict, the religious truth was to be seen as an allegory.2 This notion allowed for the 
acceptance of Greek thinking in Medieval Europe, and Averroes’ writing became much more 
popular in Christian Europe than in the Muslim world (Knowles 200-02). At the twelfth century 
school of Chartres in France, theologians began to apply Biblical exegesis to pagan sources, thus 
incorporating ante gratia3 philosophers into the Christian cosmology and salvation history. In the 
thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas took Averroes’ ideas and further developed the 
                                                
 
2	  Averroes	  also	  creates	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  types	  of	  believers,	  wherein	  the	  simple	  ones	  can	  look	  to	  religion	  to	  
understand	  things	  and	  the	  most	  complex	  ones	  need	  “absolute	  demonstration”	  through	  philosophy	  (qtd.	  in	  
Knowles	  201).	  Although	  such	  a	  view	  invites	  the	  acceptance	  of	  philosophy,	  it	  also	  perpetuates	  the	  subordination	  of	  
the	  masses	  to	  class-­‐perpetuating	  religious	  proscriptions,	  i.e.	  the	  serfs	  enduring	  hardship	  and	  postponing	  their	  
corporeal	  gratification	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  reward	  in	  afterlife.	  
3	  Ante	  gratia	  translates	  as	  “before	  grace.”	  These	  philosophers	  included	  anyone	  born	  or	  writing	  BCE,	  as	  they	  had	  
not	  had	  the	  opportunity	  for	  salvation.	  Plato,	  Aristotle,	  Cicero.	  Early	  Christianity	  wrestled	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  including	  
their	  teachings	  in	  Christian	  theological	  works	  but	  eventually	  excluded	  them.	  The	  return	  of	  their	  works	  to	  
educational	  canons	  signaled	  an	  opening	  up	  to	  a	  greater	  field	  of	  ideas.	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compatibility of Aristotle’s natural law with Christianity (Law 44-45).  Through this surge of 
humanism, schools taught rhetoric as one of the seven liberal arts.  
In Medieval Europe, the classic Ciceronian division of rhetoric into three purposes 
(declamatory, epideictic, and forensic) was further dropped and replaced with an emphasis on 
preaching and clerical communication. Some modern scholars have attempted to understand how 
rhetoric persisted through an age of sacerdotal4 suspicion. For example, James J. Murphy 
highlights letter writing, poetry, and preaching as three of the most important medieval uses of 
rhetoric. Murphy’s edited collection Medieval Eloquence gives scholars an opportunity to posit a 
variety of different types and uses of rhetoric in this time period. Nevertheless, Murphy 
demonstrates a clear dominance of the how-to guides of Latin instruction. These manuals were 
all clearly instructive in nature and used in contemporary scholastic settings. On the other hand, 
George A. Kennedy in his chapter “The Survival of Classical Rhetoric from Late Antiquity to the 
Middle Ages” discusses rhetoric’s new Christian use in “interpreting the Bible, in preaching, and 
in ecclesiastical disputation” and includes treatises on grammar (271). Due to this shifting 
subject matter covered in medieval rhetoric, scholars struggle to delineate the boundaries of 
medieval rhetoric but also enjoy the flexibility in genre offered by the field. 
In the Middle Ages, rhetoric was not only an interpretative hermeneutic but also a 
process of creating handbooks for composition and, on occasion, moral behavior. These skills 
were called ars5 in Latin. The Latin tradition of rhetoric infiltrated a wide variety of social 
                                                
 
4	  Sacerdotal	  indicates	  “relating	  to	  priests	  and	  the	  priesthood”	  
5	  Ars	  is	  the	  Latin	  equivalent	  of	  Aristotle’s	  techne,	  the	  Greek	  translation	  for	  “skill	  or	  craft,”	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  
knowledge,	  particularly	  in	  Aristotle’s	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  Rhetoric	  for	  Aristotle	  was	  an	  example	  of	  techne.	  In	  his	  
dialogue	  The	  Phaedrus,	  Plato	  used	  the	  phrase	  logon	  techne,	  meaning	  “art	  of	  speech”	  (Kennedy	  30),	  and	  Isocrates	  
also	  discusses	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  techne	  (Kennedy	  48).	  In	  Quintilian’s	  theory,	  as	  Kennedy	  observes,	  he	  introduces	  “the	  
idea	  of	  ars	  (theory),	  artifex	  (speaker),	  and	  opus	  (the	  work	  of	  art).	  In	  the	  Institutes	  of	  Oratory,	  “books	  3	  through	  11	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discourse, from educational to spiritual to artistic. Ars dictamins instructed students how to write 
letters (Murphy 4). Examples include Alberic of Monte Cassino’s Flores rhetorici and 
Anonymous of Bologna’s 1135 Rationes dictandi (3). Grammar and rhetoric had also become 
very blended by this time, partly because so much of the study of each was devoted to analysis of 
language, the former syntactically and the latter perhaps more figuratively. Grammar handbooks, 
or ars grammatica, were popular as instructional tools, and many modern scholars tend to lump 
this genre in with rhetoric. Alexander de Ville’s 1199 Doctrinale and Evrard of Bethune’s 1212 
Graecismus partially supplanted older, reliable grammars from Donatus (4th century Rome, “the 
most famous of all Latin grammarians, according to Kennedy, 274) and Priscian (6th century 
Rome, the author of the standard textbook for the study of Latin; Kennedy 281) (xx). Grammar 
was subdivided into ars prosaicum (prose writing), ars rithmica (the study of rhythm or meter), 
and ars poetria (poetry).  The instruction of poetry overlapped with the study of rhetorical 
devices in the late Middle Ages because of its intense scrutiny of diction and figurative language 
(xxi). Famous examples of poetry manuals include Matthew of Vendome’s Ars versificatoria 
and Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria nova.   
Not only did medieval rhetorical manuals provide compositional instruction, but they also 
provided moral instruction. In addition to the interpretive guidance of exegesis, already described 
above, attention was also given to the arrangement and oratorical techniques of preaching a 
homily. The ars praedicandi were textbooks clerics wrote to help themselves and other preachers 
properly create and perform sermons. Examples include Robert of Basevorn’s c. 1322 Forma 
praedicandi and Alain de Lille’s Summa de arte praedicatoria (Murphy 111). Such conduct 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
deal	  with	  the	  ars”	  (Kennedy	  183).	  In	  Roman	  Rhetoric,	  ars	  typically	  translates	  as	  “art,”	  indicating	  a	  system	  that	  can	  
be	  taught,	  and	  was	  used	  with	  rhetoric	  and	  poetry	  and	  other	  genres,	  including	  preaching	  and	  letter-­‐writing.	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literature followed students to their deaths, as is evidenced by the existence of ars moriendi, 
instructions on how to die well, from the fifteenth century. 
Authors always wrote these guides, scholastic or spiritual, in Latin. Therefore, no matter 
the topic of instruction, the audiences either had to be educated in Latin or clergy had to interpret 
the texts for others. In this way strict control of education and behavior was maintained through 
the adherence to Latin. Charles Barber notes that certain groups fought hard for the continuance 
of Latin for certain domains of knowledge or occupations because their “professional monopoly 
depended on excluding ordinary people from the mysteries of their art” (177). While he cites 
doctors as an example, it is easy to see how the same philosophy could be applied to lawyers as a 
professional class and to the field of forensic rhetoric. Medieval rhetoricians were primarily 
clerical, though sometimes lay, educators or theologians, who would not benefit through 
dismantling the institutions that brought them knowledge, power, and prestige. Of course, all of 
this began to change in the later middle ages with the rise of the national vernaculars. Thusly 
ends the history of medieval rhetoric—or so the story goes. 
1.2   Critical Perspective 
To say that there is no current understanding of alternative forms of medieval rhetoric is 
an overstatement, but comparatively speaking, there is very little supported work in medieval 
rhetoric. There has been significant work done both in identifying a continuance of classical 
thought into the medieval era and in searching for new conceptions of rhetoric outside of the 
classical tradition. In terms of the former, some anthologies reprint or translate medieval 
interpretations or commentaries on classical rhetoric from the likes of Macrobius, Boethius, 
Isidore of Seville, and Bede, to name only a few (Murphy; Conley; Bizzell and Herzberg). Other 
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critics like Janie Steen have looked to Old English literature to find evidence of classical learning 
in the demonstration of rhetorical devices such as figures of speech and thought.   
Contrarily, scholars at times have presented alternative taxonomies6 of rhetoric outside of 
Aristotle’s classical deliberative, forensic, and epideictic divisions. The recovery work of these 
scholars in the history of rhetoric offers a precedent to claiming previously overlooked texts and 
genres as evidence of rhetorical thought and writing.  For example, James J. Murphy has 
assembled a collection of handbooks that suggests the invention or further development of 
rhetorical traditions of instruction on letter writing and poetics as well as the aforementioned 
homiletics. Moreover, he edits a collection of essays that explores a mixture of traditional and 
speculative rhetorical genres, such as logic, commentary, and grammar, and then looks for their 
application in a variety of linguistic and cultural traditions. Joseph M. Miller presents an 
anthology of medieval rhetorical works that includes evidence of the continuation of classical 
genres as well as the development of the newer genres proposed by Murphy. Scott D. Troyan 
edits a collection that examines composition instruction, invention, and other traces of classical 
rhetoric in medieval poetry manuals, works of personal devotion, book introductions, poetic and 
prose literature (particularly that of Chaucer and Sir Gawain), and pastoral manuals. Patricia 
Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, in the first edition of their canonical The Rhetorical Tradition 
(1990), only included Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, Boethius’s An Overview on the 
                                                
 
6	  I	  use	  taxonomy	  here	  to	  mean	  classification	  of	  sources,	  whether	  geographical,	  chronological,	  and	  based	  on	  subject	  
matter.	  Taxonomy	  requires	  the	  criteria	  for	  selection	  as	  well	  as	  the	  categorization	  and	  arrangement	  of	  the	  
selections.	  Bizzell/Herzberg,	  for	  example,	  us	  a	  traditional	  criteria	  of	  selection,	  anything	  that	  falls	  within	  the	  five	  
classical	  parts	  of	  rhetoric,	  such	  as	  invention,	  arrangement,	  delivery,	  and	  the	  present	  the	  selection	  in	  a	  
chronological	  order,	  divided	  by	  historical	  time	  periods.	  While	  my	  study	  will	  also	  travel	  chronologically,	  the	  criteria	  
of	  selection	  has	  been	  broadened	  to	  include	  writing	  that	  is	  persuasive	  by	  intent	  of	  the	  author.	  	  Laura	  Gray-­‐
Rosendale	  and	  Sibylle	  Gruber	  argue	  that	  rhetoric	  in	  a	  given	  time	  and	  place	  reflects	  a	  value	  system,	  and	  exposing	  
that	  system	  is	  where	  much	  of	  the	  value	  is	  within	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  history	  of	  rhetoric	  (2).	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Structure of Rhetoric, Anonymous’ The Principles of Letter Writing, and Robert of Basevorn’s 
The Form of Preaching for the section on Medieval Rhetoric, jumping from the end of antiquity 
in the fourth and fifth centuries, to the twelfth century.  In their second edition, published in 
2001, they expand the Medieval section to examine letter writing, poetry, and homiletics, and 
they further include works from Christine de Pizan (fifteenth century), in order to show the 
eloquence of medieval women and how they used rhetoric to effectively argue their moral and 
literary positions. Yet, Bizzell/Herzberg continue to overlook the periods between Augustine and 
Boethius and the 11th century, conveying the idea that no notable work in rhetoric occurred 
during the early Middle Ages.  
Too often the story of rhetoric during the Middle Ages either strengthens the triumphal 
and monolithic history of the Christian church, or it does the opposite, wherein classical 
knowledge and wisdom, including rhetoric, are submerged under a thousand-year sea of 
darkness, anchored by the authoritarianism of the church and unceasing waves of savage 
barbarians. These two opposing descriptions neither fit nor serve a constructive purpose; the 
story of rhetoric is much more complex. Existing typological studies of medieval rhetoric keep 
rhetoric in a narrow channel of possible fields. To better understand the medieval usage of 
rhetoric as a domain of knowledge and persuasive heuristic, we need to re-envision the re-
emergence of rhetoric in the late Middle Ages as a continuance of traditions that endured 
throughout the previous centuries, as well as a convergence of new and metamorphosed ideas. 
After all, as Ronald L. Jackson II points out, to envision Greece as the beginning of rhetoric is 
itself flawed: "We need to recognize that rhetoric did not emanate in Greece or Rome. How 
could it unless of course the origins of humankind can be found in Greece or Rome, or unless we 
are willing to concede that no human being held the capacity to think, to organize ideas, or to 
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compose arguments prior to Greeks and Romans?" (Octalog III 117). In support of a revision of 
the chronology of rhetoric, I begin in Egypt to discuss the origin of law. While I focus initially 
on the territory of the received canon of rhetoric, I quickly shift to other regional centers such as 
Alexandria, France, and England.  
Indeed, rhetoric is not solely the collected body and tradition of rhetoric and its 
instruction as inherited from Greece and Rome. There are many other sources to find rhetoric, 
ideas about it and its usage in legal and other venues, such as continued systems of education, 
composition on rhetoric, laws, transcriptions of legal cases, synods, councils, noble edicts, and 
more, though these sources are not always neatly defined and presented as rhetoric. C. H. 
Lawrence pronounces “Some muffled echoes of the debate can be heard” (79), and the job of the 
historian of rhetoric is to listen and try to make out the words. As an example, in James J. 
Murphy’s analysis of various medieval instruction manuals (or ars) on letter writing, poetry, and 
preaching, which he labels rhetorical arts, he also offers an expanded definition: “If one defines 
‘rhetoric’ as a set of precepts that provide a definite method or plan for speaking and writing, 
then each of these medieval arts can be called ‘rhetorical.’ One of the authors called himself a 
grammarian, a second was a theologian, and the third was dictator in a Bolognese school. 
Nevertheless, each one, in his own way, shared in the Greco-Roman preceptive tradition …” 
(viii). Here Murphy is finding and defending new sources for classical rhetoric, while he also 
allows for any kind of instruction regarding discourse to be an appropriate source for rhetorical 
exploration. There is value in expanding on Murphy’s approach, selecting sources that 
demonstrate discursive argument as new forms of rhetoric, yet it is necessary to go beyond the 
search for traces of the Greco-Roman tradition as well. Murphy describes medieval rhetoric as 
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“the Western perceptive tradition,” and he stresses the diversity and selective pragmatism of 
medieval rhetors within this received tradition:  
… the writers of letters fastened upon certain rhetorical doctrines: preachers of 
sermons selected still others, and even the grammarians compounded the original 
expansion of Donatus by broadening their field of studies. The basic principle of 
medieval rhetoric is a frank pragmatism, making highly-selective use of ideas 
from the past for the needs of the present. (xiv) 
Murphy indicates that Medieval writers were practical and applied and expanded rhetoric for 
their purposes, so he advocates for expanding the canon of rhetoric to include these innovative 
sources. Such diversification is rightly necessary in the search for new, inventive resources as 
they reflect a more realistic use of rhetoric in historical periods beyond the copying and 
interpretation of classical sources. 
1.3   Methods and Methodology 
As Sharon Crowley suggests, "We undertake our work with pedagogical goals in mind;" 
(Politics 7). While teaching argument in composition classes, I began delving into different ways 
to analyze court cases, teaching students how to find the issues at hand and to make their cases, 
when I recognized that very little training was given in school for this civic responsibility and 
practical need in life. Stasis theory provided an initial avenue into this exploration and I adapted 
it to the composition classroom, utilizing television court shows and excursions to local 
magistrate courts.  
I noticed that plaintiffs and defendants both often lacked the skills to argue effectively in 
a judicial context. Actors were able to argue about morality, ethical behavior, and basic rights, 
but somehow, they had been given no framework to fit these ideas constructively into a 
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framework for legal effectiveness. Judicial power had been relegated to official professionals, 
such as lawyers and judges, with the occasional exception of juries, who had to have legal rules 
and responsibility briefly explained to them beforehand, case by case. When so much of modern 
life involves legal duties, I thought it preposterous that these skills were not being taught. It is 
highly likely that students will buy a home, evict a tenant or be evicted themselves, sue another 
individual or be sued by them, face civil or criminal charges, or sign a myriad of contracts 
throughout their lives, many of which could be performed without a lawyer. 
These thoughts led me to wonder where and when the right to argue for oneself had been 
taken away, rhetoric entirely professionalized as a costly service, and whether that right had ever 
existed. It became clearer that knowledge of rhetoric had been subsumed in a long, historical 
power struggle. Other historians of rhetoric have certainly made this observation as well. James 
Berlin strategizes that historians of rhetoric “explore the relationship of discourse and power, a 
rhetoric again being a set of rules that privilege particular power relations.... Since a rhetoric is 
best understood in its difference from other rhetorics, from competing versions of normal 
discourse, it reveals the conflicts of an historical moment" (Politics 12). The study of the history 
of rhetoric clarifies history itself, so by tracing the history of argumentation, I hope to establish a 
foothold for further research for my own scholarship and that of others, point readers to 
additional sources and debates, and promote instruction on the matter so that some ability can be 
returned to popular learning, at least for those less complicated and common legal matters. 
Richard Leo Enos advocates that “the diversity of approaches in rhetorical criticism 
illustrates the expansiveness of rhetoric. That is, we see now that rhetoric operates in a variety of 
dimensions and ways that were unforeseen by the traditional methods of classical rhetorical 
criticism” (“Classical Rhetoric” 364). There are many ways to approach the history of rhetoric, 
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all useful in creating a better understanding of the past and its application to the present. In this 
study, I focus on both classic and overlooked written rhetorical texts along with their propagation 
and methods of transmission in order to investigate the intentionality in stages of the process as 
well as to delineate who had access to them. I move chronologically to select key historical 
moments in rhetoric, and in each historical period I pinpoint authors, sources, or events that 
demonstrate its continuance and theoretical innovation, uncovering the roots of the field. Robert 
J. Connors challenges that the history of rhetoric is important, "As a field, we need connection 
with roots. Rhetorical history can provide those roots, that self-definition" (232). Connors also 
offers that the history of rhetoric provides "hard knowledge," historical facts, and proof (232). 
Legal historian Adriaan Lanni extends Connors’ point by arguing that the history of rhetoric, 
because of its broad focus on society and institutions, is even more constructive than traditional 
historical approaches: “The Athenian courts can tell us something about the “Athenian mind” 
that is more than the historian’s convenient fiction: the product of many generations and many 
hands may bear the imprint of the collective more deeply than that of any individual’s work …” 
(5). Therefore, I follow the intersections of historical socio-political movements, philosophy, and 
religion, in order to illuminate further which social groups held rhetorical power and access to 
legal systems and other rhetorical avenues of persuasion in order to seek out those roots and the 
hard knowledge we need in order to create historical narratives. 
In the field of History, Edward Said’s postcolonial Orientalism encouraged historians to 
look beyond the narratives of the historical victors and to examine history from the perspective 
of the oppressed, whose stories were often obscured and overlooked. Similarly, back to the field 
of Rhetoric, Malea Powell submits, "We have to learn to rely on rhetorical understandings 
different from that singular, inevitable origin story" (Octalog III 122). In agreement with that 
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methodology, my study does not show a continuous path; rather it shows peripheral, parochial, 
and overlooked, albeit still European, cultures appropriating or creating their own rhetorics. 
Historian Benedict Anderson’s 1981 Imagine Communities examined various nations and 
geographies as mythical entities, socially constructed ideas passed along through generations. 
While some actors within these entities purposefully sought to create and promote these ideas for 
political purposes, the reality was that populations living with them were unaware or less 
essentially bound to these political constructs. Subsequent generations began to believe these 
fabricated histories, often gaining a sense of belonging and identity through their association 
with them and their othering process against those they wished to exclude. The creation and 
promotion of these social constructs for political purposes is exactly the power rhetoric had as 
well and what I seek to draw out in my research. Frankly, envisioning a Golden Age of rhetoric 
in Classical Athens would be an imagined history. Therefore, influenced by postcolonialism, I 
embrace multilinear narratives and focus on the periphery and the overlooked, as I approach the 
history of rhetoric.  
Robert J. Connors asks, "Why did the culture and the writing teachers of the periods 
covered need and demand such teaching tools as the modes? What did that say about their 
culture?" (238). Similarly, Nan Johnson speaks to the raw uncovering of humanity and lost ideas 
that is possible in exploring the history of rhetoric: "Intellectual curiosity-Inquiry- Discovery-
Who were we then?" (Octalog II  24). I ask precisely the same sort of questions—I want to know 
who these people were and what their ideas were. James Berlin illustrates how important it is to 
have a mimetic understanding of sociopolitical movements in the time and place of a particular 
text, indicating: 
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Rhetoric, any rhetoric, ought to be situated within the economic, social, and political 
conditions of its historical moment, if it is to be understood. A rhetoric is a set of rules 
that attempts to naturalize-an ideology-to make one particular arrangement of economic, 
social, and political conditions appear to be inevitable and ineluctable, inscribed in the 
very nature of things. To understand a rhetoric, it is thus necessary to examine its position 
in the play of power in its own time. (Octalog 11) 
Everything about a historical text can be deconstructed by its relationship to power, such as the 
rhetorical situation of the author, what influenced the author, who it challenged, how it was 
promoted, why it endured over time, and so on. While the evidence gathered is never exhaustive, 
every idea gleaned from this sort of investigation can be used as threads in a new narrative and to 
add to the bodies of narratives. Like Nan Johnson promotes, I want to do more than present 
evidence; I am trying to tell a story, to craft the history of rhetoric into a narrative (Octalog II  9-
10). Similarly, Jay Dolmage, too, sees the value in the accumulation of constructed narratives, 
the product of which are new super-narratives: "My own perspectives are the creative and 
sometimes conscious layering of other people’s stories and ideas. When I can do this with some 
cunning and ingenuity, I am doing my job as a rhetorical historian" (Octalog III 113). This is a 
good way to describe my approach to the secondary sources and scholarship on the topics to 
follow. Recovering, closely reading, and layering historical narratives produce the chain of being 
Richard Leo Enos calls for when he insists, “Works are best understood when viewed not as 
isolated and autonomous events but as intertextual, that even discrete texts are part of a 
diachronic chain of being” (“Recovering History” 14).  
Furthermore, I wish to add to the field of Composition by giving teachers and students 
new ways to look at argumentation and its historical uses. Connors insists, “The history of 
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rhetoric adds weight to the current field of composition, which can be seen as newer (Rhetorical 
History 233), drawing attention to the "uniquely troubled nature" (Rhetorical History 236) of the 
field. Richard Leo Enos applauds the development of new evidence and new sources, but he does 
not solely worry about their application to the classroom (Politics 8). With this sentiment I do 
not entirely agree. Although I personally get fascinated in these historical details, I do feel there 
needs to be application to, if not the classroom, then at least to personal and civic life skills—yet 
these are usually learned in the classroom. Robert Connors also touts the value of rhetoric 
beyond the classroom, "The rhetorical world is wider than the world of teaching composition" 
(Politics ?). Uncovering historical ideas about argumentation provides a good deal of knowledge 
to today even outside of the classroom, though surveys and teaching do seem to be the primary 
means of transmissions available for any new ideas along that line. Regardless of immediate 
relevance to the classroom, every newly discovered historical events, text, or methodology, is a 
stepping stone from which other scholars may build their own pedagogical applications.  
Connors says there is a "moral charge" to what you do with the field (Rhetorical History  
238), insisting, “What saves us from historicism in composition studies is what I will call, 
perhaps naively, our open and almost ingenuous desire to do some good in the world with our 
study and our teaching" (Rhetorical History 237). Likewise, my analysis is much more focused 
on what use can come from it rather than promoting my strict, biased interpretation. I point back 
to the exigence of my research, to improve the lives of students and help them find entry points 
into argumentation in their practical world in the overlooked area of legal civic activities. History 
of rhetoric accomplishes this better than most subjects. Connors reminds us, “History situates 
us—what we can and can't do and how people faced these questions before” (Rhetorical History 
239). What could be more useful for a student to learn? 
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The field of rhetoric embraces a variety of approaches to studying the history of rhetoric, 
even retelling known narratives through new perspectives or angles. Connors advocates a 
diversity in approaches of historians of rhetoric (Rhetorical History 231). Advocating a diversity 
in approaches of historians of rhetoric, Connors advocates, “I would never claim that any one of 
them can be studied in isolation or studied perfectly using only one methodology” (Rhetorical 
History 231).  Two entry points, expanded historical genres and historical points of innovation in 
rhetorical strategy, I find most useful in order to begin to gather new data through analysis of 
historical events and texts—to help myself and other scholars craft new interpretations and 
narratives about the history of rhetoric. Rhetoric existed beyond prescriptive texts like monastic 
rules and didactic texts like hagiography and underlies the sociopolitical power struggles and the 
rhetorical strategies agents used. Susan C. Jarrett says to look beyond rhetorical handbooks for 
students and to explore other fields and their dialogue with rhetoric (9), and I agree with this, 
although I still take stock in the handbooks, as they are clear evidence. I want to expand our 
thinking past the three Medieval rhetorics of Murphy and the conduct literature and look 
anywhere, in poetry and prose, for example. Not only are others genres besides traditional 
classical rhetorical sources such as handbooks as well as novel prescriptive genres, such as letter 
writing and homiletics, worthy of continued exploration but also other prescriptive genres of 
writing, such as hagiography, and non-prescriptive genres, such as the large body of Anglo-
Saxon literature, worthy of investigation. It is necessary to seek out the cultural transmission of 
forensic rhetorical strategies and settings and historical events that reveal innovative 
developments in rhetoric itself. These developments are revealed through strategies of actors, 
such as textual ethos, interpretive ethos, synods to establish heresy, scriptoriums, and typological 
comparisons. As Jan Swearingen feels, the field of rhetoric need to reclaim hidden traditions 
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(Octalog II 22) (though she is speaking of women's writers). I, too, feel traditions can be 
reclaimed through analyzing non-explicitly rhetorical sources, and even historical events and 
discourses around those events can be analyzed for rhetorical strategies. Dolmage emphasizes 
the extra-textual, "I see rhetorical history as the study not of just a selected archive of static 
documents or artifacts, but a study also, always of the negotiations, valences, shifting claims and 
refutations, canons and revisions that orbit any history" (Octalog III 113). And this speaks to the 
range and diversity within my scope. 
1.4   Arrangement 
I begin with an exploration of the foundations of forensic rhetoric. When possible in 
subsequent chapters, I focus on forensic rhetoric, but the sources are not always available to 
support the continuous focus on forensic rhetoric, and oftentimes, the innovation in rhetoric I 
wish to highlight is not necessarily found in a debate which would be considered classically 
forensic. To this end, the second chapter dispels any notion of a monolithic, altruistic, populist 
field of rhetoric in Classical Athens. Instead, I argue that forensic species of rhetoric, as a tool of 
legal persuasion, is inexorably linked to power and the maintenance of order in order to protect 
property. I explore how privileged elites create and perpetuate rhetoric as one of many 
institutional channels within which privileged elites obtain and preserve social cohesion.  
Robert J. Connors explains why it is important for historians of rhetoric to find where 
cultures in the past developed ideas and institutions to fit their circumstances, writing, 
""Historical study … tell[s] us how other persons in other times have set up their visions of the 
field, have asked and answered questions that seemed valuable to them, have shaped a discipline 
according to their perceived needs and cultural presuppositions" (236). I would agree and point 
to two significant Roman historical rhetoricians, Cicero and Quintilian, who steered rhetoric in a 
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new way as a reaction against what they perceived as harmful to their societies. In my third 
chapter, I suggest that during two stages of political crisis in the Roman Republic and later in the 
Roman Empire, Cicero, didactically, and Quintilian, defensively, adapted the Greek tradition of 
rhetoric by strengthening the influence of ethical appeals in rhetorical education. Both these 
phases of development have been studied before, but I wish to compare them together to create 
the narrative of the development of ethos as the springboard for the development of further 
innovative changes in rhetoric during the medieval period. 
Chapter 3 moves geographically and politically from Greece to the late Roman Empire 
and examines how authoritarian political dominance forces rhetors to shift to ethical appeals to 
avoid persecution. Chapter 4 centers on fourth and fifth century Alexandrian culture to trace how 
early Christian factions moved the focus of ethos from a person to a singular text, in order to 
gain prominence over their theological (and thus their political) adversaries. Innovations 
included textual ethos, consensus on interpretation of the textual authority, and claims of heresy 
as a rhetorical strategy to maintain control of said interpretation. Chapter 5 visits eighth century 
Carolingian France to discuss how the authors of empirical legitimacy in peripheral kingdoms 
used rhetoric to promote access to the authoritative ethical text, while expanding options for 
other textual ethical authorities. Innovations include typology and scriptora, which expands 
access to the text and its interpretation. Chapter 6 shows the application of applying close 
reading to overlooked genres to look for forensic rhetoric or for any of the rhetorical innovations 
described in the previous chapters.  
In the conclusion, I consider how the moves across appeal strategies reflected the further 
appropriation of rhetoric as a tool of power amongst shifting hegemonies. I also suggest how the 
information from these chapters can be used pedagogically as guideposts in designing and 
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teaching surveys and special topics courses to better understand how the history of rhetoric was 
affected by the so-called “Dark Ages,” rather than glossing over the period for expediency. 
Although scholars have explored rhetoric in places and periods throughout history, it is difficult 
to find a guiding narrative that strings this research together to help the student bridge the gap 
from classic to modern. Learning and knowledge does not disappear for one thousand years; the 
received story is too linear and shallow. Contrary to the traditional conception of rhetoric as 
having drastically declined in the Middle Ages, diverse sociolinguistic groups of medieval 
Europe instituted their own culturally-specific forms of rhetoric. Connors explains, “Meaningful 
historical writing must teach us what people in the past have wanted from literacy so that we 
may come to understand what we want" (Octalog I 7). Oftentimes, we often do not know what 
we want until we find it. 
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2   FEAR AND CONFIDENCE: FORENSIC RHETORIC AND SOCIAL COHESION IN 
CLASSICAL ATHENS 
Practitioners of rhetoric have attempted to see the origins of forensic rhetoric as a 
progressive system of reasoning and effective persuasion up to the collapse of the Roman 
Empire. Historians of rhetoric often brush over how the historical texts of the rhetorical canon 
constructed a system that privileges some actors over others in getting their desired judgments. 
Although early texts focus on the process and strategies of debating in a court, forensic rhetoric 
allowed for little popular participation, even in democratic Athens, where the sophists charged 
high fees to study rhetoric, and others hired themselves out as logographers, writing the speeches 
that other men delivered at trial. Only male citizens could bring lawsuits or appear in court, 
excluding all immigrants and slaves, but also those from lesser families and from lesser means. 
Thus, few could apply these skills, and regardless, the scales of justice were inherently weighted 
towards the privileged group maintaining control over their property.  
To demonstrate these less visible—and less clearly spoken—issues behind forensic 
debate, this chapter will hone in on Aristotelian rhetoric and its practical applications in the 
courts of fifth century B.C.E. Athens. In this context, forensic rhetoric elevated the elite citizens 
and suppressed non-citizen others by determining what people could do, what people could 
know, and who could belong. Participants, who could wield legal and political power, wished to 
reduce their social and economic fear and gain confidence in their safety (Lanni 1). Analyzing 
the constraints on legal conduct, knowledge, and participation within Classical forensic rhetoric 
disabuses romantic delusions of an idealized classical democracy or notions of an astoundingly 
wise age.  
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Fear drove action. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle reinforces the connection between fear and 
human behavior: “Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of 
an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain” (II.V. 1). Such evils must also be “near at hand 
and threatening.” Individuals are wary of the fear itself and watch for signs of things or events 
that “appear to have great power of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce great 
pain” (II.V.5). According to Aristotle, envy was the motivator of those who had less. He 
cautions, “Those who have spent much envy those who have only spent a little to attain the same 
thing” (II.X.7-10). He described how the capability, hatred, and anger of individuals created the 
scenario for danger and how even society could cause such distress through institutional 
conditions that promote the possibility of injustice.  
Confidence was the goal for those in power. Empowered citizenry, the elite, sought 
confidence that they would be free from harm or loss or property. Confidence implied not just a 
lack of injustice but also freedom from fear of those injustices. Aristotle described confidence in 
opposite terms from his framing of fear, “… so that the hope of what is salutary is accompanied 
by an impression that it is quite near at hand, while the things to be feared are either non-existent 
or far off” (I.V 17-21). In fifth century BCE Athens, rhetoricians assisted in this endeavor by 
crafting strategies to decrease fear and raise confidence among the public. Law as an institution 
and forensic rhetoric as a learned skill provided a sense of safety and public good, at least at the 
surface level. 
For understanding human judgment and human actions, Athens, Greece, was unique in 
establishing criminal and civil trials and an elaborate court system that included judges, juries, 
and citizens acting as prosecutors and defenders. Other ancient cultures had law codes and used 
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judges and witnesses, but Greece invented forensic rhetoric.7 The tragic playwright Aeschylus 
created the mythical origins of jury trials in his drama, The Eumenides. In the play, the third in 
the Oresteia trilogy (458 BCE), Apollo defends Orestes, who upon Apollo’s order has avenged 
the murder of his father Agamemnon, at the hands of his mother, Clytemnestra, by killing her. 
Prosecuted by the Furies, Athena chooses twelve men to be jurors and establishes the tradition of 
the jury trial, with herself as judge, ultimately converting the Furies into the Eumenides, “The 
Kindly Ones,” by the skillful use of rhetoric, which undoes the cycle of physical violence, 
replacing it with reason and justice. Athena and Apollo represent the new Athens, particularly its 
democratic form of government and the role of poetry and rhetoric within it, while the Furies 
represent the old ways and the older deities and generations.  
This democratic approach to judgment seems objective and altruistic. Isocrates discussed 
how, indeed, the institutions of a society, such as law and the arts, separate mankind from the 
other animals (Parrish 15). But while there was a nobility of purpose in providing courts of law 
where disagreements in a community may be settled, these courts aimed at what were likely 
impossible ideals. Truth is elusive, rhetoric is the available means of persuasion, dealing with 
probabilities, not necessarily discovery of truth—one of the reasons Plato was so suspicious of it. 
Human judgment is inevitably subjective, and unfortunately, court rulings are often politically or 
personally motivated as is the rhetorical art of gaining these judgments. Furthermore, moral and 
legal justice are not the same. Therefore, forensic rhetoric has much to do with maintaining 
societal cohesion, made evident through the Athenian court system, the privileging of elites, the 
nature of forensic rhetoric, and the inherent structure of jurisprudence. 
                                                
 
7	  For	  context,	  George	  Tridimas	  writes,	  “The	  direct	  democracy	  of	  ancient	  Athens	  emerged	  in	  508	  with	  the	  
Cleisthenes	  reforms	  that	  transferred	  policy	  making	  power	  from	  the	  landed	  aristocracy	  to	  the	  Athenian	  demos”	  
(102).	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Societal cohesion is the maintenance of the political and cultural structures that preserve 
the social stratification of a particular time and place. In addition, societal cohesion preserves the 
status quo, protects the property of the wealthy and the prestige of the privileged, and also 
prevents internal conflicts that might threaten to disrupt the system, such as civil war or rapid 
movement vertically through the system. In addition, cohesion creates strong cultural identity to 
protect the internal system from outside influence or inward migration of groups wishing access 
to that system. Adriaan Lanni explains a dominant scholarly view on the subject, that law courts 
and the forensic rhetoric used within them focused on extra-legal issues and were “not aimed 
chiefly at the final resolution of the dispute or the discovery of truth; rather, the courts provided 
an arena for the parties to publicly define, contest, and evaluate their social relations to one 
another, and the hierarchies of their society” (1). Legal accusations could have political purposes, 
such as to disgrace a political figure publicly or undermine opposing policies. Furthermore, 
accusations could also be used more personally to discredit rivals. Courts were, in practice, 
vehicles for exclusive actors to preserve their status and property and rank themselves against 
each other.  
2.1   Law in the Athenian Courts 
The Classical Athenian legal system developed to provide societal order. The first such 
attempt to seek justice and order was the creation of narrative mythos, which had the intent of 
passing along an assumed divine law. Mythos, the imaginative tales of the actions of gods, was 
the first type of knowledge the Greeks used to explain the world around them as well as human 
activity. The mythic gods brought law and order to the world. Mythos, meaning plot or sequence 
of events, passed wisdom along culturally. For example, King Sisyphus is punished with endless 
labor in Hades for his craftiness and thus serves as a warning to other treacherous politicians. 
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Rhetoric even appeared in the literature of mythos. As Kennedy and Walker argue, the poetry of 
Homer and Hesiod, and even Sappho, mention rhetoric and persuasion, as well as demonstrate its 
power in language and actions.   
In the third through first millennia BCE, cultures outside of Greece were also evolving, 
and possibly influencing each other. Ancient Egypt had a legal system and law books. Although 
none of those books remain, Egyptians personified Ma’at, a principle of order and justice, as a 
Goddess. The idea of a divine order she represented was eventually codified into law (Andrews). 
Elsewhere, Jack R. Lundbom shows how Hebrew rhetoric is recorded from Deuteronomy to 
Jeremiah from the eighth to the sixth century BCE. Once writing is introduced into Greece in the 
eighth century BCE, laws, whether considered human, natural, or divine, were some of the first 
ideas written down (Carey 2).  
Logos was a development arising out of mythos and eventually evolving into gnosis and 
nomos, although when the Older Greek Sophists used logos in their texts it meant everything 
including words, language, knowledge and speech (Bizzell/Herzberg 4; Kennedy 11). By the 
time of Aristotle’s rhetoric, logos specifically referred to reason and rational thinking, as well as 
“logical argument,” and it used deductive and inductive reasoning to explain events less 
metaphysically. Logos also used invention to create arguments based in probability (Kennedy 3). 
Within the realm of Ancient Greek philosophy and religion, knowledge was still characterized by 
its relationship to order and to nature, and continued to provide contrast between the divine and 
the human. According to classics scholar Karen Carr, “The Greeks often thought of the world as 
being a fight, or an agon, between the two forces of rationalism and chaos, or between law and 
nature. The Greeks called these two forces ‘nomos’, meaning law and order and rationalism, and 
‘physis,’ meaning nature.”  
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Nomos also indicates control, while physis describes forces and emotions beyond human 
control. Nomos was personified as the daimon, or spirit of the law, often attributed as the father 
of the goddess Dike, who embodied justice, moral order, conventional rules, and right-doing 
(“Dike”). Laurent Pernot also notices that physis can mean natural ability or talent, “a natural 
gift,” while episteme can indicate “learning” (219). Nomos was the label given to rhetorical 
exercises where students wrote a speech proposing a new law (Pernot 148). Dike as a term and a 
goddess represented human or man-made laws, while her mother Themis was the deity for divine 
order, natural laws and customs, and fairness. Themis from Ancient Greece led to Iusticia 
(Justistia), or “Lady Justice,” in Ancient Roman mythology. Accordingly, Themis: 
was the Titan goddess of divine law and order--the traditional rules of conduct first 
established by the gods. She was also a prophetic goddess who presided over the most 
ancient oracles, including Delphoi (Delphi). In this role, she was the divine voice 
(themistes) who first instructed mankind in the primal laws of justice and morality, such 
as the precepts of piety, the rules of hospitality, good governance, conduct of assembly, 
and pious offerings to the gods. In Greek, the word themis referred to divine law, those 
rules of conduct long established by custom. Unlike the word nomos, the term was not 
usually used to describe laws of human decree. (“Themis”) 
Dike’s siblings included Peace and Good Order. Dike, as one of the horae, “watched the deeds 
of man.” In an Orphic hymn, “She was the enemy of all falsehood, and the protectress of a wise 
administration of justice” (theoi.com). The three sisters together personified the stability 
Athenians desired. However, Adriaan Lanni urges a more human fabrication, “Although the 
Athenians liked to tell themselves that their legal system and laws were the product of single 
intelligence—‘the lawgiver’ of the distant past—Athenian court procedures developed from a 
39 
combination of laws passed at different times by the popular assembly and an accumulation of 
custom and practice” (4). For this reason, law reveals much more about the collective desires and 
needs of a culture than a rhetorical handbook written by one author; although, both the 
collectively imagined history of the culture and the historical artifacts of the civilization reveal 
useful information. 
Once law was institutionalized and written down in Greece, rhetors debated the motive of 
law, the object of the courts, and the purpose of forensic rhetoric. Forensic rhetoric developed as 
a skill with which to navigate within and win cases in the court system. Aristotle says the object 
of forensic rhetoric was “genuine justice” (Rhetoric I.XV), but there were actually many objects. 
For example, the purpose in homicide law in Athens was revenge, purification, and deterrence. 
In homicide cases, the killed person was considered to have been done a wrong that required 
revenge or retribution (MacDowell 1). One responsibility of the courts was to “free the state of 
the pollution incurred by the homicide” (3). In addition, there was a duty of the family of the 
killed person to seek revenge, through the courts or otherwise, and it was a religious offence to 
forsake this duty (3). Failure to take vengeance by the family could be prosecuted legally as well 
under the charge of impiety: “You will thus achieve three good things: you will diminish the 
number of future criminals, you will increase the number of god-fearing men, and you will free 
yourselves from the pollution which this man has brought upon you” (Antiphon qtd. in 
MacDowell 5, 9).8 This pollution was not only spiritual, a kind of curse or sin, but also physical, 
as it had the potential to lead to revenge and unrest. 
                                                
 
8	  Sophocles’	  Antigone	  examines	  the	  contradictions	  within	  this	  system	  when	  divine	  law	  interferes	  with	  human	  law.	  
Antigone	  loses	  her	  rights	  because	  she	  follows	  familial	  responsibility	  and	  divine	  law,	  but	  the	  play	  demonstrates	  that	  
the	  man-­‐made	  law	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  king,	  was	  at	  fault.	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Although some written laws were written on stones and available to the public, the rules 
and structure of the courts of Athens were complicated and geared towards the more powerful 
sector of Athenian society. Unusual for this historical period, large juries decided cases, led by 
an administrative archon. Lanni describes the makeup of the court system, “… the Athenian 
hostility towards professionalism resulted in the expectation that private parties initiate lawsuits 
and, with some exceptions, represent themselves in court” (31). The division of the court system 
into two parts was based on who had been harmed; there were private cases (dikai) and public 
cases (graphai) (35). Since the system was designed by and for the propertied classes, much 
attention was given to preventing and recuperating from theft. Court cases could also be 
politically charged: the citizenship status and charges of impiety could be used politically to 
exert force or power against enemies and to create a stronger sense of identity to individuals 
belonging within certain privileged groups. Lanni agrees “some litigants were undoubtedly 
motivated by a desire to gain honor on a public stage” but that “social or ideological functions” 
were not the primary function of such extra-legal argumentation (44).9 Christopher Carey 
demonstrates that courts were originally and increasingly more political in nature, even allowing 
for legislative actions to be brought up for review if they were said to be in contrast to previous 
laws (4-5). He divides the court systems of Classical Athens into distinct systems that dealt 
primarily with cases involving homicide, assault and wounding, property, commerce, and 
citizenship. There was little enforcement or prosecution run by the state, so trials relied on 
private initiative. The legal system reflected the direct democracy of the government in that 
                                                
 
9	  However,	  elsewhere	  Lanni	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  court	  system	  failed	  to	  provide	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  justice	  on	  its	  own	  as	  	  
“Publicity	  provided	  accountability	  for	  litigants'	  out-­‐of-­‐	  court	  behavior:	  the	  courts	  provided	  a	  venue	  for	  litigants	  
publicly	  to	  shame	  their	  opponents	  for	  wrongdoing.	  This	  informal	  enforcement	  of	  norms	  was	  important	  to	  
maintaining	  order	  in	  Athens	  because	  it	  compensated	  for	  systematic	  under-­‐enforcement	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  
state	  prosecution	  and	  enforcement	  mechanisms”	  (“Publicity”	  119).	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participation was limited to male citizens. Trials, both amateur and popular, were publicly 
viewable and provided some amount of spectacle and entertainment as well for the public 
(Lanni, “Publicity” 119-120). A wronged party could pursue legal action by making a 
proclamation, or possibly an arrest if relevant, to the courts. The litigant would gather evidence 
and there was a preliminary hearing. If arbitration could not settle the dispute, the case went to 
trial by jury. Juries were made up of citizens chosen through an elaborate process. Litigants gave 
oral speeches and presented testimony to sway the jury. Judges presided over the proceedings. 
Majority vote by the jurors decided the outcome of a case, and generally, the punishment was 
already set by law or agreed upon by the litigants (Lanni, “Law” 31-39). 
The homicide courts of Athens show what steered actors in this arena and illustrate the 
complexity of the broader court system, the design of which ensured compliance of beneficiaries 
and excluded non-participants.10 Some homicidal action was allowed, as evidenced by the 
existence of the concept of unintentional homicide, like death in an athletic contest, dying in the 
care of a doctor, or self-defense in a fight, and of lawful killing, such as fighting off a 
highwayman, defending oneself against a brigand, or the justified killing of an adulterer if the 
husband caught him inside the house with his wife, as in the case by Lysias on the murder of 
Eratosthenes, defending Euphiletos (Falkner). Any of these exceptional acts of killing had to be 
immediate and performed by the one being wronged, for example the owner of the property. 
Others justified acts allowed one to act officially on the part of the community, such as punishing 
                                                
 
10	  The	  broad	  divisions	  of	  the	  law	  itself	  are	  often	  relevant	  to	  note	  as	  well,	  whether	  there	  are	  commercial	  suits,	  
whether	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  civil	  and	  criminal	  codes	  and	  procedures,	  and	  whether	  there	  are	  public	  or	  
private	  suits,	  as	  the	  divisions	  reveal	  insight	  into	  a	  community’s	  notions	  of	  property	  and	  ownership.	  Carey	  describes	  
how	  almost	  all	  cases	  were	  private	  in	  reality,	  but	  citizens	  could	  volunteer	  to	  sue	  for	  the	  public	  good	  (12).	  According	  
to	  Carey,	  homicide	  law	  had	  a	  distinct	  religious	  scope,	  so	  Athenian	  society	  was	  conservative	  in	  making	  any	  changes	  
to	  it;	  defendants	  were	  seen	  as	  unclean	  and	  court	  proceedings	  were	  held	  in	  the	  open	  air	  to	  keep	  participants	  from	  
being	  polluted	  (1).	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offences against the state, executing someone who breaks exile, or impeding those setting up a 
tyranny or overthrowing a democracy (MacDowell 75-77). All of these protected offenses sought 
to maintain social, governmental, and economic institutions. 
The fact that any male citizen who caught a traitor could kill him legally denotes that this 
system was immature and in flux (MacDowell 78-79). MacDowell observes, “The usual 
direction of development for a society is from habits of self-help towards the use of legal trials; 
the fact that an Athenian was still permitted in the fourth century to kill a nocturnal thief or an 
adulterer for himself instead of taking him to court shows that Athenian society in this respect 
remained primitive” (MacDowell 80). Nevertheless, despite its novelty the courts established an 
institutional channel through which both older families and the newly wealthy and acclaimed 
could act within established, protected manners in order to stake and achieve their legal claims. 
The less powerful feared legal retribution and false accusations. For example, Deborah Kamen 
demonstrates how the courtesan Neaira, formerly of the privileged chattel slave class, had to 
defend her freed woman status through a trial, after she had bought her way out of slavery later 
in life (19-31). 
Legal responsibilities helped to define what it meant to be an elite, full citizen. Laws 
added more complexity and formality to the quite amateur court systems in Athens.11 For 
example, families became obligated to participate in some cases. There is even a term, apagoge, 
which the crime of someone exercising rights to which he was not entitled (MacDowell 26). In 
the case of homicide, it was the duty, both divine and civil, of the family unit to attain justice for 
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  Likewise,	  extralegal	  obligations	  impacted	  the	  legal	  strategies	  of	  the	  elite;	  Tridimas	  writes,	  “…in	  the	  4th	  c.	  
performing	  a	  liturgy	  was	  a	  useful	  defense	  against	  court	  accusations	  that	  a	  rich	  man	  avoided	  his	  duties	  to	  the	  polis”	  
(105-­‐106).	  Because	  homicide	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  pollution	  to	  the	  state,	  performing	  the	  liturgy,	  or	  public	  religious	  
ceremony	  in	  order	  to	  clean	  the	  pollution,	  provided	  visible	  evidence	  to	  the	  populations	  that	  this	  societal	  duty	  had	  
been	  take	  care	  of.	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the killed person. This important duty extended as far as to sons of cousins and to in-laws. The 
family performed two actions: proclamation, which included a charge, and prosecution. The 
funeral proclamation at the tomb satisfied the religious angle, while the legal proclamation in the 
agora met the civil requirement.12 An example of these separate actions is told in Antiphon 6, 
wherein the accused chorus master relates how Philokrates and his family make a charge at the 
funeral and carry out a proclamation to initiate the legal proceedings (MacDowell 22-23). Failure 
to carry out these obligations and seek vengeance could result in the charge of impiety against 
the irresponsible family member; Demosthenes wrote in Against Androtion that Diodoros’ uncle 
was prosecuted for impiety on the grounds of associating with the accused killer of his relative 
(9). 
Although moral justice was sought by victims, there was also an obligation to provide 
economic reparations for any loss. In heroic societies, blood money was a payment that could be 
made from one party to another to compensate for the wrongdoing that had been done. That 
blood money and bribery did not resolve disputes legally demonstrates how a layer of legal 
obligation was necessary for societal cohesion. Families were not necessarily due any type of 
blood money in retribution. Blood money did not count as vengeance in a religious sense—it did 
not clear the societal pollution caused by the crime; although such transactions occurred, they 
were not necessarily legal, or the right thing to do. Law and court proceedings were needed for 
that part to be done (MacDowell 8-10.) Moral justice was so necessary that even in a homicide 
case when a known killer cannot be found, and the family still cannot find anyone to accuse, 
there is still a trial, this measure speaks to the duty and the spiritual cleansing that has to take 
                                                
 
12	  Religious	  law	  was	  also	  being	  systematized	  in	  parallel	  with	  civic;	  the	  keepers	  of	  religious	  law	  were	  referred	  to	  as	  
exegetes.	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place for the religious welfare of society (MacDowell 86). Punishment, too, was a religious 
necessity. If found guilty, the unknown or absent killer was often exiled and animals and 
belonging were physically exiled in his place (Lanni 77).  
2.2   Privileging the Elite 
Legal procedures illuminated where power was held and by whom. In addition to the 
preeminence of the aristocratic families, Lanni writes, “Athens saw the rise of groups outside of 
nobility now demanding a greater share in political power by virtue of their wealth and military 
contributions” (15).  This shift unsettled the status quo, introducing new competition for status 
between the old and new families. Carey explains further how those with power used political 
means to slow down the inflow of new elite, “For citizenship it was necessary before 451/0 to 
have an Athenian father and a free mother; after this date the qualification was stricter, with 
Athenian parentage on both sides being necessary” (9). Such a qualification excluded recent 
immigrants and their immediate descendants and favored older, landed families. Citizenship was 
also the exclusive right of males (9). Deborah Kamen uses the term “class” to describe privileged 
groups, and quotes Moses Finley’s definition of order to best represent common ground in 
scholarship on Classical Athens: “A juridical defined group within a population, possessing 
formalized privileges or disabilities in one or more fields of activity, governmental, military, 
legal, economic, religious, marital, and standing in a hierarchical relation to others” (1). Kamen 
then further delineates multiple class statuses for the population of Athens, including chattel 
slaves, privileged chattel slaves, freedmen with conditional freedom, metics, privileged metics, 
bastards, disenfranchised citizens, and full citizens with an additional division of male and 
female to consider (1). Such detailed stratification exposes a complex system of restrictions 
designed to maintain the older power structure in the face of new, rising groups. 
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The formalization of law, legal education, and the Athenian court system all delineated 
boundaries to the roles of legal participants, creating a prescriptive structure which benefitted the 
elite. The benefits of participation in the legal system defined much of what it meant to be a 
citizen of Classical Athens. Athens was a grossly unequal society economically. Tridimas 
describes the inequity: 
… in the mid to late 4th c. total Athenian wealth was 12,661 talents, which with a 
population of 31,000 adult male citizens implies a mean wealth of 2541 drachmas 
(1 talent = 6000 drachmas) ... median wealth stood at 925 drachmas, the top 1% 
of the population (that is the class charged with advance-tax-payment liturgy) 
owned 30.9% of wealth and the top 10% owned 60.2%, and that there were about 
5000 landless Athenians. (106) 
Athenian democracy was fragile and temporary, something imposed on the aristocracy. Even 
among male full citizens, participation was limited according to four classes determined by level 
of land ownership (Kamen 98). Democracy lasted until Athens “finally succumbed to the might 
of Macedon in 322, who then established a government run by the rich elite that ended the 
democracy by disenfranchising the majority of middle and low income earners” (Tridimas 102). 
Eventually, this small elite group reestablished their dominance of the society without the façade 
of democratic controls that had been put in place earlier in history.13 
Law, as an institution, maintained the status quo. Customary laws delineated what were 
the societal norms, passed on the rules of conduct, and maintained identity for communities. 
                                                
 
13	  According	  to	  a	  third	  century	  census	  in	  Athens,	  there	  were	  around	  100,000	  citizens,	  30,000	  of	  those	  being	  adult	  
male	  citizens	  who	  could	  fully	  participate.	  The	  upper	  elite	  would	  have	  been	  even	  a	  smaller	  group	  (Lanni	  19-­‐20).	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Lanni writes, “The participatory nature of the Athenian courts assured that the courts were a site 
of popular norm elaboration. And …  publicity helped to ensure that court sessions were a form 
of democratic practice that fostered a sense of civic identity” (“Publicity” 119). Federica 
Carugati, Gillian K. Hadfield, and Barry R. Weingast demonstrate that the Classical Athenian 
legal system enforced customary norms in a somewhat dynamic and pluralistic city-state: 
“Athens successfully transitioned to a legal order from purely informal or ‘oligarchic’ order in 
which ordinary citizens organized their norm enforcement efforts on the basis of classification 
schemes that combined long-standing norms with those imposed by powerful elites” (296). The 
application of and access to law was subject to participatory restriction.  
Not only were specified actors designated to perform obligatory roles, but also the courts 
of Classical Athens where forensic rhetoric was performed were a complex geography of 
procedure, wherein each space was restricted to certain issues. Lanni explains how popular cases 
allowed for legal and extra-legal argument, were subject to more variability according to the 
context of the cases, aimed primarily for a just resolution to the case, and had a stricter formality 
to them (3-4). For example, different types of homicide were tried in the five different homicide 
courts with different procedures: the Areopagus tried homicide cases from the sixth century on, 
which was an important “shift in emphasis from self-help to legal sanctions” (Lanni 15); 
unintentional homicide and bouleusis (planning) were tried at the Palladium (MacDowell 64); 
there was no punishment for lawful killing—athletic contest, waylaying, war, adultery, etc. (73); 
the Delphinion was the temple where cases were tried where someone admits killing and says he 
did it lawfully (70); and the Prytaneion and the court in Phreatto courts had trials held for 
accidental deaths, a person is killed by someone who is not present to stand trial, or an object 
falls and kills someone, then that object gets tried and cast out (77, 85-6). Lanni argues the 
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difference between these two approaches is one of ambivalence, the struggle between flexibility 
and discretion versus “consistency and predictability,” an ambivalence, he claims, “that has 
haunted law ever since”. He sees the two competing approaches as a result of a “political 
commitment to maximizing the discretion wielded by popular juries” that still manages to 
achieve a sufficient level of the aforementioned consistency and predictability (3-4). In this 
system, societal cohesion is maintained by a careful balance of providing a legal channel to 
citizens to process their disputes while still maintaining the status quo. 
The elite still held much control in the democratic court systems. For example, court 
offices, such as the basileus, were chosen from and elected by the citizens.14 Tridimas describes 
how: 
… the 4th c. formalization of liturgical duties including the liturgy of advance-
tax-payment, and the associated partial redistribution of powers from the 
Assembly to the courts and Areopagus (where the rich could be more influential), 
signified an increase in the political influence of the rich and their control of tax 
revenues, because their agreement and cooperation became a necessary condition 
for the operation of the system…. extensive 4th c. peacetime public expenditure 
that benefited primarily the poor citizens (theorica and employment in public 
administration) aimed to incentivize them to vote for peace instead of war and its 
spoils. (106)  
                                                
 
14	  The	  basileus	  was	  not	  a	  judge	  but	  rather	  a	  magistrate	  who	  oversaw	  homicide	  cases.	  The	  term	  likely	  referred	  to	  a	  
public	  official	  or	  group	  of	  public	  officials	  who	  “had	  significant	  power	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  homicide	  case	  could	  proceed	  
and	  which	  court	  would	  try	  the	  case”	  (Gagarin	  574).	  While	  this	  role	  formerly	  had	  more	  power	  in	  Athens,	  it	  is	  
possible	  that	  through	  it	  privileged	  citizens	  continued	  to	  find	  an	  advantage	  in	  maintaining	  their	  place	  in	  the	  social	  
order,	  by	  undue	  class	  influence,	  such	  as	  trading	  favors	  or	  familiarity,	  on	  the	  basileus.	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As Tridimas describes, war hurt the wealthy citizens financially, as war was expensive and it 
shook up society. Therefore, the wealthy citizens contributed to the appearance of measures 
aimed at pacifying the greater population but in self-interest. Additionally, he points out the 
transfer of power from the political arena to the legal one, where the wealthiest citizens held 
even more power and influence, further slanting the legal domain towards an institution that 
maintained the status quo and privileged the elite. 
Duty and obligation, while mandated, inherently allowed for participation as citizens. In 
other words, rights are a definite part of identity and belonging. Current legal systems use the 
term, rights, to liberate populations from tyranny, but historically rights maintain societal 
cohesion through limiting the influence of certain actors; fully participating citizens had rights to 
their advantage, and foreigners, metics, slaves, and women, for example, were left out or more 
specifically denied rights by law. A class existed called metics, non-citizen aliens, who also were 
not extended rights. Similarly, the enslaved belonged to the state, to a temple, or to an individual 
household and were also treated as property (MacDowell 22.) In addition, the citizens could lose 
their rights and become atimos (Carey 9). Those not extended rights were therefore also 
excluded from the legal system. 
Access to courts was a restricted enterprise; only a citizen could initiate a private suit, or 
dikai, wherein a citizen sues for his own interest (MacDowell 17.) A citizen could also sue on 
behalf of someone else, which was a graphai (Lanni 35). Although there was a concept of the 
state suing to protect public interest, in actuality there was no institution for enforcement of such 
a process. Gender and age further restricted participation in litigation in Athens (MacDowell 18). 
Only male citizens could become fully adult in the matters of the law, which started around 
seventeen or eighteen years old, when boys could adopt, marry, or join the army (Golden).  
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Although access to the courts could be gained, further restrictions based on privilege impeded 
one’s effectiveness in trials. 
Kamen describes how the elite held a privileged position in the courts as claimants: 
“Litigation was a big part, ideologically, of what it means to be a citizen.”15 Suits were expensive 
and held high financial risk. Furthermore, judges and juries gave preference to participants who 
had benefitted the polis, something the poorer or non-citizens, numbering in the hundreds of 
thousands, were less likely to have had the capability of doing (Lanni 18). Kamen writes, “The 
fact that most cases (at least those that survive) represent strife between elites seems to indicate 
that the courtroom was a forum for primarily elites, rather than nonelites” (100). Litigious 
ability, then, helped to define informally full participation as a citizen. According to Lanni, a 
copious and well-attested number of cases are extant, but they reflect the cases of wealthier 
citizens who could afford a logographer who could record them (Lanni 5-6). Moreover, elite 
participation in trials was even more exclusive among juries. 
Juries were not today’s bodies, representative of the population. In the open-air trials of 
the Areopagos, the jury was constructed of men who were elected to archonships. Upon retiring 
after the year term, jurors became Areopagites for life after their euthynai, “the examination of 
their conduct in office.” They were forbidden to write comedies, which speaks to their ethos and 
the solemn nature of their duty. They were subject to misconduct in office as well.  As an 
additional layer of protection, archons were head of the nine types of law courts, for life, so not 
influenced by popular opinion or official worries (MacDowell 37-42). 
                                                
 
15	  Courts	  handled	  about	  40	  cases	  a	  day,	  and	  Athenians	  were	  known	  for	  their	  litigiousness,	  even	  being	  the	  butt	  of	  
jokes	  in	  two	  of	  Aristophanes’	  plays	  (Lanni	  33).	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Only male citizens could also be judges, or magistrates, and participation in this role was 
even more restricted than for litigants or juries. In Rhetoric Aristotle described how judges “have 
to decide actual and definite cases; and they are often so entangled with likings and hatreds and 
private interests, that they are not capable of adequately considering the truth, but have the 
judgment clouded by private pleasure or pain” (1354b.7) . Judges acted with an advantage within 
the system, naturally, as they had “privileged access to a body of authoritative norms” (Posner 
11). Furthermore, those in the position of elite authority could more readily interpret and bend 
legal rules to their advantage. However, judges in Classical Athens interpreted laws and could 
apply them unfairly, and the elasticity of law benefitted the sovereign more than those subjected 
to it. Posner asserts, “From the perspective of persons subject to the rules, the fact that rules have 
fuzzy edges or may be changed does not make them nonbinding. But from the standpoint of the 
rulers, rules may be so much putty” (52). Clearly, the vision of a democratic Athens where all 
could participate in trials was not a reality, and this anti-democratic system was by design. 
According to Tridimas, “It must also be noted that the 4th century marked the rise of anti-
democratic thinking. Philosophers like Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle denounced the democracy 
as a tyranny of the poor over the rich, while Xenophon and Isocrates also exalted the virtues of 
kingship.” (106) Rather than providing social equality, Isocrates, Aristotle, and other rhetoricians 
crafted forensic rhetoric to maintain property interests and class interests. Fear of loss of property 
was minimized and the confidence of maintaining the status quo was preserved. Lanni suggests, 
“Litigation was not aimed chiefly at the final resolution of the dispute or the discovery of truth; 
rather, the courts provided an arena for the parties to publicly define, contest, and evaluate their 
social relations to one another, and the hierarchies of their society” (1). Litigation was less 
democratizing and more an apparatus of the elite that enabled them to preserve property and 
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status. Another example reveals that Demosthenes, one of the greatest of the Ten Attic Orators, 
and held up as a model for the Romans and during the Middle Ages, “was not the defender of the 
poor, but of the affluent, of the creditor against the debtor; he also wrote speeches for political 
allies” (Kennedy 70). Additionally, Plutarch was said to have “severely” censured Demosthenes 
when he wrote his Parallel Lives, because Demosthenes “cynically sold his pen to anyone who 
would pay” (Kennedy 71). As Carugati/Hadfield/Weingast establish, “Elite competition 
weakened the elites, threatened to compromise the polis' internal stability, and jeopardized its 
chances to compete at the international level. Like in other Greek city-states, Athenian elites also 
turned to written law” (297). In order to make the most of the legal system, the elite needed 
education in forensic rhetoric. 
2.3   The Development of Forensic Rhetoric 
Fredrick J. Long gives a summary of Aristotle’s description of forensic rhetoric: 
“Forensic rhetoric essentially consists in someone formally accusing an individual or the state 
with a wrongdoing,” so at a basic level the system allowed for settling disputes and maintaining 
the general peace (2004). Actors, if they knew the rules, could perform accordingly. There was 
comfort in the security of deterrence, and it ultimately built confidence among the populace. 
Furthermore, if there was a disagreement and there was some outlet to resolve this disagreement 
without conflict, then some pacification of the population had been accomplished. Nevertheless, 
forensic rhetoric formed as an institutional extension of the already privileging legal system. 
Rhetoric formed as a kind of conduct literature, explaining how one should behave, and 
constrained one from acting in a manner against what was predetermined. Legal scholar R. A. 
Posner explains that although some people do not perform criminal acts because of “moral 
repugnance,” they also act out of “fear of an external penalty.” Uncertainty, the growing belief 
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that a perpetrator will get caught in the act of a crime, keeps non-criminals from acting. The 
perpetrator has a “freedom from encumbrances of uncertainty” (136), thus lessening the 
likelihood of deviance.16 No matter the motives, law helped increase confidence in right action. 
Following the establishment of direct democracy as a governmental form in Athens and 
the earlier codification of law, elite male citizens could receive a higher education, which 
included forensic rhetoric, so that they could write and perform their own oratory in civil trials. 
For example, Aristotle lectured at the Lyceum, an Athenian temple dedicated to Apollo, and 
these lectured coalesced into a school and library. T. J. Morgan reveals the comingling of literate 
and non-literate education in this period, though access to written texts was prohibitively 
expensive for the non-wealthy (48). Rhetorical training privileged those allowed to participate, 
partly because it was expensive and so separated the upper classes by their education, and partly 
because the politically powerful sponsored non-Athenian sophists who taught and practiced for 
them.17 Plato used the term sophist critically to refer to those rhetoricians who were paid to teach 
virtue (Corey 16).  Those without the specialized training were at a distinct disadvantage within 
the law courts. Isocrates, the fourth century Attic rhetorician, advised society to educate its youth 
in rhetoric: “It behooves all men to want to have many of their youth engaged in training to 
become speakers” (qtd. in Litfin 73). Morgan insists both Isocrates and Aristotle promoted an 
elite system of education: “The effect of both their prescriptions is to limit access to education, 
and to limit it on the twin grounds of ability and wealth (57). For example, Aristotle discussed at 
                                                
 
16	  Similarly,	  Adriaan	  Lanni	  explains	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes’	  “bad	  man”	  theory	  of	  law,	  “Holmes	  described	  the	  
function	  of	  law	  by	  imagining	  a	  ‘bad	  man’	  who	  viewed	  the	  law	  purely	  instrumentally	  and	  planned	  his	  behavior	  
based	  on	  what	  he	  predicted	  he	  could	  (and	  could	  not)	  get	  away	  with	  under	  the	  existing	  rules”	  (132).	  
17	  According	  to	  David	  D.	  Corey,	  the	  Peloponnesian	  Wars	  (431-­‐404)	  led	  both	  Aristophanes	  and	  Plato	  to	  vent	  their	  
discomfort	  with	  foreign	  influence:	  “In	  the	  charged	  political	  atmosphere	  of	  war,	  tolerance	  of	  foreigners	  often	  runs	  
thin,	  and	  the	  sophists	  may	  well	  have	  appeared	  as	  a	  group	  of	  outsiders	  teaching	  potentially	  subversive	  ideas	  to	  
Athenian	  youths	  at	  the	  worst	  possible	  time”	  (20).	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great length the concepts of emulation and virtue that directly explains one process of privileging 
elites: “wealth, a number of friends, positions of office, and all similar things. For believing it 
their duty to be good, because such goods naturally belong to those who are good, they strive to 
preserve them” (Rhetoric 243.) Both men were concerned with access to political power through 
advanced education and literacy (58). Sons of citizens went to school from age seven or eight to 
age fifteen or so from just after sunrise to just before sunset, in the care of a household slave 
called a paedagogos. Girls were formally excluded, typically trained in domestic arts and 
married off for family connection as young as age thirteen (Isbilen/Karaduman 42). Although, 
Anne Meade Stockdell argues that women were able to participate in rhetorical debate within 
religious ceremonies and cults (4).18 
An even smaller group of wealthier students went on to private higher education in 
rhetoric, among other subjects. At this level of education, further prejudices towards ability 
emerged. Some students were considered by nature to be better at forensic rhetoric. Isocrates 
argues: “But let no one think, that I imagine justice can be taught; for I do not think there is any 
such art which can teach those who are not disposed by nature, either temperance or justice; tho' 
I think the study of popular eloquence helps both to acquire and practice it” (21). He seems 
education and specifically rhetoric as training for participation of gentlemen to participate in 
politics, which improved the democracy (Mehdi 15-16).  Isocrates envisioned inborn skill to 
work hand in hand with education: 
                                                
 
18	  Stockdell	  also	  emphasizes	  the	  funereal	  domain	  of	  duty	  for	  women:	  “Since	  the	  female	  relatives	  of	  legitimate	  
citizens	  were	  restricted	  in	  their	  access	  to	  public	  spaces	  their	  noticeable	  presence	  at	  public	  funerals,	  particularly	  the	  
well-­‐attended	  ceremonies	  for	  aristocratic	  figures	  or	  soldiers	  fallen	  at	  war,	  would	  have	  been	  disturbing	  to	  the	  
dominant	  class	  of	  citizen	  men,	  ultimately	  undermining	  their	  total	  regulation	  of	  public	  spaces”	  (6).	  Women’s	  
pronounced	  influence	  in	  this	  sphere	  highlights	  and	  contrasts	  their	  absence	  from	  the	  official	  rhetorical	  spaces	  they	  
could	  navigate.	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For men who have been gifted with eloquence by nature and by fortune, are governed in 
what they say by chance, and not by any standard of what is best, whereas those who 
have gained this power by the study of philosophy and by the exercise of reason never 
speak without weighing their words, and so are less often in error as to a course of action. 
(Antidosis qtd.. in Benson 51) 
Both Isocrates and Aristotle promoted the purpose of political participation for education. 
Aristotle also saw the strengthening of virtue as a goal, and he relied on a foundation of inductive 
reasoning (Moseley xi). Both saw the influence of fortune as an advantage in education. 
Rhetoric was taught orally before the increase in literacy as an educational requirement. 
Handbooks like the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, of contested authorship, were used as textbooks. 
Aristotle was innovative with his full treatise on rhetoric, which was also designed as an 
educational tool. Systemization of rhetoric as an ars was first required in order to teach it. 
Eugene Garver points out how Aristotle wanted to show that civic activities, namely rhetoric, 
could be “subject to rational analysis and to presentation as an art,” so as he did in other fields, 
he did seek to systematize rhetoric (7).19 There had been no division into three species of rhetoric 
in the fifth century. Sophists did not divide their categories of rhetoric in the same manner. 
Schiappa reminds us that applying that schema to the Sophists would be anachronistic. He goes 
on to say that the sophist Protagoras, for example, might have thought of forensic oratory, in 
general, as part of a person’s “civic arête,” but Protagoras had no special theory of forensic 
rhetoric. Rather, Schiappa claims each Sophist had his or her own idiosyncratic theoretical focus 
rather than prescribing to common schematizations (42). Aristotle’s divisions of rhetoric were all 
                                                
 
19	  Aristotle	  also	  wrote	  on	  Physics,	  Poetics,	  and	  Politics,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  He	  focused	  efforts	  on	  artistic	  endeavors	  as	  
well	  as	  on	  scientific	  pondering,	  often	  crossing	  between	  philosophy	  and	  application.	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for the purpose of applying skillsets to domains of public life, a formalization which stunted the 
areas to which the creative and personalized theories of former rhetoricians were applied; 
systemization was practical, useful, certainly innovative, but more restrictive. Isocrates as well 
had written of conformity: “And for those sophists who have lately sprung up, and fallen into 
this arrogance, tho' numerous now, they will be forced at last to conform to my rules” (“Against 
the Sophists” 19). Here Isocrates speaks to the accused sophist intent of selling training to learn 
virtue; rather, Isocrates believed virtue was innate but eloquence could be taught. The 
formalization of rhetoric also set up a historical precedent to further define and control the means 
of persuasion, to tighten the reins on speculative thought, processes that continued in the 
millennium to come. 
In mythos, Pistis was the goddess of faith, trust, and reliability. Forensic rhetoric relied 
on the concept of pistis as a central persuasive element of forensic rhetoric, what a judgment was 
based on, but pistis is not such a simple concept. George A. Kennedy discusses the many types 
of pistis, “The problem with pistis is that it can have at least three different meanings in … 
[Aristotle’s] … text: ‘proof,’ in the sense of logical demonstration; ‘proof’ as a formal part of a 
speech; and ‘means of persuasion,’ including not only logical demonstration but the 
trustworthiness of character that a speaker can project and the emotion he conveys” (60). Joseph 
T. Lienhard argues that one meaning of the word pistis, or proof, is “the state of mind produced 
in the audience,” so rhetoric purports suggestibility if not control of the mind of the hearer (450). 
Much of the content of handbooks on rhetoric as well as Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric focus on 
creating enough proof in the mind of the jury in order to win the trial. 
Logos in the fifth and fourth centuries, before the use of the word rhetoric, could be used 
to mean words, language, knowledge, persuasion, and writing. The actual Attic term for logic is 
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“logismos.” Within Aristotle’s theory, logos indicates proofs or pistis, knowledge, but especially 
the idea of artistic proofs, or those that could be invented by the orator, using language, drawing 
on enthymemes, examples, maxims, and also special topics for each branch of rhetoric along 
with the common topics/commonplaces. Christopher Carey points out that within forensic 
rhetoric, logos does not directly translate to all the facts of a case; rather, the facts, such as 
written contractual documents and laws, even depositions from witnesses, were read out by a 
clerk. Logos was a way to appeal to the jury’s rational minds and intellect in order to win a case. 
Effective appeals to logos were invented by the orator. Premises could lead to a provable 
conclusion or state. Aristotle relied on non-contradiction, wherein one could show rationally how 
something could not be a certain thing and not be that same thing at the same time. Lastly, logos 
could still also refer to the facts within the orator’s constructed narrative of his side of a case, 
recounting events that occurred and facts in a particular sequence (95).   
Proof did not translate directly to truth, though. Plato and other philosophers had feared 
rhetoric had the power to deceive. Participants in trials aimed to win their cases, by any means 
necessary, and forensic rhetoric created a means by which to sway a jury, regardless of the truth.  
Plato describes the potential trickery behind rhetoric in his Gorgias: 
At some points, he emphasizes rhetoric’s universality or subject-neutrality: rhetoric 
differs from the specialized crafts precisely in that the rhetorician can be more persuasive 
about anything than anybody else. And this subject-neutrality is consistently associated 
with what I have termed the manipulative conception of rhetoric, on which it is 
essentially a tool of enslavement” (Barney 103).  
Barney creates what she calls conceptions of deceptive rhetoric and terms the action of getting 
someone to work against his or her own interests, as the manipulative conception (101). Barney 
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then describes Socrates’ cooperative conception of rhetoric, “…this specialized conception fits 
better with a cooperative conception of rhetoric, on which it involves a genuine expertise in 
questions of justice—an expertise deployed on behalf of the community, as the doctor deploys 
his expertise in medicine” (103). Though these conceptions can be either deceitful or altruistic in 
motive, both demonstrate the falsehood inherent in the outcome of the application of rhetoric. By 
nature of forensic rhetoric being taught for use in law courts, Aristotle clearly promoted the 
cooperative conception of the art of rhetoric by creating his school and lecturing at the Lyceum 
as he wished to prepare selected youth to better perform in civic life for the good of the polity, 
resolving to create new theoretical improvements in the field on top of the more conventional 
instruction of better practices through handbooks. Barney further exposes internal and external 
standards of correct usage of rhetoric, internal refers to using something incorrectly for what it is 
not intended, while external refers to more nefarious, intentional misapplication (102-103). 
Again, internal and external standards of correct usage demonstrate yet another way rhetoric, 
whether applied correctly or misapplied, innately competes against or complicates veracity in 
practice.  
Aristotle inherited a drive to cultivate good and virtuous men, and this tradition would 
carry on into Roman rhetoric as well. Socrates and Plato had accused the Sophists of promoting 
dissoi logoi as a technique that could be exploited in an amoral way by a skilled rhetorician. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle argued that being able to argue both sides of a case did not make the 
rhetorician an advocate for evil or falsehoods, but rather it prepared the rhetorician to defend 
against someone who did argue for evil. Further, he also said being able to argue both sides of an 
issue helped the rhetorician fully understand his own argument (Rhetoric I). Additionally, 
Aristotle believed that rhetoric allowed truths and justice to triumph over falsehood and 
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injustice,” but he understood orators could use it to influence either side of a legal claim (qtd. in 
Smith 17). Clearly, Aristotle was ambiguous on this subject despite his intent. George A. 
Petrochilos says that Socrates had first aimed to teach his pupils to possess kalogathia. He 
explains: 
The word kalogathia menas the character and conduct of kalos kagathos, that is, of the 
perfect and just man; thus it could mean kindness, uprightness, and honesty, attributes 
that finally lead to happiness. In classical Greek, the meaning of the word kalos is linked 
with the human physique rather than human character; thus, kalos has to do with the 
beauty, harmony, of the body, attained through physical exercise. The word agathos 
means the good and virtuous man, who is wise, brave, and just. (606) 
Certainly, morality was an intended Aristotelian component of forensic. Morality, though, was 
not the object of the legal system in practice; rather, law maintained the order of the state, 
protected higher classes from intrusion by lower ones and foreigners, and secured property and 
wealth for those fortunate enough to be able to fully participate in the system. 
Through the creation of his theoretical work on rhetoric, Aristotle attempted to shape 
argument into a system that was objective, predictable and scientific. Science can be described as 
“a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged 
and showing the operation of general laws” (“Science”). However, such an endeavor is 
impossible. Though Aristotle said, “The True and the Just are naturally superior to their 
opposites” (Rhetoric I.i), legal scholar Richard A. Posner details the ambiguity inherent in 
“problems of jurisprudence”: “… if science does establish certainty, still its methods and domain 
are so different from those of law that one exactitude of science cannot be translated into 
exactitude in law, while if science does not establish certainty, then it cannot be used as a 
59 
foundation for or model of legal certainty” (67). Furthermore, Lanni points out how 
circumstantial flexibility outweighed consistency, for a broad array of information was provided 
in Athenian courts, “… both extralegal and legal information were considered relevant and 
important to the jury’s decision because Athenian juries aimed at reaching a just verdict taking 
into account the particular circumstances of the individual case rather than applying abstract 
rules and principles provided by statutes to the case at hand” (42). Rhetoric could certainly be 
taught as a skill, but it was never capable of being constructed into a science. Rhetoric’s lack of 
legal certainty stems from law’s ambiguous and restrictive relationship with knowledge. 
2.4   Jurisprudence and Epistemology 
The nature of jurisprudence innately fails to meet the classical stated aims of forensic 
rhetoric. Rhetoric for the sophists was epistemic, “making knowledge” (5), but that knowledge 
was contingent and relative, even fragmented or multiple, related to a historical moment, a 
specific cultural context, geography, and subjectivity, being the opposite of Plato’s absolute 
“Truth” and “Knowledge” (Bizzell/Herzberg 5, 22). Furthermore, rhetoric places constraints and 
boundaries on the mind and on knowledge because it constrains communication by imposing 
order and rules, similarly, “Architecture brings space under control, music brings noise under 
control, and mathematics brings the infinite under control” (Carr). Aristotle argues that rhetoric 
can be reduced to a system, and that it comprises a science and art. As Richard Parry asserts, “It 
is in Aristotle that we find the basis for something like the modern opposition between epistêmê 
as pure theory and technê as practice. Yet even Aristotle refers to technê or craft as itself also 
epistêmê or knowledge because it is a practice grounded in an ‘account’ — something involving 
theoretical understanding.” Rhetoric works well as a skill based on theories of knowledge, but it 
falls short of being a science that can discover truth. 
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 Aristotle’s effort in systematizing reasoning is near impossible. One need only look at 
the aims of forensic rhetoric to see the complexity that smothers any such attempt to make legal 
reasoning into scientific knowledge. Richard A. Posner describes science as “objective, 
impersonal, determinate … external” and demonstrates that “important questions of law … 
cannot be answered by the use of the methods of legal reasoning … reasoning runs out and the 
judge has to appeal to policies, preferences, values, morals, public opinion … it will often mean 
that the answer is indeterminate” (37). In sharp contrast, Valeria Cinaglia describes Plato’s 
conception of knowledge, which was clearly a determinate conception: 
In Plato’s epistemology, there is only one kind of true knowledge: to be able to see what 
really is, and what the truth is, is the crucial factor that divides knowledge from mere 
belief. The empirical world and the sensations connected to it are just starting-points of a 
process of recollection that is the prerequisite for true knowledge; perceptual knowledge, 
however, is not knowledge in the proper sense" (50).  
In order to move rhetoric closer to the concept of an investigative science, Aristotle dismisses 
Plato’s ideal forms, grounds knowledge in inductive reasoning and observable evidence, and 
positions empiricism over rationalism.20 Cinaglia summarizes Aristotle’s primary 
epistemological views: 21 
What we know better, particulars in the world, need to be explained by what we would 
have to know better, if we had complete knowledge of universal principles of the 
                                                
 
20	  Law	  is	  about	  conducing	  or	  deterring	  future	  events.	  Forensic	  rhetoric	  discusses	  the	  more	  immediate	  and	  the	  past.	  
Aristotle	  wrote,	  “…	  to	  the	  forensic	  the	  past,	  for	  it	  is	  always	  in	  reference	  to	  things	  done	  that	  one	  party	  accuses	  and	  
the	  other	  defends”	  (Rhetoric	  I.III.4).	  
21	  George	  A.	  Petrochilos	  points	  out	  that	  “Socrates	  was	  the	  first	  to	  turn	  his	  attention	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  
Ionians,	  which	  was	  centered	  on	  nature,	  to	  a	  philosophy	  that	  revolved	  around	  mankind.	  Consequently,	  for	  the	  first	  
time	  we	  have	  discussions	  about	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  issues”	  (603).	  Thus,	  that	  is	  when	  rhetoric	  first	  starts	  
to	  become	  a	  formal	  Greek	  art.	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intelligible structure of the world—and of our language—that we can potentially grasp in 
part through our sensations. Secondly… in Aristotle’s account, a successful process of 
understanding requires a particular attitude or, more precisely, trained intellectual skills, 
in order to achieve the kind of understanding that can make sense of what is around us. 
(42) 
Therefore, although Aristotle had the aim of making forensic rhetoric a science, as Posner 
describes from a more current understanding of what science is, he did not succeed. Rather, he 
was able to craft prescriptive procedural rules that constrained the more philosophical 
explorations of Plato. 
Epistêmê is connected to skills with technê. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, “Epistêmê is the Greek word most often translated as knowledge, while technê is 
translated as either craft or art. These translations, however, may inappropriately harbor some of 
our contemporary assumptions about the relation between theory (the domain of ‘knowledge’) 
and practice (the concern of ‘craft’ or ‘art’)” (Parry).  Richard Parry also explains, “As the 
concept of technê develops, the role of reflective knowledge is emphasized. Whereas technê 
is associated with knowing how to do (epistasthai) certain activities, epistêmê sometimes 
indicates a theoretical component of technê. Then it is associated with understanding (gnôsis)” 
(Parry). Another older term for describing knowledge by the Greeks was sophia, usually 
translated wisdom. The sophists, the teachers of rhetoric, were “wise men” (Kennedy 7). Making 
rhetoric a learned body of reserved knowledge and a specialized practiced skill grants power to 
those with expertize, because they hold exclusive access to information others need. 
Episteme and techne can also lead to discussions of knowledge versus opinion, and the 
relationship between tradition, received knowledge, and conduct. According to Bruce 
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McComiskey, “The sophists … believed that all ‘knowledge’ is opinion (doxa), and that all laws 
and policies (nomoi) grow out of opinion,” so rhetoric was the way to master opinion and 
function well in society (207). Plato argues that rhetoric teaches an amoral form of persuasion. 
Socrates tells Gorgias, “And so the rhetorician’s business is not to instruct a law court or a public 
meeting in matters of right and wrong, but only to make them believe” (qtd. in Benson 11). This 
belief is a form of conviction, but not one based in an absolute truth, but a conviction in what 
seems believable, but may not be right.  
Aristotle’s Rhetoric states that the object of forensic rhetoric is judgment—not 
persuasion. A claimant does not need to persuade anyone or change his mind or convince him; 
rather, a claimant simply needs to get the judgment he wants (II.i.2). At times, the desire to see 
justice and the desire to win a case coexist. In the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, of contested 
authorship, the author writes, “By means of this study [rhetoric] you will come to know how at 
the present time to form reasonably sound opinions about the future, how not ineptly to instruct 
your subject peoples what each should do, how to form correct judgments about the right and the 
just and their opposites and, besides, to reward and chastise each class as it deserves” (V.iv). 
Within this claim, the author shows a desire to instruct practitioners of rhetoric in the art of 
discernment so they can perfect the skill of making reasonable and righteous judgments, but this 
claim sits within a handbook that also teaches the art of winning the case. 
Ultimately, particular justice was sacrificed as dispensable towards maintaining the 
public good. Petrochilos asks, “Given that justice was a quiet cooperative virtue and that the 
achievement of prosperity for the city … may have required … [injustice], the following 
question arose: When did injustice become a better means to the desired end of stability and 
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prosperity than justice?” (606).22  In contrast, Lanni dismissed the idea of justice as the 
appropriate moral consequences, given the knowledge of a case. Instead he presents justice as 
legal certainty of economic reliability brought about by “repayment of debts, payment according 
to contract, promise, or obligation, safekeeping of money or property of another, and honesty in 
transactions” (27). This conception reinforces the idea of forensic rhetoric protecting the social 
structure, the status, the power, and the property of privileged classes over the epistemological 
goals of truth or scientific knowledge.  
2.5   Conclusion 
In an attempt to maintain societal order, Athenians first developed mythos to explain the 
order of the universe. They eventually started to use the concept of logos to create a more 
manmade order, with nomos as a way to delineate the human institutions that could be shaped 
and controlled and in contrast to the uncontrollable physis of the world around them. They create 
laws, wrote them down, and designed a legal system to maintain order and especially property 
for the more privileged male citizens and their families. 
Access to this legal system was restricted to male citizens, and at every layer, restrictions 
were introduced to make the system a privileged one. There was little ability for suits to be done 
by the government for the public good, even though a great deal of public policy was transferred 
from the legislative assembly to the law courts. Every role in the legal system was restricted to 
male citizens and excluded metics, non-citizens, women, children, slaves, and other classes. The 
                                                
 
22	  Plato’s	  ideal	  society	  was	  served	  the	  public	  good	  over	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  individual.	  Petrochilos	  writes,	  “In	  
Plato’s	  terms	  stability	  and	  efficiency—that	  is,	  the	  efficient	  administration	  of	  the	  state—will	  be	  provided	  mainly	  by	  
the	  philosopher-­‐king	  and	  his	  guardian	  class,	  who	  are	  kaloi	  kagathoi	  and	  have	  all	  the	  necessary	  ethical	  attributes	  to	  
rule	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  community.	  This	  shows	  that	  Plato	  had	  a	  more	  value-­‐oriented	  notion	  of	  a	  society	  
structured	  to	  support	  an	  ‘ethical	  elite’…”	  (607).	  These	  learned,	  moral,	  elite	  citizens	  were	  carried	  into	  Aristotle’s	  
view	  of	  teaching	  forensic	  rhetoric.	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more prestigious the role, such as a magistrate, the more restricted the access. The geography and 
division of the courts acted as a physical manifestation of those same restrictions.  
Rhetoricians developed forensic rhetoric to fill the need to argue a case in these courts. 
The stated aim of many of them, such as Isocrates and Aristotle, was to better prepare citizens to 
participate in their civic duties, for the betterment of the state. The ability to argue either side of a 
case was a powerful and necessary tool, and although that strategy was not immoral, there was 
the sacrifice of moral justice in this practice. Aristotle attempted to go beyond the use of 
handbooks for best practices in this field and develop a theory of rhetoric that elevated it to a 
more predictable and consistent science. However, jurisprudence is not scientific by nature. No 
systematized legal certainty or predictability was produced. 
Despite the Athenian legal system’s attempts to reduce fear and gain confidence among 
its populace, legal insecurity remained Lanni writes: 
The lack of consistency and predictability in the Athenian courts resulted in widespread 
uncertainty regarding one’s legal rights and duties. This relatively high level of legal 
insecurity had a pervasive effect on Athenian social interactions. The capability of the 
written law to guide conduct and order social relations was extremely limited, and legal 
uncertainty imposed significant costs on many private transactions. (132) 
Forensic rhetoric, as a technical craft or ars, was elevated to an influential and practical field of 
study, if only available for the privileged elite pursuing their interests to rank themselves against 
each other and generally maintain the status quo. 
During the Hellenistic Age, between the fall of Greece and the rise of the Roman Republic, 
“Hellenistic rhetoric continued to be primarily concerned with judicial oratory,” which proved 
“that for the average person rhetorical skills were most useful in law courts” (Kennedy 82).  It 
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would take a more draconian form of government to impose stricter laws and rules on the public 
body. In the Roman Empire, under authoritarian regimes, rhetors would find a stricter body of 
law and legal system, but they found their ability to act and speak within the new system itself 
restricted. 
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3   THE RISE OF THE GOOD MAN SPEAKING WELL AND THE TRIUMPH OF 
GREEK ETHOS IN ROMAN RHETORIC 
The Roman Republic inherited from the Greeks a well-established tradition of three 
species of rhetoric: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. Mainly through Marcus Tullius 
Cicero’s (106 – 43 BCE)’s writing, which adapted Hellenistic rhetoric in the Greek language into 
Roman principles and Latin terms and applications, these species remained, but Cicero added the 
five canons of rhetoric, an innovation beyond Aristotle’s rhetoric, creating divisions and 
elaborating rules for Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery. Cicero’s rhetoric, 
from its republican foundation, survived into the Roman Empire, where it was further 
transmitted and adapted by Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (35 – 100 CE). While classical Athenian 
forensic rhetorical texts gave great emphasis to logical proof and emphasized the training and 
strengthening of the mind in those techniques, early Roman Republican rhetorical instructional 
texts followed suit to reflect a similar interest in logos. However, due to a series of imperious 
political challenges to any vocal dissention during the early Roman Empire, rhetors eventually 
shifted the subject of their instructional writing to what they considered a safe zone, a greater 
exploration of ethos and its training.  
Cicero and Quintilian had a few elements in common. Both studied law and practiced 
law, Cicero in Rome and Quintilian in Spain; they both wrote treatises intended to teach new 
audiences about their rhetorical theory; and they each wished to preserve the history of rhetoric 
for those coming after them. While Greek writings on forensic rhetoric focused largely on the 
nature of truth or on winning a case through logos, there is a profound shift in Roman rhetoric, in 
two phases, both in times of dictatorial distress; first, Cicero moved the conversation to dialogue 
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on ethos and the nature and application of morality, then, Quintilian discussed the 
institutionalization of ethos into society through education. 
In the Greek rhetorical tradition, Aristotle had preferred logos in rhetoric to the other 
appeals of ethos and pathos, but he certainly had also understood that all three were necessary 
and applicable. Joseph T. Lienhard points out that using ethos does not lessen one’s use of logos 
automatically, “… it is possible for the speaker to inspire confidence in his own character or 
produce disposition in the auditors apart from the deductive and inductive processes of rhetorical 
reasoning; such a use of ethos and pathos seems to be precisely that condemned by Aristotle in 
the first chapter of the Rhetoric…” (449). Despite any condemnation, Aristotle had suggested 
that trust in a speaker made an audience more susceptible to his arguments, ethos boosted logos, 
and that all three appeals worked together in concert to create the most persuasion (Smith 79). 
Craig R. Smith argues, “The genius of Aristotle’s conception of ethos was that it was audience 
based” (80). To Aristotle ethos began with prior reputation, the impression of the speaker the 
audience already had in mind (80). However, he wrote, “Now this trust, too, ought to be 
produced by means of the speech” (qtd. in Benson/Prosser 57). Towards that end he discussed 
three artistic ways to increase ethos with the audience: demonstrating sagacity, goodwill, and 
character. Sagacity was shown through showing expertise in the subject and good sense in how a 
speaker connects things together. The speaker projects goodwill when he can convince the 
audience he cares about their welfare. The speaker evinces character by getting the audience to 
feel he is moral and that he matches the values of society (Smith 80).  
Ethos was relevant in declamatory rhetoric as well, which focused on the speeches in the 
senate and assemblies, beyond the creditability and moral character of a legislator, in that 
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legislators had to demonstrate a law itself had ethos, or was of a good and beneficial character. 
According to the Greek rhetorical handbook, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: 
One who wishes to advocate a law has to prove that it will be equal for the citizens, 
consistent with the other laws, and advantageous for the state, best of all as promoting 
concord …contributing to the noble qualities of the citizens or to the public revenues or 
to the good repute of the commonwealth or the power of the state … (Benson/Prosser 69)  
This Greek author described in more detail what was beneficial to the state: “Expedient for the 
state are such things as concord, military strength, property and plentiful revenue, good and 
numerous allies” (Benson/Prosser 65). These elements all continued to create the social cohesion 
that benefited elite citizens.  
The effects of this transition from logos to ethos would be long felt. The consequences of 
the change to a focus on ethos in late antiquity would last throughout the early Middle Ages, past 
philosophical and political struggles among the practitioners of the early Christian Church 
through successive waves of Germanic invaders on the continent and on the island of Great 
Britain.  Within a few centuries in Alexandria, ethos was harnessed by ecclesiastical demands for 
political power.  United with secular authority, this monopoly on ethical faculty in the church 
gained widespread European recognition. Later, cultural Renaissances among the Franks and 
Anglo-Saxons failed to overturn the power of ethical appeal; instead, they coopted it to the 
advantage of secular authorities. First, however, Cicero translated ethos from its Greek origins 
into the Roman culture and the language of Latin.  
3.1   Translating Ethos from Greece to Rome 
Personal ethos is the character and reputation of an individual that lends that individual 
persuasive authority in a matter. There was a distinct focus on ethos in the Roman Republic and 
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Empire and personal ethos continued to be the most powerful appeal in Western Europe 
throughout the Middle Ages. According to James M. May and Jakob Wisse, political oratory 
played an important role in the first century BCE Roman Republic because both the Senate and 
assemblies as well as the criminal and civil courts relied on it (4-5). Cicero pleaded cases in the 
courts and rose through the ranks to become a quaestor, praetor, and eventually consul in Rome. 
He opposed the Catiline conspiracy then was exiled by the alliance of Julius Caesar, Pompey, 
and Marcus Crassus in 58 BCE. Caesar declared himself to be “Dictator for Life,” but his rule 
was both brief and not without a lot of push back and resistance, coming from the senate and 
senatorial classes. Soon after he delivered his invectives against tyranny in the Senate in 43 BCE, 
Mark Antony and Octavian ordered his execution (8-9). 
These political circumstances influenced his writing greatly, inspiring him to write of 
ethical character, the ideal orator, and the place of good men in politics. His first challenge had 
been navigating the patriotic tensions between Greece and Rome. He had toured Greece and met 
famous rhetoricians and philosophers there, including influential Stoics. Cicero’s contribution to 
ethos was that he added to Aristotle’s audience-based definition of ethos; Cicero insisted on the 
moral character of the orator and not just the reputation. Also, he lessened emphasis on the 
symbiotic bolstering of the three forms of appeals. James M. May and Jakob Wisse reveal how 
Cicero carefully integrated Greek tradition with Roman society, “Cicero himself aimed at 
combining the best of what the Greeks and the Romans had to offer, but he also wanted to 
persuade his more skeptical fellow Romans,” those who distrusted the Greeks as “theoretical, 
impractical, and arrogant, …  of the validity of his views” (6). Therefore, he selected, amplified, 
and innovated in the areas that were relevant and useful in Roman society. 
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The Romans had inherited their educational system from the Greeks after all, and rhetoric 
was a core subject in school (Murphy x-xi). Schools were systematized because citizens of the 
Republic expected the same services they would receive in Rome: “Where the soldiers went, the 
schools went as well” (Murphy xii). James J. Murphy describes how “the subject of rhetoric was 
so highly schematized by the lifetime of Cicero (born 106 B.C.E.) that even as an adolescent 
(aged fifteen to seventeen) Cicero was able to rehearse what he had learned and produce a major 
treatise on rhetoric—his De invention” (x-xi). Cicero built onto this inherited structure. His aims 
in his writing were the systematization of Roman rhetoric, the preservation of his own place and 
legacy within that system, and changing the identity of rhetoric from Greek to Roman. His 
philosophy began with his belief in the merit and primacy of individual human beings: “His 
concern for human beings was a splendid contribution to an age dominated by autocrats like 
Sulla and Caesar” (Grant 7). Both Aristotle and Cicero believed rhetoric dealt with the realm of 
probabilities. Philosophy and science were for certainty. Cicero wrote both rhetorical treatises 
and works of philosophy. His emphasis on ethos was a cry for political reform. Cicero divided 
moral goodness into three parts: ability to distinguish truth, restraint of one’s passions, and 
cooperating with others, three skills lacking in his contemporary political climate (On Duties 
5,17). 
From his focus on character, Cicero moved to an analysis of reputation, or the perception 
of moral character in others. For Romans, reputation was a key aspect of ethos that could be 
manipulated by the orator in order to appeal to an audience. For example, the Roman rhetoric 
handbook, Rhetorica ad Herennium, instructs: 
 From the discussion of our own person we shall secure goodwill by praising our services 
without arrogance and revealing out past conduct toward the republic, or toward our 
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parents, friends, or the audience … likewise by setting forth our disabilities, need, 
loneliness, and misfortune, and pleading for our hearers’ aid, and at the same time 
showing that we have been unwilling to place our hope in anyone else (I.V). 
Alternatively, the Rhetorica ad Herennium described how a similar strategy could be used to 
denigrate the ethos of one’s opponent: 
… from the discussion of the person of our adversaries we shall secure goodwill by 
bringing them into hatred, unpopularity, or contempt. We shall force hatred upon them by 
adducing some base, highhanded, treacherous, cruel, impudent, malicious, or shameful 
act of theirs. We shall make our adversaries unpopular by setting forth their violent 
behavior, their dominance, factitiousness, wealth, lack of self-restraint, high birth, clients, 
hospitality, club allegiance, or marriage alliances, and by making clear that they rely 
more upon these supports than upon the truth. We shall bring our adversaries into 
contempt by presenting their idleness, cowardice, sloth, and luxurious habits (I.V).  
A person could attack the motive of a defendant in this manner, by focusing on previous manners 
of life such as previous offences and suspicion of offence (II,III,5). Furthermore, Cicero showed 
how a person could look after his own interests through subordination to another person who has 
power: goodwill, gratitude, eminence, profit, fear, reliance on promise, and bribery (On Duties 6, 
21). All of these were essential starting points in forensic rhetoric in judging someone’s character 
or in trying to understand motivation and appropriate punishment in trials. Although Aristotle 
had written of strategies to attack ethos, these ethical starting points stand out against the 
exploration of logical starting points provided by the Topics and commonplaces of Greek 
rhetoric. 
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Cicero advised the way to gain reputation was to increase three feelings among the 
public: goodwill, confidence, and respect (On Duties 8, 31). What Cicero instructed was not so 
much how to go about accomplishing this precisely but more so how to look at these three public 
sentiments as adding to the concept of reputation as ethos. Reputation has practical, societal 
application: “For popular favor is profoundly influenced by a name and reputation for generosity, 
beneficence, fair dealing, loyalty and all the other good qualities which are associated with an 
attractive and agreeable character” (8, 32). Winning confidence is done by being intelligent and 
just (9, 32). But there is a caveat—it takes both: “Intelligence without justice creates no 
confidence at all” (9, 32). On the third factor in reputation, he writes, “… they admire qualities 
that exceed their expectations. And so they heap praises and respect upon any individual in 
whom they claim to discern remarkable and exceptional features…” (10, 36). Seeing the decay in 
civic life, Cicero yearned for these qualities in citizens, not just in the political arena but also in 
the courts of law. 
 He praised, “But it is in the courts that the possibilities for winning approval are the 
greatest” (On Duties 14, 48). In the area of forensics, he provided ethical guidelines for 
prosecution. Although Cicero cautioned against prosecuting often, he suggested it is worthy to 
prosecute if it is in the best interest of the state. Importantly, never prosecute to infringe against 
the civil rights of an innocent person (On Duties 14, 49-51). Great respect is due the defender of 
the innocent: 
The greatest renown, the profoundest, gratitude, is won by speeches defending people. 
These considerations particularly apply, when, as sometimes happens, the defendant is 
evidently the victim of oppression and persecution at the hands of some powerful and 
formidable personage. (On Duties 14, 52) 
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Defense of the innocent was a suitable counter to the increasingly hostile political developments 
of Cicero’s era. 
Like Cicero, who cautioned to prosecute or defend for just purposes, Quintilian centered 
on being moral in argument, and he elevates this didacticism above rhetorical techniques such as 
style, which the Greeks might have used to argue something they knew was false or murky in 
order to win a case. Quintilian’s preference for the rhetorical style of the capital shows a strict 
deference to authority. The important areas of style are idiom, so that the writer sounds as if from 
Rome and not merely a Roman citizen, again showing a prestige for the capital city, and 
propriety, which focuses on clarity, simplicity, and appropriate dignity in speech (Benson 220-
222). Listeners and judges may not be able to discern what is being said if language is 
ambiguous, obscure, or too flowery. This strictness of style is in sharp contrast to even Cicero, 
who recognized from the Greeks the usefulness of various styles in order to achieve specific 
aims with an audience. Cicero had instructed:  
To prove is the first necessity, to please is charm, to sway is victory; for it is the one thing 
of all that avails most in winning verdicts. For these three functions of the orator are three 
styles, the plain style for proof, the middle style for pleasure, the vigorous style for 
persuasion.  (Benson 233) 
Cicero’s plain style would go on to be the favored rhetorical style of early Christian writers. 
Quintilian, on the other hand, showed a dialectal prestige and a formal register in his promotion 
of idiom, that would be inevitably overshadowed by the more flowery and embellished Greek 
Second Sophistic throughout the first and second centuries. 
 Lastly, ethos exists in the principles of an entire community. Cicero was vague about the 
definition of the brotherhood of man and the perfection of virtue (Grant 11). At a minimum, 
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principle takes a “tremendous social and communal obligation” to get the “basic requirements” 
(Grant 8). Greek rhetoric had placed religious and legal demands on families, as demonstrated by 
laws against impiety. However, Cicero saw the threat imposed by the tyranny of the state and 
wrote about the “fundamental rights of the individual against the demands of the state” and 
provides a defense of private property in the second book of On Duties (Grant 119). 
Furthermore, he taught what should be done when “right and advantage” clash, but this was to 
provide a moral guide for the aristocracy after the dictatorial period of Caesar (Grant 119-20).  
This philosophical direction in his writing was safer for him under tyranny than declamatory 
speeches or his forensic instruction.  
Cicero preserved an attention to societal cohesion and some of the forensic thoughts on 
prohibition from the Greeks: “True law is reason, right and natural,” commanding people to 
fulfill their obligations and prohibiting and deterring them from doing wrong (Grant 11). These 
sentiments harken back to the way that both Cicero and Quintilian tried to criticize society 
through a gradual increase in focus on ethos as a safer form of rhetorical proof. All men have to 
treat each other properly because they all reflect the divine (Grant 10-11) and that “it is only the 
labor of man’s hands that places the profits and advantages from inanimate objects at our 
disposal” and that skills “are just the thing that make a human being’s civilized life different 
from the existence of a beast” (On Duties 3, 13-15). Cicero argued that man is more powerful 
than nature and so rhetorical skill to win over other men to your cause is essential.  
Although Cicero wrote about the effects in his academic works, he placed the dramatic 
dates in a previous age, not in the current time—he wanted it to be symbolic, not a record of 
events. He was not writing a history of his time but responding to the danger in ways he hoped 
will either lead back to the republic, or that will preserve the accomplishments of the Republic. 
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Cicero hinted at the dangerous political environment within the Republic for an orator, the 
erosion of that domain within which orators could practice traditional rhetorical techniques. He 
perceived the transformation away from the Roman Republic as a failure and criticized those 
who had been part of the transition and had gained political power from it. He wrote about the 
effects in his academic works, but he placed the dramatic dates in a previous age, not in the 
current time—he wanted it to be symbolic, not a record of events. He was not writing history of 
his time but responding to the danger in ways he hoped will either lead back to the Republic, or 
that will preserve the accomplishments of the Republic. Still, his criticism of Mark Anthony 
resulted in his execution. Cicero’s own fate points to the political dangers for orators. Cicero’s 
fears were founded and his words manifested in the reality of his assassination. His focus on 
ethos was a warning against authoritarianism, but it was Quintilian would truly write beneath the 
tyrant’s yoke. 
3.2   Translating Morality from Republic to Empire 
The Roman Republic changed to the Roman Empire when Octavius was proclaimed 
Augustus in 27 BCE. Cicero’s reality, his constraints and freedoms, were far different from 
Quintilian’s—most especially in regard to forensic rhetoric. Cicero, while experiencing some 
tyranny and government upheaval, also lived, and practiced law, in a different political structure 
than Quintilian, and in one that had more in common with Athens than the later Roman Empire. 
He was very free when he wrote his legal speeches. At the end of this life, when he was writing 
his treatises, circumstances had changed dramatically—but his theories are impacted by the 
freedom and the suppression. In the early Roman Empire, orators had to reverse the focus and 
concentrate on ethos over logos in order to practice their craft while avoiding persecution and to 
emphasize in a safe manner that good moral character was crucial to matters of state. Quintilian, 
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over a hundred years later, when the Empire had been in existence for roughly 50 years, left law 
and began teaching rhetoric to students. 
Quintilian may have received his elementary education in Spain, but when he was about 
sixteen years old he was in Rome for advanced rhetorical education. Under the patronage of 
Emperor Vespasian, Quintilian taught and wrote about trimming rhetoric of its wasteful 
flourishes and simplifying it to be more practical (Bizzell/Herzberg 359). Quintilian’s purposes 
were shaped by the politics within which he flourished. Murphy explains: 
By the time of Emperor Vespasian (A.D. 70-79) the schools had become an instrument of 
public policy. Vespasian initiated the practice of granting teachers immunity from certain 
municipal taxes, a practice which was confirmed and expanded by many later emperors, 
on the grounds that their service was a benefit to the state. It was also Vespasian who 
established official professorships to be paid from the state treasury; Quintilian was the 
first to receive the chair for Latin rhetoric, with its annual stipend of 100,000 sesterces. 
(Murphy xi) 
Quintilian “was placed in charge of the ‘first public school of Rome’ with an annual salary paid 
from public funds.” He also received “consular rank, bestowed by the Emperor Domitian—
which was, for that time, an unparalleled accolade for a rhetor (Murphy xvi-ii). However, despite 
his accolades, Bizzell/Herzberg insist that even Quintilian was aware of how his work was 
derivative, though richly sourced, researched and analyzed. His most important contribution, 
“that the good speaker be a good man” (360). He derived this innovation as a reaction to the 
environment in which he taught. 
 Under Domitian, the political climate was worse for orators who spoke their mind than 
during the Republic or under less dictatorial emperors, so Quintilian focused instead on the 
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moral character of a rhetor in order to stay in good graces with the emperor. Murphy asserts, 
“His emphasis upon moral principal as a factor in education must have made a profound 
impression in the dissolute society of his time” (xv).  But his focus on morality was also didactic 
as a critical meta-discourse on the state of the empire. Murphy describes the political terror that 
constricted the realm and effectiveness of oratory: 
The Roman senate survived in structure but was beginning to deteriorate into a huddle of 
terrorized sycophants existing at the pleasure of imperial military power. There was no 
longer any safe position in Rome for the outspoken citizen of the type which Cicero 
represented in the days of the Roman Republic” (xix).  
As a strategy to avoid the wrong kind of notice but still provide a critique, Quintilian drew on the 
Roman past for examples of virtue and vice in order to avoid retribution with his contemporary 
political environment, “an age in which public morals seemed to have descended to a savage 
low” (Murphy xx). For example, this typological comparison of connecting the present to the 
past would continue to be an effective tool to criticize the present indirectly throughout late 
antiquity and the early middle ages, as will be seen in later chapters. 
In response, Quintilian developed ethos more fully, exploring concepts of moral 
character, reputation, and community principles. He also showed innovation through his 
attention to pedagogy, to the entire life of the student and the people in it, presenting a humane 
and moral contrast to the political world in which he lived (Bizzell/Herzberg 360). Murphy 
agrees, “Quintilian not only describes for us the educational processes which he had inherited 
and which were to be replicated substantially down into our own century, but he explains to us 
why these processes are superior to their alternatives and what they can accomplish for society 
by educating citizens which are both humane and effective” (x). Quintilian was humane for the 
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gentle advocacy he displays in his advice for the student and effective in being practical and 
focused on an implementable and flexible program. His program’s successful adoption in Roman 
society and continuance into early Christian education show the value in these characteristics. 
Not only did orators of the Silver Age increase reliance on ethos, but they also simply 
moved to other fields of study and practice. The historian Tacitus and other Roman writers in the 
first and second century CE shifted from vocation in the law courts to history and poetry. They 
stated derision for the way rhetoric was being taught in schools and used in society, complaining 
of “remote subject matter” and a bombastic style. Bizzell/Herzberg note that Tacitus derided “the 
retreat of rhetoric teachers like Quintilian to the classroom” (360), reminiscing of an idealized 
prior era when a rhetor “could accomplish more when, in the general ferment and without the 
strong hand of a single ruler, a speaker’s political wisdom was measured by his power of 
carrying conviction to the unstable populace” (qtd. in Benson 114). Tacitus blamed the informers 
for the decline of oratory in his Dialogue on Oratory (Kennedy 190), perhaps blaming the 
decline of rhetoric on the decline of morality in general in the Empire.  
3.3   Right Reason and Behaving Well: Roman Rhetoric and the Good Man Speaking Well 
First, Roman orators wrote of moral character, prescriptive rules applied to oneself. Much 
rhetorical instruction was on self-guidance, being good, and acting right. Students still needed to 
hone their rational skills, but they needed the wisdom to know proper application. Cicero said the 
law that binds human society is “right reason applied to command and prohibition” (Grant 11); 
not only does one need to develop reasoning skills but one needs to know when and how to use 
them. There was reason and then there was, for Cicero, “right reason” (11). 
According to May and Wisse, Cicero aligned with his contemporary rhetoricians in that 
the ideal orator needed “natural ability and practice,” “a good voice and appropriate bodily 
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movements,” “good moral character,” and “devotion and diligence” (9-10). A positive home 
environment with the high hopes of a father and good speaking skills of the mother and 
pedagogue gave a student the right start (Bizzell/Herzberg 361). Where Cicero differs is in the 
rigidity of the system of rules presented in the handbooks, “prologue, narration, argumentation, 
and epilogue,” offering instead for the orator a more flexible progression through another 
inherited five parts of a speech, that of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. This 
arrangement gives the orator a “comprehensive view of the individual case at hand” (May/Wisse 
10). Given Cicero’s experience as an orator in courts and in the political arena, his focus on 
decorum and performance above and beyond the composition of the speech is natural. Cicero 
also focuses on the need for the orator to have “universal knowledge,” which included 
knowledge of philosophy, again showing how he shapes Greek rhetoric into the realities of the 
Roman system (11). 
This cultivated wisdom was the key to happiness. In On Duties Cicero wrote, “For surely 
to be wise is the most desirable thing in all the world. It is quite impossible to imagine anything 
better, or more becoming for human being, or more appropriate to his essential nature” (Grant 2, 
5). He also described how individuals have a responsibility to develop this faculty (Grant 8).  
Cicero opined, “The Stoics, he said, in spite of this different way of expressing the matter, 
attached as much weight to riches and good health …” as they did to spiritual and moral good 
(Discussions  41, 119). Cicero sought to fix this historical misuse of rhetoric through instruction 
on character. Essentially, Cicero’s On Duties was conduct literature because it is a guide to 
behaving well: “For it is necessary to assume that a method for learning how to behave well does 
exist—and that the place to find it is philosophy and nowhere else” (2, 5). Morality consisted of 
moral character and proper action. Cicero warned against doing any harm with words, such as 
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praising the character of a bad person (May/Wisse 207). Quintilian also combined skill with 
ethics in his instruction. James J. Murphy accents Quintilian’s focus on morality, calling his 
Institutio oratoria a “handbook on the moral duties of the orator” (“Quintilian” xix). 
 Not only was morality a chose behavior to these orators, but so was rationality. 
Rationality could be taught. Stoic theory influenced Cicero, and, long after Quintilian, the idea of 
control and rationality guided the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.  Stoic philosophy and Aurelius’ 
work Meditations helped create a bridge from pagan rhetoric to Christian rhetoric, and Aurelius 
is judged to be the last of the “good emperors,” driven by his own moral code and sense of “right 
reason.” Since Aurelius read and wrote in Greek as well as Latin, his own education in rhetoric 
guided him. Rationality was an essential part of the formula for moral character. Cicero believed 
humans could behave rationally under the worst conditions. In the Tusculans, he wrote, “… 
human beings are capable of acting rationally despite the influence of fears, pains and emotional 
disturbances …” (Grant 19). Rationality should be supreme to sentiments. Fitting within his 
educational program, Quintilian emphasized the learned nature of a student’s skills; the best 
could bring together a broad range of knowledge and practice in all the necessary rhetorical skills 
when needed. 
 Character, too, was explicitly joined to knowledge: “Virtue is based on knowledge” 
(Grant 23). Cicero did not rank morality as superior to cleverness but rather one and the same. In 
Discussions at Tusculum, he explained, “An acute first-class brain is the finest asset anyone can 
have –and, if we want to be happy, it is an asset we must exploit to the uttermost. But a good 
brain, mental excellence, is identical with moral excellence …” (Grant 23, 66). Here morality 
and rationality combine and drive the formation of good character, which bolsters personal ethos. 
Cicero also illustrated that character consists of kindness and liberality, traits that blend. 
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Kindness can be won through personal services or monetary gifts, but he shows how personal 
acts of kindness is an unlimited fund to draw from, while money is of a limited supply and only 
should be used when necessary. One must be generous without being extravagant (On Duties 15, 
51-52, 55). Quintilian, writing a century later, also emphasized rationality and responsible action. 
He published his comprehensive work Institutio oratoria  in 90 CE soon before his death. He 
described the perfect orator as a good man, excellent at speaking, and with excellent mind: “We 
are to form, then, the perfect orator, who cannot exist unless he is a good man” (preface to Book 
I ). He defined oratory itself as “the good man speaking well,” which clearly has two parts, the 
former focusing on citizenry and morality (Murphy xviii). Bizzell/Hersberg discuss how 
Quintilian advocated for a dual focus on character and skill, “Quintilian’s pedagogy suggest[s] 
that he wants to design a total environment for encouraging love of the good, as embodied in 
caring teachers, as well as mastery of rhetorical technique” (361). Part of good character, as has 
been discussed, was wise decision making. Quintilian also left room for intellectual fluidity and 
did not provide “rigid rules” for his students; “instead, he aims to develop the minds and talents 
of young men who can themselves decide their own actions in the public arena (Murphy xxvii). 
Again Quintilian offers a gentler pedagogical approach for his students. 
 Both rhetoricians bemoaned the impossibility of finding such an ideal orator, but it was 
Quintilian who thought to create one through the ideal system of instruction, complete with an 
emphasis on the moral requirements (Bizzell/Herzberg 361). Unlike the audience-based ethos of 
Aristotle, the ethos both orators spoke of was focused on genuine character and not just on the 
impression of character. Improvements in character and skill were a lifelong task. And the 
rhetorician should be inspiring (Bizzell/Herzberg 361). It is this personal ethos that will carry on 
into early Christian rhetoric over the next few centuries, as Bizzell/Herzberg agree, “This 
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emphasis [on the moral element] help to explain why Quintilian became a particularly influential 
resource for Christian rhetoricians from the early Middle Ages until well into the nineteenth 
century (361).  
3.4   Conclusion 
 By the second century CE forensic rhetoric, especially in terms of how it can be taught in 
education, had moved from a focus on logical appeals to ethical ones. Instruction on logical 
appeals remained in place, especially for the forensic arena, with an elaboration of stasis theory 
in the handbook tradition, but innovation in that area had slowed. Most of the work on logical 
proof in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, such as stasis theory, had been passed along somewhat 
intact from the Greeks, as formulated by Hermagoras and Hermogenes, as well as the earlier 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. The most profound innovation in rhetorical theory under Rome was 
found in the expansion of a focus on morality in instruction on rhetoric. Cicero and Quintilian 
expounded on subjective matters such as character, reputation, and societal principles. Ethical 
appeal had proven a safe, attractive, and useful arena in which to expand rhetorical thought. 
Murphy stresses the lasting significance of Quintilian’s educational ideas, “Roman schools, after 
all, trained such Christian leaders as Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Saint Augustine 
… was himself a teacher of rhetoric in a school following Quintilian’s program” (“Quintilian” 
xxxix). Although those Christian writers would debate rhetoric’s place in Christian thoughts and 
writings, the writers themselves were educated in rhetoric and used it to argue their ideas. 
 By the third century CE, rhetoric had entered into what Kennedy calls the Second 
Sophistic. In line with what has been presented here in this chapter, these latter sophists remain 
conservative in the exploration and application of rhetoric. Kennedy writes: 
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The older sophists were the radicals of their time: they introduced new methods of 
teaching, questioned traditional values, and encouraged their students to do the same. The 
latter sophists were conservatives, even reactionaries: they introduced no innovations in 
education, they did not generally encourage original thought on the part of their students, 
when they criticized contemporary society it was generally for its failures to live up to the 
past standards of conduct … (231) 
Their comparison to perceived golden ages of the past in order to critique their present society 
was well established by Roman orators of the Republic and Silver Age Empire. The Second 
Sophists relied on their oratory skills to convey their message rather than the personal ethos 
stressed by both Cicero and Quintilian. In coming centuries, as the Roman Empire experienced 
schisms and weakening of central control, forces in the early Christian Church would build on 
the technique of stressing ethos, while recalling from the stylistic excesses and pagan themes so 
popular in the late Empire. Criticism through nostalgia, by relating the ethos of a contemporary 
to one of antiquity, would become a forceful technique.23 The orators of this Second Sophistic 
period harkened back to Greek influences for their poetic declamatory and forensic 
arrangements. Christian leaders, though trained in rhetoric, would also come to criticize the 
Second Sophistic for its artificiality and floridity, preferring the plain style for their pastoral 
message. 
The Stoic technique of allegorical interpretation of pagan works would also be adopted by 
the Christians, first with Origen and eventually formalized by Augustine (Kennedy 260). In order 
                                                
 
23	  The	  Christian	  rhetorician	  Tertullian	  applied	  this	  technique	  in	  an	  innovative	  way,	  claiming	  that	  the	  true	  elements	  
of	  Greek	  philosophy	  were	  derived	  from	  Moses	  and	  the	  Jews,	  thus	  devaluing	  Plato	  and	  the	  Greek’s	  contributions	  
(Kennedy	  260).	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to fully utilize this technique, they would need to create an authoritative text to which they could 
apply this skill, the Bible. In doing so, they would learn to transfer the persuasive power of ethos 
from the person to a text, which ignited the pursuit of interpretative power over that authoritative 
text.  
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4   PATRISTIC TEXTUAL ETHOS AND THE RHETORIC OF HERESY 
Rhetoric and other forms of classical learning experienced a crisis period or turning point 
towards the end of the Roman Empire. As European society and its institutions moved from 
pagan to Christian dominance, so did rhetoric.  Rhetoric was despised by Christian writers as a 
legacy of paganism, and it was yet to be seen if and how it would be incorporated into Christian 
writings. In the second century Christianity seemed to the Romans a sect of Judaism, a cult, and 
a political conspiracy (Holloway 4). Throughout the Patristic age (100 – 451 CE), as historians 
and the church itself call the period in which early church fathers wrote, Christian writers used 
rhetorical learning and skill to transition the Mediterranean world to Christian thought and 
religious supremacy.  
In his own history of Roman Rhetoric, George A. Kennedy identifies how “The period 
from the death of the emperor Augustus in A.D. 14 until the reign of Marcus Aurelius in the 
second half of the second century is known as the “Silver Age” of Latin literature in contrast to 
the Golden Age of the Ciceronian and Augustan periods” (173). At the end of the Roman 
Republic, Cicero had expanded on the meaning and essential function of ethos in rhetoric, and 
the Silver Age Roman orators, like Tacitus and Quintilian, navigated to the safe harbor of ethos 
over logos due to imperial political threats, retreating to discussions on personal morality rather 
than advocating speech on political dissent. In the fourth century, the Christian Church 
developed new rhetorical channels in which to practice. Ethos remained the dominant rhetorical 
appeal, but the development of an ecclesiastical legal system, a professional legal class, and an 
authoritative text created an innovative, powerful, and enduring rhetorical strategy to shift the 
source of ethos from the orator to a text. Where Cicero and Quintilian’s ethical appeals relied on 
the morality and reputation of their ideal orators, the Greek Christian Jerome’s (347 – 420 CE) 
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assembly of the Latin Vulgate Bible instead allowed bishops to appeal to it and their 
interpretation of it in their ecumenical debates. Kennedy describes a new form of “radical 
Christian rhetoric … that prefers authoritative proclamation to rational argument” (258). Once 
these pieces were in place, a series of historical contests enabled the winners to claim interpretive 
victory, and thus, profess to hold the authoritative, divine truth.  
Reactions to early secular and pagan persecution forged the path for many of the 
arguments that would develop within the early Christian church. Over the course of a few 
centuries Christianity gradually moved from being illegal to a state religion. Hostility towards 
Christians had emerged since Nero’s reign (54 – 68 CE): “Persecution continued sporadically 
until the abdication of the emperor Diocletian (284 – 305), who made liquidation of Christianity 
one of the major goals in his program of imperial renewal” (Brundage 7). Diocletian was 
Emperor of Rome from 284 to 305. He reunited the Roman Empire after the crisis of the third 
century, when the Empire had been split into the Gallic, Roman, and Palmyrene Empires.  It is 
not surprising that Diocletian chose to eliminate other potential sources of disunity within the 
Empire. The Diocletianic Persecution of religious minorities, Christians, Manicheans, and others, 
lasted from 303 to 311. 
Constantine, who reigned as emperor of Rome from 306 to 337 CE, ceased persecution of 
the Christians. In 313, his Edict of Milan decriminalized practicing Christianity. The Emperor 
Gallien had previously legitimized the religion, but Emperor Diocletian’s period of persecution 
had followed. Ilaria L.E. Ramelli argues Constantine’s intent his act as a restoration with the 
added motivation of consolidation of power under him through monotheism (65-66). Then, in 
380, Constantine issued the Edict of Thessalonica, in which Christianity became the official 
church of the state. Noted medieval European historian and scholar of medieval canon law, 
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James A. Brundage writes that by that point “… the church became virtually an organ of 
imperial government, enriched by privileges, favors, and public funds, but also used as an arm of 
imperial administration” (7-8). Official status reversed the role of persecution, now Christian 
against pagan, and created a new arena for early Christian figures to compete against pagan 
influence and against each other. 
Because of Christian writers’ dislike of rhetoric and pagan authors, they developed a 
number of innovative approaches to rhetoric. They implemented a strategic shift to textual ethos 
as the strongest appeal and applied this textual ethos in ecumenical battles over heresy. One of 
the greatest centers of rhetorical conflict was in Alexandria, Egypt, a historical center of learning 
in the eastern part of the Roman Empire. There, Athanasius, Eusebius, and other bishops newly 
empowered by Christianity’s rising legitimacy, sought to devalue the knowledge and the political 
standing of pagans, to standardize an authorize a text, and then negotiate power by gaining 
control of the interpretation of that text. I define textual ethos as the authority wielded by a 
written source as opposed to the verbal skills of an orator. Once Christian bishops established 
this rhetorical appeal of textual ethos, the fourth and fifth centuries became a narrative of bishops 
declaring politically disruptive theological teachings of other Christians as heresy, or an idea or 
practice against the official teachings of the church. 
4.1   Christian Prejudice Toward Pagans and Rhetoric 
While the Christian leaders in Alexandria referred to “pagan practices,” their use of 
pagan as a label denied the diversity within a variety of non-Christian groups, including 
competing mysticisms, ancient learning, and the Jewish and Islamic faiths. The city of 
Alexandria in Egypt during the fourth and fifth century was a hybrid of cultures and sketches an 
excellent illustration of the battleground for rivaling groups looking for civil and spiritual 
88 
authority, and from the perspective of the particular, Alexandria illuminates what was happening 
regionally throughout the crumbling Roman Empire as the old institutions of Rome faced 
external Germanic tribal threats and internal dictatorships and schisms on its way to becoming 
the Holy Roman Empire. In this region, the Christian church faced many conflicts, internal, from 
the state, against other established or budding religious sects, such as mystic cults of Bacchus 
and Isis, Gnosticism, and others, against which they maintained an ideological or philosophical 
stance of the promotion of faith to the pagan populations.  
Alexandria had been an epicenter of pagan learning in the Hellenistic and Roman periods 
with a university, although the fabled library had been destroyed in previous centuries. It was 
now equally an epicenter of Christian theology and an influential crossroads of cultures. The 
provincial infighting in the church reflected larger patterns of east and west divisions in the 
Empire, stemming from the consequences of partitive inheritance, the multiplicity of cultures, 
ethnicities, and languages, and the gradual fracturing of centralized Roman political control. 
Although there was much diversity in religious practice, from the Christian perspective, there 
were two strong and divergent societies coexisting in the Roman footprint, Christian and all the 
others, lumped into a pagan category.  
Christians bishops engaged in rhetorical, and eventually legal, combat against pagans 
through theological apologies, exclusive community practices, and, secular legislation. Pagan 
Roman contact with Christians had been acrimonious and rhetorical attacks proliferated on both 
sides. According to American Archaeologist and classics scholar, R. Ross Holloway, writing of 
Rome and Emperor Constantine (2004): 
It was in this context of official restraint but occasional sporadic repression and universal 
suspicion that the debates between pagan critics and Christian apologists began. The 
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record of the pagan voices was largely erased by the triumphant Christians but the attacks 
of two of them, Celsus, who wrote in the time of Marcus Aurelius, and Porphyry, who 
lived on into the opening years of the next century, can be reconstructed from the 
refutations offered by their Christian opponents.  Beside the prejudices of the ordinary 
pagan citizen, we find in these writers a searching refutation of Christian theology. (6) 
Given the erasure of the pagan voice, it is difficult to reconstruct how pagan rhetoric developed 
during this time. However, traces are evident, through the influence of paganism on early 
Christianity, especially by way of Stoicism and Neoplatonism. 
Celsus and Porphyry were both students of Plotinus. Sara Ann McGill explains the 
importance of Celsus as a Neoplatonic philosopher in the transition from pagan to Christian 
worldviews, “In his lost work, ‘True Doctrine,’ Celsus argued that Christianity went against 
logic and reason. In answer to Celsus' accusations, a Christian named Origen in Alexandria, who 
lived during the third century, wrote ‘Against Celsus.’ Origen (c.185  –  c.254 CE) was [also] a 
Neo-Platonist” (2). Porphyry wrote about Plotinus’ ideas about the soul, the intellect, and the 
mind at the same time Athanasius attempted to explain the Alexandrian Christian church’s 
perspectives on the nature of the Word (Valantasis 61). In the Christian world, there was a 
movement from the Stoic concept of virtue leading to happiness to the Platonic concept of virtue 
being unattainable without the assistance of the divine, a shift that imposed a permanent 
fallibility over the material being.  
To gain authority, the Christians first of all had to devalue pagan forms of philosophy, 
knowledge, and ritual. One such instance was that of pagan rhetorical style. Jiří Kraus explains a 
more stylistic reason Christian philosophers disliked rhetoric, “This animosity of the first 
Christian thinkers towards rhetoric was escalated due to rhetoric in early Christianity being 
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dominated by the manner-ism of the Second Sophistic. Although some Christian authors were 
willing to tolerate it during public gatherings or in court, they rejected it in preaching the word of 
God when believers expect … the ‘simplicity of expression, not eloquence’” (85). Christians saw 
their teachings seen as pastoral, for the impoverished masses; they disliked the embellishment 
and flourishes of Greek rhetoric. Cicero focused on style in his work De Oratore, employing the 
Latin rhetorical elements of style: plain, middle, and grand. Despite Christian characterizing of 
pagan rhetoric as grandiose this tradition emphasizes the right style for the right purpose. 
Additionally, he integrated the Greek tradition of style, highlighting correct language, clarity, 
distinction, and appropriateness (May/Wisse 36). 
In matters of education, the Christians separated themselves from the pagans as well. 
Brundage writes, “Christian parents … were encouraged to see to it that their children were 
taught exclusively by Christian teachers. Christian teachers … were warned repeatedly to beware 
of the harmful consequences of having their pupils study pagan literature and philosophy save 
under strict supervision, lest they imbibe ideas and attitudes that might inhibit proper spiritual 
development” (16). These restrictions ensured orthodoxy, protection from contamination of ideas 
from foreigners, and the distribution of the ideas of the church and its leaders (16).  Although 
Constantine did not legislate against the pagans directly, his son Constans did (C. P. Jones 25). 
The fourth and fifth century sees a vacillation between imperial tolerance and intolerance 
towards the pagans. Theodosius, Roman emperor from 379 to 395, made “deviance from 
approved Christian doctrine or disobedience to the behavioral standards set by the bishops … a 
capital crime” (Brundage 17). By the reign of Theodosius II and the completion of his 
Theodosian Codes in 438, secular authority fully enforced doctrines of the church and legislated 
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against pagans (C. P. Jones 24), a necessary step to occur before the Christian adaptations of 
rhetoric would fully form. 
Pagan rhetorical strategies had also infiltrated institutions outside the church. Secular 
courts also relied on pagan rhetorical strategies inherited form the Romans. These proceedings 
would have been similar to how trials ran throughout the Roman Empire in the previous 
centuries, relying on stasis theory and Roman law. A professional class of lawyers had 
developed. Being a paid advocate was not legally possible in Rome until its conversion to 
imperialism yet had become a solid professional class by the fourth century (A. H. M. Jones 507-
13). Secular law was not directly directed against pagans; it was, however, supportive of 
Christianity. Christopher P. Jones notes, “The [secular] legal codes contain no law of 
Constantine directed against paganism, though several that reinforce Christianity” (24). On the 
other hand, still weakly consolidated, church courts varied regionally and idiosyncratically, and 
they often borrowed much from Roman law at the time (Brundage 12). Christianity had begun 
instituting its own legal system as a practical matter. Church laws were referred to as canon law. 
While the two legal tracks, secular and sacred, maintained different systems, canon law and the 
church legal system became more intricate and established. James A. Brundage writes, “… the 
church soon began to develop its own legal system, for its leaders quickly discovered that a 
viable community … required some rules and regulations for the orderly conduct of its business, 
to define the functions of its officers, and to govern relationships among its members” (5). This 
development in church law allowed for the strengthening of the church in interpreting its own 
institutional positions instead of relying on imperial, secular determinations. The self-regulation 
and consolidation instituted by the strengthening of canon law would parallel the growing need 
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for a consensus on matters of theological interpretation of Scripture; without regulation, discord 
and chaos reigned within the church structure and among its followers. 
Next, church legal texts were institutionalized as an authoritative judgment as the need 
arose. Formative legal topics focused on “the preservation of beliefs and practices that church 
authorities regarded as essential” (Brundage 13).  Michael Edward Moore explains how the 
decrees of the Eastern bishopric, which included Alexandria, were enshrined into canon law: 
 The highest regard was extended to the bishops of the early councils, such as Nicaea, but 
collectively all the bishops of recognized and accepted councils could be called ‘ancient 
fathers’. Canon law was often collected in chronologically ordered compilations, 
revealing a perceived connection between the law of the councils and the course of 
ecclesiastical history. (247) 
Furthermore, bishops used canon law to differentiate Christian cultural practices from pagan 
ones. Pagan targets included the gladiatorial games, animal sacrifice, and divination, for example 
(C. P. Jones 25). Christian cultures also strove to preserve itself among the pluralism of cultural 
communities. They fought against interreligious marriages. They also sought the permanency of 
marriage and also required both parents’ consent for marriage. All three of these practices were 
stabilizing factors, which would help to define and keep identity and peace in a community. 
Christians proselytized at every level, especially among lower classes. When they advocated for 
the fair treatment and other family rights of the enslaved, they spread Christianity among the 
enslaved class, another method of securing growth of the burgeoning religion (Brundage 14). 
Again, preservation and growth of the Christian community was behind much of this doctrine 
and canon law, providing their own sort of societal cohesion upon gaining freedom from 
persecution followed by authoritative ascendancy.  
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Not all Christian objection to paganism stemmed solely from preservation of the 
community, though, as some ideas sprang from ideological or philosophical differences. 
Porphyry, a leading Neoplatonist, also objected to animal sacrifice (C.P. Jones 68). Christians 
relied on scripture such as from the book of Amos to defend their antagonism towards animal 
sacrifice, and this doctrine was turned into canon law. Christopher P. Jones explains this process 
of transition from scripture to law, as well as the consequences for transgression: 
The Apostolic Canons, a collection of eighty-five ecclesiastical regulations dating from 
the fourth or fifth century, and later regarded as the earliest set of “canon” laws, laid 
down that no Christian should eat meat containing “the blood of its life,” or meat from an 
animal that had been killed by another animal or had died a natural death; an ecclesiastic 
of any rank who broke the rule suffered deposition, a layperson excommunication. (68) 
Canon law forbade elements of the pagan diet. Thus, early Christians used their own legal 
system as well as that of the government to differentiate from, discriminate against, and 
dominate pagan culture. 
4.2   Christian Practices of Rhetoric 
Christian writers did, however, appropriate elements of the pagan philosophy of 
Neoplatonism. In the Christian world, there was a movement from the stoic concept of virtue 
leading to happiness to the platonic concept of virtue being unattainable without the assistance of 
the divine, a shift that imposed a permanent fallibility over the material being. In time, a 
Neoplatonic ideological superstrate also covered both Christian and pagan philosophies. Both 
these philosophies transferred into the Christian world.  
James J. Murphy explains how Roman education was preserved: “While there were some 
zealous Christians like Tertullian and Cyprian who wanted to renounce learning in favor of a 
94 
simple faith, the fifth century church decided instead to pursue the values of the educational 
system already in place” (vii). Augustine of Hippo, trained in rhetoric and a teacher of rhetoric, 
was a Neoplatonist, and he incorporated elements of the philosophy into his Christian writings 
after converting. Other Christian writers and church leaders did the same. For example, 
Neoplatonism underpinned the arguments Athanasius used to secure political power within the 
church. The bishops in and near Alexandria were heavily influenced by Neoplatonic thought. 
Neoplatonism, a movement with third century origins, expounded on the philosophies of Plato 
but also had a religious element. A Neoplatonic ideological superstrate eventually covered both 
Christian and pagan philosophies, though a link between the two seems to fade in the fourth 
century.  
A Neoplatonic wave swept over the region as philosophers shifted from the ontic, or the 
physical and observable, to the ontological, or the metaphysical. Neoplatonism was taught by 
Plotinus and his student Porphyry. It was based on Plato’s writing but was original enough to be 
considered its own school of thought. Plato had envisioned a transcendent world apart from the 
material one. McGill summarizes how Neoplatonism extended on this concept,  
Plotinus taught that at the center of Plato's transcendent world is a unified and perfect 
being called One. Out of the One came the Divine Mind or Logos. From the Divine Mind 
came the World Soul, which connected the material world to the upper or transcendent 
world. Below these three things is the material world that we live in. The goal of 
humanity is to, through meditation, reach the Divine Mind and join the One. (2) 
Plotinus’ philosophy was metaphysical and quasi-religious. Neoplatonism existed alongside 
Christianity but was distinctly pagan. Students of Plotinus and their extended followers believed 
they were simply a continuing line of disciples of Plato’s philosophy, part of a continuing 
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tradition that gained popularity when Plotinus opened his school in Rome (Remes 1-3). For 
example, Porphyry used Aristotle’s Categories, a work about logic not philosophy (Strange 7), to 
argue for ontological dependence of particular things on their ideal Platonic forms (4), an idea 
that was carried on by the Bishop of Alexandria—Athanasius (296 – 373 CE)—and other early 
Christian philosophers, establishing their argumentation about the nature of the Word, a term 
used to mean God. Plato believed there was a perfect version of everything in the material world 
out beyond sight. The Neoplatonists believed in the dependence of material things on this 
metaphysical world and applied that relationship to humans in order to come up with the concept 
of a soul, which Christianity then borrowed.24 Christian scholars saw the Word as the divine 
truth that flowed through both the immaterial and material worlds. Control of the debate on the 
nature of the Word, whether intentional or not, meant having control of bodies and minds. The 
outcome of this contest for control would demonstrate how new rhetorical strategies focusing on 
textual ethos and control of the interpretation of the authoritative text could prevail. Bishops used 
these innovate rhetorical strategies ultimately to direct church doctrine, reinforce political power, 
and introduce Christian theology more deeply into law and forensic rhetoric. 
The leaders of this movement, who focused on the ethos of the text, were trained in 
rhetoric and other classics (Weinandy 1). Athanasius was trained by Alexander, the Bishop of 
Alexandria, and studied scripture and local theological traditions as well as literature and 
philosophy in order that he could refute those topics (Weinandy 1). Athanasius “… obviously 
became a shrewd and astute ecclesial politician during the course of the Arian controversy” 
                                                
 
24	  John	  Dillon	  explains	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  Plotinus’	  The	  Enneads,	  “…	  the	  Celestial	  Soul,	  concentrated	  in	  
contemplation	  of	  its	  superior,	  and	  the	  Lower	  Soul,	  called	  the	  Nature-­‐Looking	  and	  Generative	  Soul,	  whose	  
operation	  it	  is	  to	  generate	  or	  fashion	  the	  lower,	  the	  material	  Universe	  upon	  the	  model	  of	  the	  Divine-­‐Thoughts	  …	  
this	  lower	  principle	  in	  the	  Soul	  is	  sometimes	  called	  the	  Logos	  of	  the	  Universe”	  (xxxiv).	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(Weinandy 8). Athanasius’ works such Orationes contra Arianos and Apologia ad Constantium 
are rhetorical works in practice. Athanasius admitted there was a pagan contribution to 
education: “One cannot grow in holiness without the help and example of others” (Weinandy 
130). Some New Testament writers such as Paul and Luke were familiar with Greek literature 
and used rhetorical devices in their writing (Kennedy 258). The Christian orators Origen and 
Augustine of Hippo used rhetoric to develop a Christian rhetorical technique of Biblical 
exegesis, in which one peeled back multiple layers of metaphor in the Bible to reveal divine 
meanings (260). The Christian writer also “found On Duties adaptable to the needs of the 
Church” (Grant 33). Christian rhetors, despite being suspicious of the pagan origins of rhetoric, 
found innovative ways to adapt rhetoric to promote their ideas. 
The endurance of rhetoric in the Christian Church through all of these avenues aided 
Christian theologians in their internecine debates on theology and assisted them in gaining and 
maintaining positions of authority. Greek rhetorical rules had set the stage for a host of ways to 
argue within a religion about religious matters, but for Christianity, the focus became purely 
about the legitimacy of an interpretation of a specific text and agreement on that interpretation.  
4.3   Textual Ethos: Creating an Authoritative Text in Christian Rhetoric 
Once Christianity became dominant and legitimized by the state, Christian bishops in 
competing power centers with alternative theological teachings turned on each other for control. 
Creating an official Bible allowed the bishops to turn on each other for control of the interpretive 
authority among their ideological rivals.  I use textual ethos to describe the persuasive authority 
found in a written text as opposed to the personal ethos that emanates from the morality, 
character, or reputation of an individual. For a text to have the ethical authority, a definitive text 
had to be established and reproduced enough to be available to individuals and groups eager to 
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wield power. First of all, imply moving from orality to text was an act of power among a largely 
illiterate community. This movement created a power distance between the literate text owners 
and the rest of the populace.  
The rise of the codex as a writing form aided the creation of an authoritative text. The 
codex was a book form of writing, made up of sheets of parchment, vellum, or other material. By 
300 CE, the codex had begun replacing the scroll, one long parchment with rollers on either end, 
and was equal in availability with scrolls at that point. The codex spread with Christianity and 
particularly with the Bible. It replaced the scroll within about two centuries (“Codex”).  
Monasteries were influential in this rise of the codex. There were no monastic scriptoria until the 
early sixth century. However, the monastic movement itself spread across the Eastern Roman 
Empire in the fourth century (Lawrence 11). Lawrence cites the dissemination of literature as 
one of the reason interest in monasticism spread (11). He writes, “It was the literature of 
Egyptian monasticism that brought the first flood of converts. More than any others, the work 
that made the deepest and most long-lasting impression upon Western readers was the Life of St 
Antony by Athanasius (11).  
Competing mystery religions stressed orality; Christianity moved in a different direction. 
Even in Neoplatonic writings there was a mysticism that discouraged writing down teachings 
(Valantasis 52-3). In the fourth century, the Christian, monastic scholar Jerome translated the 
Bible into Latin, called the Vulgate, so from that time on an official text could be referred to in 
rhetorical debate. In addition, other rhetorical texts appeared that narrate the story of the church 
as a linear, monolithic entity, such as Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History. The first church 
regulatory handbook appeared around the turn of the first century, but by the second and third 
century there were longer rulebooks (Brundage 5-6). Augustine of Hippo describes how “the 
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divinely inspired writings have created for us the canon of scripture with its most beneficial 
authority” (qtd. in Green 105). Once the authoritative text was established, the interpretation of 
that text was next under debate 
Christian bishops interpreted the Bible differently to come up with competing theological 
ideas; they needed consensus on the interpretation to end internecine political disputes within the 
church. James Jasinski also insists that “there can be no final or ultimate ground that proves, 
once and for all, what … [a given text] … means” (293). The Bible, nor any text, rendered an 
automatic, infallible interpretation. Augustine wrote, “There are two things which an 
interpretation of scripture depends: the process of discovering what we need to learn, and the 
process of presenting what we have learnt” (qtd in Green 101). Using his experience in rhetoric 
and a system created by Origen, Augustine created a process of textual criticism for interpreting 
multiple layers of symbolism in the Bible and even in profane text, wherein one searched for 
salvation allegory within the passages beyond the literal meaning.  Thus, Augustine lays out how 
rhetoric could and should be used within a Christian exegetical context, securing the control of 
how to interpret the authoritative text. Steven Mailloux discusses how a group of readers reach 
agreement or consensus on an interpretation of a text: “Interpretive work always involves 
rhetorical action [and] attempts to convince others of the truth of explicating and explanations” 
(qtd. in Jasinki 292). Christian bishops, as a group of readers, inherently used rhetoric to settle 
their interpretive disputes. The bishops who held the interpretation, held great power, and they 
used this power to subjugate and control other rival bishops with competing ideas. 
4.4   The Rhetoric of Heresy 
After gaining legitimacy for the Christian Church through Constantine’s edicts, Christian 
theologians and bishops turned against each other over interpretation of doctrine and authority 
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within the church. The church held temporary councils and synods to debate theological issues, 
and votes were taken to achieve majority consensus on theological ideas. However, unlike in a 
legislature, the losing sides’ ideas were proclaimed permanently unorthodox or illegal: the 
concept of heresy was established. Secular authority would enforce these outcomes. To start, the 
rule of Constantine I (311 – 337 CE) marked the end of the initial persecution of Christians.  
Some background on the divisions that developed within the church will help at this 
point. Bishops, reporting up to the Pope in Rome, the highest Bishop, gathered in councils and 
synods and created new bodies of ecclesiastical law. The local gatherings called councils, a word 
of Latin origin, numbered in the hundreds during the fourth and fifth century. The more formal 
synod, a word of Greek origin, required all bishops to show and to have equal vote, but the terms 
synod and council are often interchanged in lay commentary. “The church adopted the principle 
of subordination of authority in the fourth century as a consequence of its integration into the 
administrative system of the Empire, which was already organized as hierarchical structure” 
(Brundage 8). Christian structure began to split from within between those who were tolerant 
towards bishops who cooperated with the Roman authorities during the persecution and those 
who were not tolerant of those bishops. These divisions continued into the fourth and fifth 
century, manifesting as competing political centers within the church. 
The First Council of Constantinople (381 CE) established the pentarchy of patriarchs 
with Rome supreme (Brundage 9); five regions were led by Bishops with the most powerful 
seated in Rome. Brundage illuminates how by the fifth century, bishops created their own 
regional laws, “Bishops … established their own courts, the audientia episcopalis, in order to 
adjudicate matters that fell under their authority” (10, 12). Ecclesiastical law had different 
purposes at its start, related to the organization and administration of the clergy: arbitration, 
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reconciling, preventing conflicts, and mediating (12). This developed into prolonged, heated, and 
repeated combats against heresy, which involved harsher punishment for those who challenged 
the authority of the hierarchy under the guise of “moral lapses” or “Serious deviations from 
mainstream teachings and doctrines,” which implies that there was actually something 
mainstream at this time, rather than evolving and growing as has been established by the 
lengthening of the doctrines available and the incremental formation and establishment of the 
church courts and synods (12). One must remember these were not heresies until proclaimed so: 
such movements or political challenges were delineated and then defined as heresies, and it was 
that process that actually helped define what was orthodox (this is the othering process). It was 
the heresies that caused the church to maneuver itself into applying penalties in the fourth and 
fifth century instead of continuing their tradition of arbitration (12). Kennedy writes, 
“Theological controversy was bitter within the Church between the orthodox (that is, those who 
eventually won) and heretics (those who eventually lost). All the weapons of rhetoric were used 
by both sides in life-and-death battles …” (264). While rhetoric was surely used in the debates 
themselves, the entire process was rhetorical as well. Majority vote, acting not unlike a jury in 
law courts, decided the outcome, and that outcome granted extreme persuasive ability to silence 
or destroy theological adversaries. 
Monasticism further restricted epistemological strategies of argument. Athanasius made 
alliances among the monks to fight Arius (Weinandy 3). Lawrence described how the monks and 
their ideas were absorbed into the larger Christian milieu: “Its scholars provided some heavy 
artillery in the Pelagian controversy over grace and free will. It was also a nursery of monk-
bishops. The appearance of monks in the ranks of the episcopate signified the assimilation of 
monasticism into the ecclesiastical organism” (16). Augustine also lent his support to 
101 
monasticism and helped to blend it into the organized church (Lawrence 17). Lawrence 
described how “by the fifth century, then, the ascetical tradition of the Eastern desert had been 
transmitted to the West” (17). Pachomius of Egypt is credited with moving beyond the more 
torturous and isolated forms of contemplative eremitism and bringing the anchoritic lifestyle into 
coenobitical communities, but it was Basil who popularized a new intellectual path to asceticism 
(8-9). Jerome credited the imperial persecutions for driving Christians into the desert for safety. 
Columba Stewart sums up the ascetic goals and strategy of Evagrius, a fourth century monastic 
psychologist: “… Anger differs from lust, though both are triggered by interaction with others … 
healing the intellectual requires reading, vigil, and prayer; healing the desiring part of the soul 
involves hunger, toil, and withdrawal from others; healing the irascible part of the soul requires 
psalmody, patience, and mercy” (Stewart 68). Lawrence suggests also to view the monastic 
movement as a reaction of the more austere and devout against the relaxed attitudes of the 
Christians after the end of the persecutions and thus monasticism itself as a rhetorical argument 
(Lawrence 1-2). Regardless it created a type of division within the Christianity community, one 
that Athanasius could take advantage of during times of exile in order to craft and push his larger 
rhetorical design of building an enforced consensus among all Christian communities. 
Another example of securing consensus as a rhetorical strategy emerges from the 
challenge of Arianism. Arianism was a collection of ideas that became a church political 
movement, but it became a heresy through the Council of Nice (Ligouri 55). Arius was a very 
educated African who went to Alexandria to advance in the church. After being snubbed for a 
promotion, he attacked his opponent, Alexander, for being heretical. The church sided with 
Alexander and identified two teachings, or differences of opinion and belief, of Arius: namely, 
that Jesus was created from nothingness and that he was human, capable of virtue and vice (9, 
102 
56). Arius preached these ideas publicly (57). Ligouri writes that Alexander first used 
admonition to sway his behavior. Alexander called a synod of 100 bishops to Alexandria in 320 
CE. Arius announced his beliefs there, and the synod excommunicated him in response. The 
attacks on Arius’ character grew worse when adversaries claimed he seduced his female 
followers (57). He produced a work called Thalia, which he used to proselytize his minority 
views to the common people (57). His ally Eusebius of Nicomedia conducted s synod in Bithynia 
of favorable bishops to Arius, who asked Alexander to receive Arius back into the church. 
Another strategy of Arius’ supporters was to convince Emperor Constantine that the issue at 
hand was of no great consequence, a small issue.  Constantine acceptingly responded to this 
minimization by telling all sides to remain quiet about the issue and continue on with differing 
beliefs (58). From 335 – 337 CE, the Council of Tyre resulted in the exile of Athanasius. The 
tide against Athanasius’ tool of consensus had temporarily ebbed, but changes were soon to 
follow. 
In 325 CE the Emperor called the general council at Nice. Some of the priests there 
showed wounds of persecution for their beliefs, which is also held ethical power in this 
assemblage (58). The arguments of those bishops on the side of Arius were seen by their 
adversaries to have been weakened by their contradictions in opinions (59-60). Eusebius of 
Caesarea writes, “… many were attracted by the force and elegance of their discourse,” but 
describes how one layman reminded the assemblage that “neither our Lord nor his apostles had 
taught us the rules of logic or idle subtleties but the truth, which is preserved by faith and good 
works” (392-3), causing the crowd to remain quieter. The council decided against Arius and 
proclaimed Jesus and God as consubstantial. Of note, the Emperor appeared on the last day to 
lend authority to the judgment and proclamation (60). Constantine showed humility towards the 
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priests, lending himself ethos by yielding it and therefore validating consensus as an effective 
rhetorical appeal (61). Punishment was the deposition and banishment of Arius (62). The 
judgment was accepted by the defeated side because they feared the power of the majority and its 
secular backing and not because of the logical sway of any particular argument (64). Charles 
Freeman writes, “Confronted by the terrible animosities of Christian debate in the fourth century, 
one has reason to be relieved that silence fell in the churches” (314). Gregory of Nazianzus 
wrote, “It is better to remain silent, than to speak with malice” (qtd in Freeman 314). Clearly, the 
vitriol of the rhetorical debates and the consequences for the losers had a longstanding effect of 
silencing dissent. 
The judgment of this council strengthened reliance on the authoritative text and the 
control of its interpretation buy the empowered majority. Eusebius of Caesarea writes regarding 
Arius’ novel ideas, “By a little spark, a great fire was thus kindled” (388). Demonstrating how 
effective proclaiming heresy was as a rhetorical strategy, Aristotle’s Categories along with 
Porphyry’s commentaries on that work also fell out of use in the fifth century as it was no longer 
considered appropriate to question the nature of the delivered message or contemplate the nature 
of the divine (Freeman 315). Then, in 362 CE, the Council of Alexandria effectively ended the 
Arian controversy by combining the concepts of homoiousians with homousisan (Weinandy 7). 
Athanasius used rhetoric to cripple it profoundly from within. His rationality is the 
immortality of the soul and its capability to move closer to the Word or further towards non-
being, or sin/evil (Weinandy 19-20). This is not classical deduction; rather, it’s imagination. He 
starts with Aristotle’s “It is rationality that differentiates humankind from the animals,” then 
departs rapidly (19). Weinandy writes, “… Athanasius was consistently more interested in the 
truth proclaimed than in the manner in which it was proclaimed,” (7) which rings of Platonism: 
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“The word is the perfect divine image of the Father …” (14). The authoritative text is a window 
into the ideal. Neoplatonism, with its One, Intelligence, and the Soul have a Trinitarian likeness, 
and through these synods and rhetorical strategies used therein, the concept of the Holy Trinity 
of Catholicism was born. 
Christianity is seen as a mystery here, with the inability for anyone to fully comprehend 
the Word. Arianism was an attempt to define things. Athanasius and others preserved the religion 
as a mystery, and Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 CE) further preserves the mystery. 
Manichaeism and Gnosticism, two other major heresies of the period, were based on the concept 
of salvation by knowledge. As Roman rhetoric had already begun to focus on ethos more than 
logos for argumentation, and patristic rhetoric did the same, angling for control of the underlying 
warrants or beliefs upon which their system of ethos lay, Manichaeism provided a direct 
challenge. Christianity was comfortable with the mysterious and the unknown because those 
were not the method of proof advocated. 
Politics from within and without influenced the tactics with which early church figures 
entered arguments. Donatism, an African heresy, highlights the early church’s desire to maintain 
their established hierarchy. During the persecution of the Christians by Diocletian, some church 
leaders had to renounce their faith; Donatists did not forgive this, perceived moral corruption 
while the church establishment did. Augustine of Hippo had this movement proclaimed a heresy 
by using legal documents in a church gathering (collation). Melitians opposed leniency as well, 
causing discord among the ranks of bishops (Weinandy 2).  
Another challenge that was met with ecclesiastical consensus as a rhetorical response was 
Pelagianism. Pelagius (360 – 418 CE), a British monk, studied and settled in Rome. He posited 
the mortality of Adam and Eve and, thus, the lack of Original Sin, and that infants were born in 
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this state and, upon dying, have eternal life (Ligouri 110). Disagreeing with these ideas 
vehemently, Augustine attacked Pelagius’ doctrines through letters to adherents and also through 
his works (112). Augustine broke his ideas down into a system of subterfuges, or very loose 
reasoning around argument.  Augustine argued that original sin had corrupted the power to 
reason, and through vote on the interpretation of scripture, Pelagianism and Pelagius himself 
were condemned in councils in 412 and 416 CE (114) (Freeman 346).  
Charles Freeman writes, “With the integration of aspects of the Greek philosophical 
tradition into Christianity, pagan rhetoric came again to be valued,” especially in funeral oration, 
epideictic rhetoric highly focused on ethos (314-5). Freeman writes, “No longer is coherence of 
[logical] argument valued” (315). Both Tertullian and Augustine praised the irrationality of the 
Christian message (315). Augustine interestingly throws out the moral value of the speaker, 
insisting that the message itself, which he sees as divine, has enough ethical weight (315). There 
is a nod to Platonism in his reasoning: “Truth exists eternally and totally independently of the 
one who speaks it,” Freeman concludes (315). He discusses how approved texts by respected 
authors came to surpass the creation of new sermons and that the need for rhetoric declined 
because of it (315). Freeman writes, “The point remains that the link stressed by Isocrates and 
Quintilian between the moral character of the speaker and the words he spoke has been broken” 
(399).  Such an accusation would throw out the other aspects of rhetoric involved in the 
presentation and swaying of the audience, such as delivery and ignores that this is better 
illustrated as a shift of ethos from the orator to the text, a text which could be more tightly 
controlled than the mutable mind of a speaker.  
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4.5   Conclusion 
The methods of the early Patristic Christians were rhetorical and paved the way to 
increased power. They found the aid and backing in secular authority to dominate pagan 
communities and their practices. Then, they created and propagated an authoritative text and 
imbued it with a new kind of textual ethos. The personal ethos, so highly valued in the Roman 
Empire, migrated to a new source. Bishops gained consensus, then the sovereign implemented 
the rulings of the church through secular, legal channels, and a kind of concord was attained. The 
innovate rhetorical strategy this chapter has described, that of consensus, is unique for the 
domain of law. While a jury could pass a verdict, all the ideas of the losing side were not thrown 
out summarily and persecuted. Yet this process flourished in the early Christian church.  Legal 
scholar Richard A. Posner explains, “Authority’ means something else in law. Legal decisions 
are authoritative not when they command a consensus among lawyers, corresponding to a 
consensus among scientists, but when they emanate from the top of the judicial hierarchy” (79). 
This tactic succeeded when it came to arguing for control of the interpretation of religious texts. 
Once agreement on interpretation was reached, enforcement of that agreement still came from 
above, whether from church or secular leaders. 
Rather than rhetoric disappearing during this time, it was changed and coopted by 
ecclesiastical forces to use against the pagans and then against each other. Consensus was used to 
generate authority and then applied to the singular text and those who won the right to interpret 
that text. Eventually, secular authority backed up sacred authority and rulings, and the legal 
systems, while separate in structure, became integrated in intent and application of power. In the 
Christian world, it would be several centuries before a cultural Renaissance among the Franks 
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opened access to the control of the Bible, its interpretation, and the acceptance of other profane 
or secular texts as legitimate alternative sources for textual ethos. 
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5   SWEET AND DELIGHTFUL: RHETORIC AS A TOOL OF PAROCHIAL 
LEGITIMACY DURING THE CAROLINGIAN RENAISSANCE 
And, you who read, scorn not a book so small— 
To you brings honey the small-bodied bee. (Alcuin in Howell) 
Here we turn our attention to rhetoric in the Carolingian Renaissance. The previous 
chapter illustrated how competing factions within the early Christian Church in Alexandria 
shifted reliance in argument on ethical proof from the orator to an authoritative text. The Roman 
system of study and use of rhetoric declined and nearly disappeared with the epistemological 
dominance of the Christian Church along with the political collapse of the secular authority of 
the Roman Empire, under the conquering waves and settlement of the various Germanic tribes 
from the north and the blockade of access to the seas in the south by Islamic advances. However, 
rhetorical institutions were actually replaced by new systems put in place by the superseding 
powers.  Factions in the Christian church had appropriated rhetorical technique in order to hold 
sole interpretive power over a primary authoritative text, the Bible, along with supplemental 
church doctrine. The impoverished, conquered, or enslaved were just as disfranchised, legally 
and educationally, as they had always been in early and late antiquity by Greek, Roman, and 
early Christian Church dominance successively.  
In addition, the institutions of the elite were sustained and altered by a scattered and 
parochial collection of both secular and sacred authorities. These various political rulers used 
rhetoric to promote cultural growth, learning, and legal codification in order to establish 
parochial legitimacy.  Rich K. Eich writes, “Rhetorical scholars who have prejudged the 
Carolingian revival of learning would do well to heed Richard Winston's view that "it is risky to 
judge and condemn the intellectual achievements of one age by the standards of another" (53). 
George A. Kennedy states, “The seventh was the cultural low point in the West,” though he 
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points out various isolated rhetoricians who produced extant works up to the ninth century, such 
as Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, and Bede as well as works that carried great 
influence during this early medieval period such as those of Macrobius and Donatus (274-5).  
Eich disagrees, “The Carolingian movement, then, must not be sidestepped in the comprehensive 
treatment of the history of rhetoric” (53). The isolated rhetorical works from those writers better 
known in the history of rhetoric are certainly of great value, but the Carolingian Renaissance 
contributes as well to the history of rhetoric with its interesting innovations in rhetorical 
strategies. 
Kennedy provides his summation of the devolution of medieval rhetoric thusly, “… the 
functions of the study of rhetoric in the Church were transferred from the preparation for public 
address in law courts and assemblies to knowledge useful in interpreting the Bible, in preaching, 
and in ecclesiastical disputation” (271). However, that description applies only to the strict 
classical body of rhetorical works and technique, overlooking broader application of rhetoric in 
other forms and the works of secular actors. In this period, Western Europe saw new parochial 
kingdoms, such as the Franks, that sought legitimacy. Charlemagne ruled the Franks from 768 to 
814 CE and was crowned Emperor of Rome in 800, thus wielding great influence.  The 
Carolingian Empire lasted from 800 to 888 CE. During the eighth and ninth century, Frankish 
kingdoms saw varying actors utilize rhetoric to vie for their peripheral legitimacy through a 
variety of innovations in rhetorical strategy, such as promoting a cultural renaissance, which 
required the expansion of educational centers, the development of a rhetorical typology to justify 
cultural unity, the codification of legal systems, and the propagation of texts.  
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5.1   The Carolingian Renaissance and Alcuin’s Rhetorical Theory 
410 C.E. saw the sack of Rome and 476 the end of the empire. Some cultural institutions 
devolved, but some facets survived these political events. Kennedy writes, “In the West, the 
schools of rhetoric flourished through the fourth century” (273). He emphasizes the “nonartistic 
rhetoric of intimidation and brute force that prevailed at the time” (272).  In History, Frankish 
identity and the framing of Western ethnicity, 550-850, Helmut Reimitz suggests that the Franks 
created a post-Roman, Christian West identity, to contrast against the Byzantine and Islamic 
centers, that eventually developed into a Western European identity.  
Richard E. Sullivan defines a renaissance as:  
quickened and redirected activity in thought and expression that derives its prime 
impetus and fundamental shape from conscious turning to an earlier cultural 
tradition in search of models that will allow the creation of cultural artifacts 
capable of animating the minds and spirits of a particular collectivity, the 
members—or at least some members—of which perceive themselves to be 
restrained and confined by a deficient cultural milieu. (“Introduction” 2) 
The members’ rhetorical claim was that society was deficient; they wished to restore it to what 
they perceived as a better past. Sullivan advises that the goals of the Carolingian age (751 – 987 
CE) included “appropriating the Greco-Roman classics, purifying Christianity, cultivating the 
power of reason, and improving the human lot” (4). Partitive inheritance eventually subdivided 
the Empire, but this chapter does not seek to establish the legacy of the efforts of this period, 
rather, it seeks to expose and describe rhetoric’s adaptation to the cultural milieu, its innovation,  
and its strategic application. 
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The political restructuring in France was due to aristocratic rebellion and not nationalistic 
or ethnic sentiment. Patrick Geary writes, “The result was that regional strongmen created 
powerful regional alliances that, while professing loyalty to distant Frankish kings, managed 
their own affairs. Here Roman law, in the Theodosic Code or in abbreviated forms such as the 
Breviary of Alaric, provided the uniform territorial law for all, and counts and dukes … 
developed powerful regional identities” (139). Geary writes, “The wars of expansion fought by 
the Frankish kingdom under its Carolingian kings introduced a new role for ethnic and legal 
differentiation within Europe as one of the building blocks of the Empire” (153). This conception 
of a shared ethnicity provided an underlying foundation for members of the Renaissance to build 
from. 
James J. Murphy claims, “If the schools outlasted the [Roman] empire, it was also true 
that the teaching methods outlasted the Roman schools themselves. The history of medieval 
education is only now being written, but there is increasing evidence that the basic pedagogy 
which the Romans had inherited from the Greeks was passed on into the Middle Ages 
substantially unchanged” (xiii). Here, Murphy posits a continued classical education into the 
Carolingian Empire. Charlemagne wished to expand on this infrastructure. In 795 CE he issued 
“On Cultivating Letters,” which commanded religious centers, monasteries and churches, to 
institute a program of instruction for classical learning, namely grammar and rhetoric. Kennedy 
claims the intent was to expand the number of people who could read Scripture (282). Spiritual 
edification satisfied the goals of those who promoted an improved society. Thomas F. X. Noble 
explains Charlemagne’s religious purpose for his efforts: 
Charlemagne’s massive program of educational reform and spiritual revival … was 
focused directly on the Bible. The whole idea of the reform was to communicate biblical 
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truths to the people so that all might be led to salvation. In order for the clergy to preach 
the Bible, and for the people to understand what was being preached to them, books had 
to be obtained and copied, teachers had to be trained, schools had to be formed, and 
pupils had to be recruited. (238-9) 
Although advocates sought cultural spiritual improvement, Charlemagne had a practical need for 
educated persons to administer his Empire as well. He also sought cultural unity to maintain 
order (Eich 53, 57). Among other cultural endeavors, he did so by reviving, imitating, and 
preserving the Roman tradition of rhetoric. 
To accomplish this goal, Charlemagne “appointed Alcuin to become Abbot of Tours in 
796 … entrusted with the reform and revitalization of a venerable and wealthy institution that 
was deeply rooted in the history of the Frankish monarchy …” (Dales, 149). Alcuin was 
educated in classical rhetoric. Kennedy writes, “Alcuin was a Briton whom Charlemagne came 
to know and placed in charge of the palace school at Aachen in 781 as an effort to improve 
literacy”; to enact his educational agenda, Alcuin produced the Dialogue of Charlemagne and 
Alcuin concerning Rhetoric and Virtues in 794 (282).25 This text provided a rhetorical text to 
help spearhead the movement, backed by both secular and spiritual goals. He headed the Palace 
school, where “ambitious youths of good families resorted to the courts of the Merovingians [the 
previous Frankish dynasty that had succeeded in unifying Gaul] and their mayors in the 
expectation of learning whatever a ruler ought to know … the students were exposed to 
weaponry, etiquette, leadership, and discipline as well as to rhetoric and the other liberal arts” 
(Eich 55-6). The text and the system of education itself were not so much novel as was the 
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rhetorical strategy of initiating a new and improved educational system. Joseph M. Miller writes, 
“The Dialogue, like the treatises of Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville, did not contribute many 
original insights …” (123). Focusing only on the canonical rhetorical theory overlooks Alcuin’s 
purpose and skillful application of rhetoric in his works to address larger concerns for a cultural 
reflowering, an education system in its infancy, and Frankish political claims for legitimacy. 
Kennedy judges Alcuin’s work as derivative of Cicero’s forensic rhetorical theories and largely 
based on the handbook Julius Victor (282). Miller admits, “It goes beyond the mechanical 
definitions of terms to include practical advice on how rhetoric and the virtues could influence 
daily life of the sovereign and his subjects,” a sentiment echoing Cicero and Quintilian’s focus 
on morality and living a virtuous life (123). In this way, it bolstered both moral and practical 
aims of its promoters. 
In his introduction to the Dialogue, Alcuin compares a book of lessons on rhetoric to a 
small-bodied bee that brings something sweet and delightful. Although Alcuin lived in a time 
when many classical institutions of learning were being forgotten or destroyed, he took part in an 
organized effort to reinvigorate the concept of an education. Alcuin had Charlemagne reflect a 
utilitarian desire in the Dialogue when he has Charlemagne say, “… it seems absurd not to know 
the rules of an art when the necessity of using it confronts us daily” (qtd. in Howell 67). 
Emphasizing the distributed curricula of schools and their necessary interconnectedness, John J. 
Contreni notes: 
But no school ever offered the full range of theoretical and practical studies that was 
possible during the Carolingian realms.  Everything depended on local resources, 
interests, and talents. Indeed, the unevenness of the curriculum fostered interdependence 
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among centers and stimulated masters and students to create networks that linked 
schools, libraries, and, of course, people. (127) 
The young education system varied regionally and local and was subject to availability of 
resources, yet the system was fluid and interconnected.  
Despite early Christian resistance to rhetoric as pagan, in the sixth century writers had 
first found a desired way to use rhetoric, hagiography as a type of epideictic praise rhetoric in 
order to make their points, allowing secular powers a chance to challenge and expand the canon 
of authoritative texts. Frankish scholars also looked at pagan and secular works as authoritative 
texts, Cicero, for example, and they certainly found them supplemental and of value: “A broad 
pattern emerges of interest at court in patristic writings as well as classical literature, along with 
more technical books about grammar and computation” (Dales 297). Scholars accepted pagan 
works more than in previous centuries in order to amass the educational material needed for this 
endeavour. Charlemagne and Alcuin did not just tolerate pagan and secular authors but also 
valued them; they needed the historic, pagan knowledge to enact cultural reforms and push for 
greater legitimacy. Perhaps Charlemagne felt freer to incorporate these works, relatively 
protected as he was from the church, with many of the theological debates that established 
orthodox doctrine having been resolved in previous centuries. James Palmer describes the 
Frankish appreciation of “a variety of non-Christian cultures which influenced the Franks from 
within, from the communities incorporated into the Frankish imperium with only the most 
superficial Christianization, to the works of the ancient Roman and Greek poets which played an 
important part in the Carolingian Renaissance” (404). Furthermore, “only education dedicated to 
improving Latin literacy offered” a way to access the learning of the past (Sullivan 57). Latin 
works had influenced Alcuin’s education and choice of texts, as Greek sources were less 
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available at that time. It was Boethius’ writings several centuries earlier that carried Aristotle, by 
way of Porphyry, on into the Middle Ages, at least in the West (Watts 12). Alcuin had been 
educated at York’s cathedral school (Howell), and the works of Boethius and also Bede, 
available in Northumbria, were crucial to Alcuin and thus highly influential in the creation of the 
Carolingian course of study (Dale).   
Alcuin’s rhetorical instruction did not contain much innovation, mostly passing on the 
learning of the past. Alcuin bases his Dialogue on rhetoric on Julius Victor and Cicero. “For 
Rhetoric the textbooks were the De Oratore of Cicero and the Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian” 
(Knowles 1964).  David Knowles explains that rhetoric remained a key component of education 
in Western European cultural centers, “Between 600 and 1000 the quadrivium was in eclipse as 
an educational syllabus, and was either omitted altogether or treated simply in a brief, factual 
way.” He describes how dialectic faded from the curriculum as well. “This left Grammar and 
Rhetoric—that is, a purely literary education—in possession of the field” (1964).  Rather, 
Alcuin’s rhetorical act lay in the exigence and execution of his work itself, situated in the context 
of political legitimacy. 
5.2   Rhetorical Typology and Frankish Legitimacy 
The power of ethos as an appeal lingered, and creative writers could strengthen national 
ethos through an innovative strategy of rhetorical typology, an extension of Christian Biblical 
exegesis already in use for centuries. Augustine of Hippo had already promoted rhetorical 
analysis as Biblical exegesis in the fifth century. The Franks applied this technique to the cultural 
strengthening and reputation of their growing empire. Both the Frankish and English assemblage 
of kingdoms took part in using rhetoric and other forms of classical learning to practice nation 
building, a storytelling strategy which had sprung from Celtic and Nordic dynastic poemic 
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traditions. These fledgling attempts to establish legitimacy reach full literary force by the time of 
the Matter of Rome, especially Troy, the Matter of Britain, and the Matter of France.26 
The unification of language, culture, and identity drove the proponents of these new 
nations. Claims of national origin tended to focus on the ancient past—typically that of Greece, 
Rome, or Troy (Geary). In this vein, Charlemagne and his court wished to connect the Franks 
back to the Biblical Israel. The imagined elements of nationhood were language territory, and a 
distinct culture (Geary 35). The states of the early eighth century were the product of 
regionalism, figureheaded by local elites and made up of new combinations of cultures. Here is 
where legal codes become instrumental in establishing an imagined community: the 
“Carolingians created a new kind of European ethnicity based on an individual’s own legal code 
rather than ancestry or culture” (Geary). Legal identity was just one of the ways in which Franks 
imagined themselves a cultural entity. They also saw themselves as an ethnicity founded on 
Christianity. 
Mary Garrison discusses how the Franks claimed to be the Elect of God as the new heir 
of Israel rather than claiming descent from a fallen Roman Empire (114). Garrison writes, “The 
concept of election becomes an ideology of legitimization when it is appropriated by ruling 
groups to justify political arrangements, territorial expansion, exclusion, or oppression” (116). A 
rhetorical strategy used to justify this thinking was typological thought—whereby a new event 
can be understood as a fulfilment of an earlier one” (Garrison 117).  This typology can be 
“optative, descriptive, or prescriptive” in intent, meaning the metaphor can describe how things 
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should be, how things are, or how they must be (118).  Karl Leyser agrees, “Both the mythology 
and cosmology in which Europe emerged as one of the constituent parts of the word intrigued 
and exercised the imaginations of the Carolingian court circles they reached and, it could be said, 
poured into their lavish poetry up to the end of the ninth century” (1). This style of textual 
criticism stemmed from Origen and Augustine’s Biblical exegesis, which the church had 
formerly used to see religious allegory and soteriological messages in both religious and profane 
texts, only now it had been adopted by scholars to integrate secular politics into those religious 
readings. 
Noble claims, “The point of the careful Old Testament exegesis in the Libri Carolini, 
coupled with the designation of Charlemagne as David, was precisely to make the Frankish ruler, 
and him alone, the authentic representative of and heir to the Davidic kingship of Israel” (239). 
Not only did the Franks wrestle internally with rhetorical authority, but they also fought to 
establish their authority in argument externally; Noble writes, “For the Carolingians to take their 
place in the roll of nations, they had to battle the Byzantines, who also laid claim to the direct 
inheritance of the Roman Empire. To do this, they contested them on every field that really 
mattered; the biblical, the apostolic, the ecclesiastical, and the institutional” (248). They ranked 
their ethnic identity above other ethnicities and saw a noble, religious role for their ruler. 
The Bible was the authoritative text for any spiritual or even political debate, empowered 
with ethos, with only select factions allowed access to, and interpretation of it, a condition I 
called textual ethos. The Carolingians created a rhetorical innovation by projecting that ethos 
back to their secular ruler. For example, Garrison asserts, “By the 790s, Old Testament 
comparisons had gained a new prominence and a new public at the Carolingian court. Typology 
was reified, and the Bible’s role as an authoritative text was such that biblical law could be 
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applied to the Franks in the Admonitio Generalis and Charlemagne himself could be addressed as 
David rather than merely compared to him” (159). Scholars compared contemporary king to 
historic or Biblical king. For example, Alcuin wrote of Charlemagne, “Behold our Solomon, 
resplendent with the diadem of wisdom” (qtd. in West 47). The Franks had created a rhetorical 
innovation of typology as a persuasive appeal. 
 The cultural movement was successful. Verily, Charlemagne did promote wisdom and 
learning in his kingdom. In fact, “the nurture of cultural life was elevated to the level of public 
policy by Charlemagne” (Sullivan, “Context,” 56). Charlemagne’s edict made the cultural boom 
an official, national project, but this effort was not Charlemagne’s idea alone; according to 
Sullivan, there were many actors that influenced this focus: poets, the papacy, the episcopacy, 
monarchs, the aristocracy, and monks (“Context,” 65-71). The Biblical comparisons and the 
concept of a New Israel was sought because it could connect the Franks to the Christian 
Promised Land and could elevate the Franks to the status of God’s chosen people. Garrison gives 
credit to the papacy for initially spurring on the typological comparisons for the Franks as the 
New Israel: “… it was not the Carolingians themselves who began to depict themselves as the 
elect, but the popes … papal letters to [Charlemagne’s father] Pippin began to incorporate 
comparisons between Moses and David and Frankish kings, between Israel and the Franks” 
(123-4). Charlemagne proclaimed the letters from the papacy as wise and ordered their 
preservation (Garrison 128).  Purveyors of Frankish election, those who encourage viewing the 
kingdom as divinely chosen, linked the kingdom to Trojan ancestry as well (151).  In the Trojan 
mythos, “Priamus was their first king,” and the Franks migrated from Troy through Macedonia 
under a figure named Francio (Leyser 4). Interestingly, while clergy used a hermeneutic to seek 
out earlier, supposedly truer, primary sources to authenticate their contemporary points, royalty 
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chose instead to use the rhetorical technique of exegesis applied to the singular, sacred, 
authoritative text in order to create metonymical symbolism to bolster their arguments. 
Nostalgia and disaffection with their present age motivated the Frank. Matthew Innes 
posits, “The past … might provide a legitimating template for the current order of things, 
explaining how things were meant to be thus, or an image of an ideal order, a Golden Age 
against which the present could be judged” (Innes 1). Biblical or historic figures and narratives 
could be used as that legitimizing template. Likewise, per Douglas Dales, Alcuin’s goal for 
education was nostalgic and typological: “In a letter to Charlemagne, written in the spring of 799 
from Tours, Alcuin alluded to their hope of recreating an academic tradition that would emulate 
that of Athens of old, where the seven liberal arts would now be completed by the sevenfold gifts 
of the Holy Spirit” (194). Education was both didactic and secularly available as well: “Within 
this intellectual tradition, logical thought had its place alongside the authority that sprang from 
divine revelation. Moreover, education was not to be confined just to clergy or monks: it was to 
be accessible to the laity as well, men and women, some of whom were Alcuin’s closest allies 
and friends. Learning and morality were to go hand in hand, whether in the policy of the 
Carolingian state, or in the conduct of private individuals” (195). Within this sentiment as well is 
praise of Plato’s idealized philosopher-king (Plato had envisioned an ideal leader who would be 
trained in philosophy), a role Alcuin envisioned Charlemagne performing (196). 
Alcuin’s rhetorical analyses of the Bible had an ethical strategy, similar to how I argued 
in Chapter 3 that the Alexandrian bishops vied for interpretive control of the authoritative text. 
Dales reveals how Alcuin saw himself as church teacher, criticizing the morality of the day, and 
how he connected this to a Biblical counterpart, the wise King Solomon: 
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Solomon, was described by the word concionator, which was a translation of the 
original Hebrew designation and which in Latin meant public demagogue and 
moral exhorter, a role with which Alcuin himself clearly identified in his letters 
and elsewhere … He was addressing the ethical state of both Church and society 
during a boom-time in a manner similar to some of the biblical elements in 
Carolingian legislation. (158) 
Not only was Charlemagne subject to typological comparison, but so was Alcuin. Alcuin saw a 
typological connection with himself to church historical figures as well. Such connection 
allowed all empowered Franks to draw such comparison simply because of their newly 
constructed ethnicity. 
The church followed suit. It was not just secular leaders who took part in the expansion of 
sources available for typological rhetorical comparisons, but also church leaders took part in this 
legitimizing endeavor. Knowles describes how Canon Law was also collected and distributed for 
greater central control by the clergy: “… in the middle of the ninth century the whole corpus had 
been contaminated by the work of a group of ecclesiastical reformers … who, in order to free the 
Church from the secular power and from Celtic customs, produced the tendentious and in part 
spurious collections known as the False Decretals and the False Capitularies” (157-58). In this 
case, church members used older sources to position their arguments against competing elements 
within the church. Knowles further explains, “… the contest between the Empire and the papacy 
set the papalists searching for old and original sources in support of their case …” (158). In a 
process similar to the assembly of the Bible as the authoritative text, here the clergy continued to 
argue for authoritative textual ethos as a rhetorical strategy of appeal. 
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5.3   The Codification of Legal Authority 
Classical forensic rhetoric still applied to an elite class and “justified serfdom by a variety 
of intellectual constructs that reduced peasants to an inherited, almost subhuman status” (Geary 
20). The populace at large did not recognize themselves as an ethnic community because of 
linguistic similarities (30). The classical dichotomy of Roman versus barbarian had eroded since 
the sixth century in favor of burgeoning regional polities. The creation of national entities such 
as Britain and Gaul blurred “the lines between Roman and barbarian, when not abolishing them 
altogether” (120). It was no longer relevant to be Roman in practice. Geary writes, “By the 
beginning of the seventh century, such a distinction meant nothing. Roman citizenship was 
meaningless; regional populations were divided by social stratum, not by language; and all of 
society … were united in a single faith. Thus, the term barbarus began to take on new meaning: 
that of foreigner, and increasingly, pagan foreigner” (140). Christian and Frankish were more 
powerful identities. By the ninth century, Romanus simply meant people from the city of Rome 
(Geary 141). This setting allowed Charlemagne to divert power and influence from Rome to his 
kingdom, as Frankish identity, and more so class identity, outranked the political and church 
authority that emanated from the historic Roman power center. It had become more useful to be 
of Roman origin in a historical sense. 
In the early Middle Ages, identity was a rhetorical choice in the legal system; litigants 
could claim belong to the legal system that best suited the conditions of his case. For example, 
Geary writes about the contemporary Lombards, another Germanic people, who had like the 
Franks, conquered parts of the former Roman Empire, but in the Italian peninsula, “Law was, 
initially, a major means of creating a Lombard people. From the mid-seventh century on, the 
heterogeneous barbarian warriors serving in the kingdom were expected to follow Lombard law 
122 
unless permitted an alternative legal tradition by the King. Certainly, Lombard legal identity was 
not a matter of birth but of royal decree” (123). These multiplicitous legal heritages also became 
intertwined. Geary describes law as a “resource” rather than a “fact of birth” (124).  Law was not 
illustrative of ethnic identity (125).  Extraterritorial Franks acted like colonists in conquered 
kingdoms, “proudly preserving their particular legal systems, and transmitting it to their children. 
This patchwork of legal systems, requiring every individual who appeared in court to declare his 
or her law, long outlived the Carolingian legal system” (Geary 154). When legal systems varied 
so much, identity became a more useful tool of forensic rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, some classic elements of forensic rhetoric remained. In the Frankish 
system, ethos was still highly valued. For example, conjuratores were witnesses who swore on a 
matter as testimony, and their status affected the weight of their appeal (Lacroix 352). Where 
these cultural programs most impacted the history of forensic rhetoric was in the transferring the 
ethos of the authoritative texts from just the Bible and other church laws to codices of secular 
laws and the moving to include the secular or profane as an acceptable domain of learning. 
Harkening back to the aforementioned typological comparisons, Geary suggests: 
At the same time that Carolingian imperial policy was creating new meanings for old 
labels, Carolingian ideology was inventing ancient genealogies for them … the new 
codifications of regional laws emphasized their antiquity … they projected the history of 
these laws into the distant past; thus, the imagined history of the law codes justified the 
Carolingian imperial system (155). 
Imperial policy applied to the codification of law the same typological comparisons scholars 
used to link Charlemagne to the New Israel. 
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Law codes conformed to changes in cultural interaction. For example, the Theodosian 
(429) and Justinian (529-534) Codes show a change from tolerance to destruction concerning 
pagan temples (Mirow 263). Sometimes the purpose of the law codes was more constructive: 
“One underlying goal of the Theodosian Code was to resolve conflicts between the eastern and 
western empires through a unified text of laws” (265). Despite the intent, law puts constraints on 
cultural identity. “In the east, the Theodosian Code was soon supplanted by the Justinian Code; 
in the west, many of its provisions were to continue as a fundamental source of laws for the 
Visigothic king, Alaric II, who in 506 promulgated the Lex Romana Visigothorum, … This work, 
or the Code xi itself, influenced greatly the sixth and seventh century codes of the Merovingian 
Gauls” (263). Rather than culture conforming to law, law in effect conformed to culture. 
There was an increasing provinciality to the creation of law as the Roman Empire 
continued to splinter and lose central authority. C. F. Kolbert writes, “Provincial governors 
[issued] Edicts on matters relevant to the governing of their provinces” (15). One might think 
this provinciality in the origins of laws would decentralized actual power, but Paul Lacroix 
suggests that despite its distributed provincial origins, the Salic Law, the standard law of the 
Franks compiled around 500, and other legal codification increased the power of the king: “… 
far from lessening supremacy of the King, the national customs which were collected in a code 
extended the limits of the royal authority and facilitated its exercise” (344). Salic law also ends 
the practice of private courts held by nobility (346). In the face of varying and unpredictable 
legal systems, more legal unification and standardization was needed to provide societal 
cohesion and legal surety. 
This was the rhetorical strategy behind the practice of codification: “The reasons behind 
codification in this era are complex, but certainly one important aspect of codification was an 
124 
attempt to centralize power and unify legal rules and practice over large areas … to codify legal 
rules was also to define and structure political, social, and religious practices” (Mirow 265). 
Having laws written down and available ubiquitously allowed greater central control in both 
secular and sacred affairs. Charlemagne would then use sacred authority in turn to enforce his 
own efforts. Michael Edward Moore writes of “the extensive use of the Fathers as a source of 
conciliar law beginning in the late eighth century. The canon of Christian authors was formalized 
and their writings were presented as binding doctrine” (294). Following codification, 
Charlemagne needed production and distribution of his broader array of textual authorities in 
order to promote his cultural and legitimizing program. 
5.4   The Role of the Scriptorium 
In order to lessen the Church’s restricted access to the Bible as the sole textual ethical 
authority, it was necessary to create and distribute copies of it. “Crucial to education were books, 
as well as those capable of copying, reading and teaching them. The preservation and 
proliferation of books, Christian and classical, was one of the most abiding and striking legacies 
of the Carolingian renaissance” (Dales 196). As I argued in Chapter 3, the Bible had already 
been established as the authoritative ethical text in Christian regions, creating textual ethos as the 
prominent application of rhetoric. Dales explains the successful proliferation of that authoritative 
text: 
The scriptorium of Tours rapidly became one of the most important centers of 
Carolingian learning, producing many other fine manuscripts in elegant Caroline 
minuscule. But ‘this multiple reproduction of the biblical text during a sixty-year 
period cannot be paralleled: in all, some forty-six Bibles were produced along 
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with eighteen gospels that still survive from the years before 853, when the 
Viking attacks began to make a serious impact on the life of the monastery. (149)  
Charlemagne charged the churches in his kingdom to reform education and produce more 
manuscripts. Dales remarks how availability was more the purpose than uniformity: 
The concern of all these reformers was to establish a clear and accurate Latin text 
of Scripture, though not necessarily a standard one as has sometimes been 
thought; and to establish alongside it a consistent and orthodox interpretation of 
that text in the light of the teachings of the Church Fathers. Thus the copying of 
Bibles was complemented by the proliferation of copies of the Fathers and 
especially of their commentaries on Scripture. (150) 
A clear and accurate Latin text of the Bible was needed for legibility and increasing the volume 
of readership. The commentaries of the Church Fathers, many individuals over centuries, such as 
Origen, Jerome, Augustine, etc., was part of the expanded group of sources that secular and 
church figures considered authoritative texts. Uniformity was not Charlemagne’s primary agenda 
because he was not arguing church doctrine; he was expanding access to the authoritative text for 
the enhanced administration of his kingdom rather than restricting access to the authoritative 
text, as had been the case in church battles over heresy in the previous centuries. 
The work of the scriptorium served to blend secular and sacred institutions and further 
established Biblical textual ethos in the region: “This exemplary role was part of the wider 
program of establishing the authority of the Bible in the Carolingian church and state” (Dales 
149), but under the direction of the state. Through the scriptorium at Tours, nobility attempted to 
wrestle away some of the interpretation of the authoritative ethical text from the clergy. Dales 
writes, “The style of the Tours Bibles also gave to the Scriptures royal authority, setting a norm 
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of presentation that would have a long influence on the way the Latin Bible was perceived and 
used” (149). So not only does the authoritative text have consensus in interpretive consensus by 
the church, but it now has the backing of the secular, political authority. Specifically, the use of 
images runs against the iconoclastic dictates of the 787 Second Council of Nicaea.  
Ecclesiastical professions were highly factional, as Chapter 3 revealed. Bishops led 
diocese, while abbots led monasteries. The Church viewed bishops as more powerful, but that 
was not always the case in local practice.  The Council of Paris in 615, which set rules for 
secular and sacred appointments for officials, had effectively split ecclesiastical and civil legal 
systems, thus limiting the power of royalty in church matters (Kolbert 345), but royal agendas 
found other avenues down which to advance. The monastic community contributed to the 
centralization of authority in the kingship over the bishopric because their land and their practice 
became indebted to the king. C. H. Lawrence writes that it was a “growing practice” in eighth 
century to give “the abbey and its estate to Charlemagne, who took it under his protection and 
removed it from the jurisdiction of count and bishop” (78). This encroachment of power by the 
secular authority was part of Charlemagne’s larger pattern of legitimizing his rule and power to 
the church as well. He had already typologically asserted himself as analogous to the Biblical 
figure of Solon and his kingdom linked to salvation history as the New Israel. 
The conduct of monks across Europe was also increasingly standardized and governed by 
the Rule of St. Benedict, a popular set of customs and practices for monastic life from the 
fifth/sixth century (Lawrence 78). Monastic rules were a form of conduct literature and thus 
rhetorical in nature. Rules constitute a form of education, they are persuasive in nature, and they 
express dictates on style and behavior, maintaining cohesion and uniformity within the monastic 
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communities.27 The Rule eventually became enforced by imperial power: “Special missi were 
appointed by the emperor to visit monasteries and inquire whether the decrees were being 
observed” (79). Lawrence elaborates how “the autonomy of each community in the management 
of its internal affairs was now curtailed by the overriding authority of the abbot-general, which 
was backed by the power of the secular government” (80). Rules of enclosure kept monks more 
often sequestered within the monasteries and uninvolved with external (and political) affairs. 
Lawrence describes another relinquishment of educational influence of the monks in the schools 
they provided: “it was safer to leave the conduct of the external school in the hands of a secular 
master” (81). Royal maneuverings had converted an internal monastic movement and thus 
relegated the authority of the monks to producing more copies of the authoritative texts that were 
promoting the legitimacy agenda of the nobility. Lawrence states, “But as a whole, the monastic 
contribution to the Carolingian Renaissance largely lay in the transmission, collection, and 
preservation of the past rather than in new creation,” a role that played well into the typological 
imperative of the King (82). Because monastic communities were under the protection of the 
King, the King enforced the conforming Rule of Saint Benedict, monks were often enclosed 
from public life, monks operated the scriptoriums, and secular teachers taught at the public 
monastic schools, this component of the religious institutions of the Franks posed little barrier to, 
and promoted the authority of, the King, thus allowing Charlemagne to fully enact his rhetorical 
program unencumbered. 
                                                
 
27	  According	  to	  Lawrence,	  Benedict’s	  abbey	  in	  Inde	  “came	  to	  have	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  monastic	  reform	  as	  the	  
official	  model	  of	  the	  Benedictine	  observance	  for	  all	  the	  imperial	  abbeys—a	  kind	  of	  ascetical	  staff	  college,	  where	  
abbots	  and	  monks	  would	  be	  sent	  to	  learn	  the	  approved	  practices”	  (78).	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5.5   Conclusion 
Despite its gap in surveys on the history of rhetoric, from the evidence above, there was a 
continued strain of rhetorical education in Carolingian France. However, the Franks were to craft 
innovate developments in rhetorical strategies to address their needs for cultural unity and 
political legitimacy. In order to legitimize the new Frankish Empire, under the dual effort to 
educate his people in order to fill his administrative positions, Charlemagne anointed Alcuin to 
create a vast program at the palace school to create cultural unity. Exegesis was used to create a 
typological comparison of Charlemagne to the Biblical David and the Franks to the New Israel. 
Legal codes were collated and produced to unify a diverse populace of competing aristocratic 
factions. Clergy attempted to codify their textual authorities as well but lost some control of the 
authoritative text through Charlemagne’s guided effort to produce and interpret the Bible in the 
scriptoriums, while monastic communities also unified under the royally promoted Benedictine 
Rule. 
While Charlemagne’s kingdom had geographic as well as tightly woven political and 
religious ties to the Mediterranean world, the Christian Church, and the Holy Roman Empire, the 
remote island of Great Britain struggled to maintain such connections. The Romans had 
colonized Britain many centuries before, but successive waves of Germanic invaders and 
migrants in the fifth and sixth century had eventually subsumed the Romano-British colony. By 
the time of Charlemagne, Britain remained fragmented by warring kingdoms, bereft of Roman 
cultural institutions. By the ninth century, significant Danish invasions resulted in the conquest 
of half of the island. While the Christian Church had maintained outposts and Christianized the 
Anglo-Saxons, the Anglo-Saxons had brought with them their own legal systems and forensic 
rhetorical strategies. Once King Alfred the Great forcibly united the remaining Anglo-Saxon 
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portions, in the 880s he began, like Charlemagne, to institute legal reforms and education, more 
authoritarian than aimed at personal justice, creating and preserving a Christian, Roman heritage 
in contrast to the pagan, Danish threat. By promoting continental legal structures, Alfred’s 
reforms had the effect of limiting the efficacy of inartistic proofs inherent within the native 
culture.  
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6   DISCOVERING ANGLO-SAXON FORENSIC RHETORIC: ETHICAL 
AUTHORITY IN ELENE AND LIFE OF SAINT BASIL 
In the late ninth century in Britain, King Alfred forcibly united the portion of England not 
occupied by the Danes, and he instituted legal reforms and education, creating and preserving a 
Christian, Roman heritage in contrast to the pagan, Danish threat.28 This Alfredian Renaissance 
pivoted primarily off the accomplishments of the seventh century foundations of the monastic 
Northumbrian Renaissance. In Anglo-Saxon England, forensic rhetoric combined the structures 
and strategies for conflict resolution of heroic societies with those inherited from the Greco-
Roman system, such as discursive argument and reliance on artistic proofs. The literature of 
ninth century Anglo-Saxon society shows this transition, the two systems often represented in 
combined form or side by side. However, Old English literature frequently contains scenes of 
debate that resemble a forensic argument. Within these scenes, scholars may glean glimpses of 
forensic rhetoric, especially in terms of what was considered acceptable categories and how and 
why a participant could win an argument. This chapter looks at two such sources, Elene and Life 
of Saint Basil to demonstrate how a close reading of the literature can provide an insight into the 
techniques and uses for forensic rhetoric for the Anglo-Saxons. 
Kevin Crossley-Holland writes that the Anglo-Saxons “brought with them a code of 
values typical of a heroic society. Its axis was the bond between a lord and his retainers and its 
stress was on the importance of physical and moral courage, on the blood feud, and on loyalty” 
(x).  In Anglo-Saxon legal literature, we see cultural struggles taking place representative of the 
                                                
 
28	  Alfred	  had	  had	  trouble	  with	  his	  own	  officials	  officiating	  their	  proper	  duties	  and	  wanted	  to	  increase	  their	  ability	  to	  
read	  and	  write	  for	  better	  administration	  of	  his	  kingdom.	  To	  this	  end,	  he	  established	  a	  school	  for	  “his	  own	  children	  
but	  also	  …	  [for]	  …	  the	  sons	  of	  his	  leading	  men	  and	  others	  of	  lesser	  birth”	  (Keynes	  35-­‐6).	  His	  program	  successfully	  
created	  educated	  clergy	  throughout	  England	  and	  produced	  many	  copies	  of	  philosophy,	  religion,	  and	  history	  books,	  
while	  still	  restricted	  to	  his	  primary	  goal	  of	  improving	  religious	  life	  (36).	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clash of Greco-Roman institutions with Germanic ones, such as violence versus mediation or 
Christianity versus comitatus, the word Tacitus used to describe the Germanic warbands in his 
work Germania. These struggles profoundly impact the course of rhetoric by creating more uses 
for and strategies concerning rhetoric. Commenting on the complexity of the system in the epic 
poem Beowulf from centuries earlier, John M. Hill indicates, “We begin to see the economy of 
honor and gift giving as open to social complexity, competitiveness, and possibilities for 
manipulation” (259). However, by the ninth century, institutions based on loyalty, kinship, and 
retainership were more formally shifting to institutions based on law (259). 
Laws had been codified by other kings in Britain in the centuries before, but there had 
been a lengthy gap.29 Then, the ninth century saw Alfred and other Anglo-Saxon kings attempt to 
codify laws.30 Law was also made outside of the codices in a large body of charters, wills, court 
cases, and edicts. Ellis asserts “These laws are mainly concerned with the regulation of morals 
and Church principles, the enfranchisement of slaves, and the suppression of paganism” (1926). 
Therefore, law continued to provide for the preservation of power and property for those who 
possessed either. However, with the rising legal authority of the King in civil matters, came an 
extension of peace and safety to public spaces. Paul Lacroix quotes “a clever and learned writer”: 
“it was his province to calm human passions; by the moral power of his seal and his hand he 
extended peace over all the great lines of communication, through the forest, along the principal 
rivers, the highways and byways, etc.” (350). Although such endeavors had the intention of 
                                                
 
29	  The	  first	  cluster	  was	  from	  the	  kingdom	  of	  Kent,	  such	  as	  the	  Laws	  of	  Aethelbert	  (597-­‐616	  CE),	  the	  Laws	  of	  
Hlothaire	  and	  Edric	  (673-­‐686	  CE),	  and	  the	  Laws	  of	  Wihtraed	  (690-­‐725	  CE).	  The	  Laws	  of	  Ine	  in	  Wessex	  (688-­‐725	  CE)	  
were	  written	  down	  and	  copied.	  
30	  The	  Laws	  of	  Guthrum	  and	  Edward	  the	  Elder	  in	  Wessex	  (871-­‐901	  CE),	  the	  Laws	  of	  King	  Edmund	  (940-­‐946	  CE),	  the	  
Laws	  of	  King	  Edward	  the	  Elder	  (901-­‐924	  CE),	  the	  Laws	  of	  King	  Edgar	  (959-­‐979	  CE),	  and	  the	  Laws	  of	  King	  Athelstan	  
(924-­‐939	  CE),	  for	  example.	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maintaining societal cohesion, again for the maintenance of authority and preservation of 
property, they also had some intention of promoting the public good. Individual actors still had 
to utilize some forms of forensic rhetoric, classical or not, to navigate the constraints of these 
legal systems. 
Besides the more obvious extant law codes, scholars may look to other non-traditional 
sources from Anglo-Saxon literature to find examples and explorations of forensic rhetoric in 
practice. For example, Jennifer M. Randall examined Old English homilies as a form of 
epideictic rhetoric. Other scholars have attempted to recover overlooked texts and genres as 
evidence of rhetorical thought and writing.  For example, James J. Murphy has assembled a 
collection of handbooks that suggests the invention or further development of rhetorical 
traditions of instruction on letter writing and poetics as well as the aforementioned homiletics. 
Moreover, he edits a collection of essays that explores a mixture of traditional and speculative 
rhetorical genres, such as logic, commentary, and grammar, and then looks for their application 
in a variety of linguistic and cultural traditions. Joseph M. Miller presents an anthology of 
medieval rhetorical works that includes evidence of the continuation of classical genres as well 
as the development of the newer genres proposed by Murphy. Scott D. Troyan edits a collection 
that examines composition instruction, invention, and other traces of classical rhetoric in 
medieval poetry manuals, works of personal devotion, book introductions, poetic and prose 
literature, particularly that of Chaucer, in the work Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, and in 
pastoral manuals. A specific exploration of forensic rhetoric, though, is absent from the 
scholarship. 
Both the works under study, Elene and Life of Saint Basil, are examples of saints’ lives 
stories. Hagiography was already rhetorical in that it was used as conduct literature on how men 
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and women should behave in imitation of the life of Christ. Each includes a type of trial, and 
although there is no judge or jury, except perhaps the reader, the characters within use various 
forensic rhetorical strategies to win their claims. The outcomes express the verdict. Upon close 
reading, each work reveals innovative sources of ethos and other rhetorical strategies that 
illuminate the adapted strategies of forensic rhetoric available to Anglo-Saxon society. In 
particular, the stories show reliance on ethical authority, or ethos garnered through moral 
character, reputation, and a position of power. Ethos as an appeal had developed greatly at the 
end of the Roman Republic and during the Roman Empire as a strategy to persuade societal 
change without the danger of persecution. Ethos had strengthened during the Patristic period. 
Then, early Christian writers had developed textual authority as an appeal, persuading through 
the righteousness of the Bible. However, bishops had maintained their ethical authority through 
strict access to interpretation of the text. The Anglo-Saxon texts make strong connections to 
ethical and textual appeals throughout. This chapter will show the value in looking at Anglo-
Saxon culture for rhetorical theory, namely the innovative and syncretic mix of cultural rhetorics 
found in previously overlooked prose works such as these and, ultimately, will assist in the 
filling in the gaps in the history of medieval rhetoric. 
Elene is a West Saxon poem written in Old English sometime between 750 and 1000 by 
an undetermined author named Cynewulf. This story of Christian heroism and triumph narrates 
not only the conversion of the Romans of Constantinople but also the potential redemption and 
the conversion of the Jews. Elene is from a larger collection of hagiography. Lives of the Saints 
is another hagiographical work by the Anglo-Saxon abbot Aelfric of Eynsham (c. 955 – c. 1010), 
which includes a section on the “Life of Saint Basil.” Within this smaller story is a tale about a 
man who made a deal with the Devil. Both works contain scenes of discursive argument. 
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6.1   Personal Ethos, Violence and Other Rhetorical Strategies in Elene 
The story of Elene is a tale of Constantine’s mother Helena, called Elene in the poem, 
and her fabled discovery of the cross on which Jesus was crucified. The tale begins with an 
anachronistic battle between the Roman Emperor Constantine’s (reigned 306-337) forces and an 
invading army of Huns. However, Constantine would not have been able to engage the Huns in 
battle. Attila, the commander of the Huns, lived circa 406-453, and the Huns advanced on 
Constantinople in the mid-fifth century. Nevertheless, the stories are meshed together in this 
narrative for good reason. Medieval historian David Knowles proposes, “Soon after the end of 
Erigena’s career the Carolingian renaissance foundered under the stress of dynastic and feudal 
wars and invasions of the Northmen, and a century (880-980) began which, save for England 
under Alfred, Athelstan and Dunstan, was as dark as any that had gone before it” (1964). The 
Welsh monk Asser had produced the biography Life of King Alfred to preach the benefits of 
living under the protection and rule of the Anglo-Saxon Alfred. The goal was English unity for a 
holy war against the pagan forces of the Vikings (Keynes 41-2). Likewise, the story of the 
Christian, civilized Constantinople being attacked by the barbarian hordes of the Huns provided 
a familiar narrative to the Anglo-Saxon Christian kingdoms being attacked by Viking invaders. 
The poem begins with Constantine’s defeat of the invaders by showing them the cross, which he 
had seen in a dream. He converts to Christianity and seeks to find the relic of the cross, so he 
sends his mother Elene to Jerusalem with an army to find it. 
Once there, Elene summons wise counselors from the land to convince them to give up 
its hiding place. The Jewish counselors know of it but keep the information hidden from Elene, 
fearing what will happen to them if they concede to having been responsible for Jesus’ 
crucifixion. They hand over Judas, who knows more of Christianity, and Elene imprisons and 
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starves him until he reveals what he knows. Judas leads her to where three crosses can be dug up, 
and one cross miraculously brings a dead man back to life. Satan the appears and argues his case 
and threatens them. Constantine also wants the nails from the cross as well, and Elene finds these 
as well through a miraculous vision. 
Elene’s ethos is established in a number of ways, through her might, her battle prowess, 
and her ability to enforce her wishes through violence. She also shows a joyful obedience and a 
wit: collenferhðe, cwen siðes gefeah (“The queen rejoiced of her journey”) (“Elene” 247). Elene 
is ready and willing to do her son’s bidding. The rest of her ethos is established by typological 
analogy of subject matter selection and allusion to the Bible, which further establishes her 
personal ethical authority. Her knowledge of the Bible, as evidenced by her knowing its stories, 
gives her textual ethical authority as well. 
Elene is automatically given authority through a few typological comparisons. Typological 
comparisons usually related to heroic figures from the Bible. Elene creates a typological 
comparison simply by the characters and period presented as the subject matter, through direct 
Biblical references, and by historical claim and analogy to Rome. First, the setting and characters 
of the story are part of the Matter of Constantine, which is a typological genre, such as the Matter 
of Troy or the Matter of Britain, stories that harken back to imagined histories of a fabled era and 
lend legitimacy and authority to burgeoning national groups or kingdoms. The Matter of 
Constantine from such a distant location as Great Britain did not suggest the territorial rhetoric of 
empire as in late medieval cases when some used the Matter of Troy for such purposes; rather, it 
suggests a nostalgic connection to a purer, more powerful Golden Age of Christianity. 
Constantine was the first Christian Roman Emperor, so this period would have been seen by 
readers as a golden age of Christianity, pure, powerful, and important, when Christianity 
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achieved legitimization and pagan and secular authorities ceased persecuting Christians. In 
addition, Biblical correlations and references offer ethical weight by comparing the characters 
and events to Biblical ones. For example, the emperor wins his battle against the Huns after 
having a prophetic dream and putting the sign of the cross on his banner. Also, Elene reaches 
directly into Biblical stories to argue that the Jews used to be the chosen of God and spurned his 
redemption and explains how they rejected the instruction of prophecy. Lastly, Constantine and 
Elene are also direct and metaphorical heirs of the Roman Empire, another move by the write to 
demonstrate power and legitimacy. In a further allegorical technique, the author diminishes the 
ethical authority of the antagonists, Judas is named so as a direct reference to the betrayer of 
Jesus, since in this case he is betraying Satan (920-921). 
Elene also presents the threat of violence as a tool of persuasion. In Rhetoric, Aristotle 
recognized there are some proofs that must be dealt with outside of argumentation. These arise 
from circumstances outside of our own creation and include laws, contracts, depositions and 
witness testimony, including oaths, all of which exist and cannot be invented or crafted—they 
just are (I.I.2). The actual Greek word is atechnoi meaning without techne (skill, ability, craft). 
In a more contemporary context, citation and the use of quotations as evidence (a collection of 
facts) is also “inartistic.” These “inartistic” proofs have uses, but they cannot be invented and 
thus are not open to rhetorical theory, and they are not persuasive on their own, but they can be 
used by the rhetor. The Roman tradition continued this omission. Elene shows the further 
continuance of this tradition with witnesses appearing to testify for her adversaries, though they 
claim to know nothing, and by the use of imprisonment and torture by Elene to get the result she 
wants from her captive. 
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Much of Elene’s reliance on the threat of violence is through initial visual impression. 
There are many ways Elene persuades with the perception of a threat of violence. She travels 
wigena þreate (“with a force of warriors”) (217a). Her army was epic in size and strength: Ne 
hyrde ic sið ne ær / on egstreame / idese lædan, / on merestræte, / mægen fægerre (“Never have I 
heard before or since that a woman led a fairer force upon the water’s current, over the sea’s 
street.”) (240b-242) She herself has a royal and almost godlike personification as hwonne heo sio 
guðcwen / gumena þreate “that queen of warfare with her throng of men” (254). The passage 
includes a lengthy description of the men and battle equipment (256-258), common for heroic 
poetry. The army itself is lauded as corðra mæste “the greatest of armies” (274b). She also 
wields intimidating miraculous powers, or says she does, another divine linkage, as she 
eventually threatens the Jewish assemblage with a miraculous violence, a fire to burn the 
assembled Jews, so they give in and at last present Judas to divulge the truth (575-578). At least 
one of her threats is carried out. In a later scene, when Judas continues to lie, she applies 
isolation in a dungeon as well as starvation and bondage in chains (691-708). 
Besides relying on her ethical authority and threat of violence, as established above, 
Elene uses discursive strategies to win her arguments. Here, the influence of traditional forensic 
rhetoric interacts side by side with the methods of a heroic society. Despite her ability to inflict 
violence and potentially win what she wants through warlike engagement, Elene consistently 
turns to discursive techniques to attain what she wants. Elene continues successively to call for 
legal counselors, or wise men, to negotiate with rather than using force or calling for warriors 
with whom to battle: Gangaþ nu snude, / snyttro geþencaþ, weras wisfæste, / wordes cræftige, þa 
ðe eowre æ / æðelum cræftige / on ferhðsefan / fyrmest hæbben “Now go forth quickly, consider 
your counselors, skillful and wise-fast men, crafty in their words, those that have your law first 
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in their noble hearts” (313-316). She further argues the illogic of spurning the one who offered 
them freedom from eternal damnation. Elene next turns to logical argument for her claim. Using 
invention to find a new position to argue from, she discusses how the guilt of their actions 
continues to harm the Jews (315). She belies they will know þa me soðlice / secgan cunnon, / 
ondsware cyðan / for eowic forð (“they know how to say to me truly, to reveal an answer on your 
behalf”) as a representative/authority figure. Here the authority is being placed in advocates with 
wisdom in this arena (317-318). She indicates the other side ond gewritu herwdon (“despised the 
writing”), with a nod to tradition and education as the fædera lare (“teaching of our fathers”) 
(387b-388a). She points out their actions as contrary since Þeah ge þa æ cuðon (“you know the 
law”) (393b). She also points out to Judas the irony of how they remember the details of older 
events such as the Trojan War. 
 The author presents yet diminishes the ethical authority of Elene’s adversaries in order to 
raise that of Elene herself. The Earls have the ethical authority of being wise and educated. Earls 
who are already æcleawe (“skilled in the law”) go out to find even wiser men to argue for them 
(321a). Then they retrieve one thousand men, ten times that of a hundred moot for a shire council 
(316). Eventually, they gather 500 wiser men for an even greater council. Despite their excess of 
gathered wisdom, they have several issues that still detract from their ethos, as expressed by a 
clearly anti-Semitic author. They are shown to be lying. They also have the historical sinful 
deeds of their ancestors: their supposed crucifixion of Jesus, as a sinful weight upon them. 
 Judas has a redemptive quality to him. He is influenced and guilt-ridden by his 
conscience.  His knowledge and cleverness are cast in a negative light, as he uses those skills to 
deceive, and it is only his spiritual connections which give him ethical strength towards the end 
of the tale. Clearly, he is shown to be more knowledgeable about the past, having been trained by 
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his father in Christian teachings. Eventually, he confesses and converts, which gives him ethos as 
well. Judas is also allegorical in that he shows the Jews can be redeemed and converted to 
Christianity. Judas reveals that the wise men know what Elene is asking and they know what 
their ancestors did and are craftily hiding that information. He suggests not revealing this 
information, as their power on earth will be diminished, and he suggest crafting a common story 
they can all agree on to hide the truth. This fear of diminishing material power is a negative 
ethical trait. This appears to be the issue at hand. The story does not hinge on whether the Jews 
are responsible. It takes as a fact that they are. Rather, the issue is that they are hiding this 
information and the location of the cross, an act that lessens their ethos in the dispute. 
6.2   The Dominance of Sacred Personal Ethical Authority in “Life of Saint Basil” 
Aelfric’s “Life of Saint Basil” is one hagiographical section of his larger work, Lives of 
the Saints. Many of Ælfric’s works are translations of pre-existing Latin saint’s lives; the 
tradition for Basil begins in Greek, in fact, and it was a highly influential text for western 
theology. It contains Saint Basil’s origins as well as a sequence of miracles he performs, but one 
story, which narrates the trial for a man’s soul, revolves around a man who sells his soul to the 
Devil for the love of a woman and regrets his decision. In the story, a young man is tricked by 
the Devil into falling in love with a young woman, whose father wants her to become a nun. The 
boy sees a sorcerer, who brings him to the Devil for magical aid. The Devil wants a formal 
contract signed that the youth will renounce Christ and his baptism and believe in the Devil 
instead. The youth agrees and the marriage comes to pass.  
After they marry, the youth despairs and admits to his wife how he had been tricked by 
the Devil into apostasy by the Devil’s interference. She runs to Basil for assistance. Basil 
confronts the youth, who is indeed repentant for what happens, as he had been deceived by the 
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Devil as well. The youth formally repents, and Basil welcomes him back into the fold. After a 
period of the youth’s confinement, the Devil appears and produces a contract, arguing his case 
before Basil. Basil tears up the contract and receives the young man into communion. 
Despite the Devil’s forensic evidence of testimony and contract, Basil wins his claim 
primarily through ethos. Basil establishes his ethos through personal moral authority, due to his 
holiness and connection to scripture and God. Basil also is portrayed as intelligent and learned. 
As a saint, he has the ability to perform miracles. Basil, vested in tremendous ethos, tears up the 
perfectly valid contract, showing that the case is decided on moral authority rather than on 
conjectural evidence. Thus, the sacred ethos of Basil is greater than the inartistic rhetoric of the 
oaths and contract. Moreover, the story shows that, for the author and the audience, the newer 
ethical authority from the classical tradition now supersedes the violence and other rhetorical 
strategies of the Anglo-Saxon heroic society.   
 The author establishes Basil’s ethos through devotion, character, wisdom, and typology. 
The author uses the character of Basil for particular ethical purposes. This story is another tale 
harkening back to the fourth and fifth century in a typological way. The figure of Basil 
represented the Patristic formation of Christianity and the story’s audience would have 
understood his inherent merit and authority as a mythically elevated Christian hero.  
Basil treats the youth and his wife with kindness, concern, and forgiveness. Each time 
they come to him with their issues, he works to resolve them. Interestingly in this story, the 
witness receives food and good treatment instead of starvation in the dungeon, though both 
receive forgiveness upon confession and penitence. In contrast, the Devil’s approach is cruel, 
formalized, and rigid; he clings to the details of the contract and offers no flexibility. 
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The narrative shows that a classical education was valued and strengthened Basil’s ethos.  
During the third and fourth centuries, Christian Patristic authors had fought to exclude the study 
of non-Christian philosophy in education in a struggle for political and social power. This story 
was likely originally written in the late fifth century, and by that time, inclusion of respected 
pagan authors was more admirable and, certainly, useful. “Life of Basil” shows that this idea 
continued into the tenth century. According to the introduction, Basil was sent to school to learn 
philosophy at seven because that is what nobility expected men of honor to do. Then, for five 
years he was sent to Athens to Eubolas’ school for further learning—this school is notably a 
pagan one, which would have promoted a classical education. Notably, the Roman Emperor 
Julian the Apostate, who reigned 361-363, is also mentioned as going to that same school. Julian 
had been infamous among the Christians for his promotion of paganism and anti-Christian 
policies; including him in this section on Basil’s education signals an acceptance of non-
Christian scholars. Lastly, Basil’s devotion to scriptural knowledge lends him ethos, as he had 
journeyed to Egypt to get the true lore from Christian books, the writings of early church leaders 
that contained the singular, textual ethical authority on spiritual matters, 
On the other hand, given his lack of ethos, the character of the Devil, instead relies on 
violence, logos, and inartistic rhetoric to support his claim. The young man has agreed to sign 
over his soul to the Devil in return for the young woman’s love. When forging the pact with the 
young man, the Devil insists, wryt me nu (“Write me now”), because he recognizes the weakness 
and mutability of an oath and desires a legal, written contract (“Aelfric” 379). First, he pulls on 
the man, performing an act of violence, but this use of force does not prevail. He then presents 
conjectural evidence to try to sway the argument: he makes a claim that he has been robbed, 
presents evidence that establishes that the contract is the actual one in question, and provides 
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witness testimony, for the defendant testifies the signature is his handwriting. Nevertheless, these 
facts do not provide the conclusion for which the Devil wishes. These outcomes demonstrate that 
violence and conjectural evidence, a form of logos, are weak in this scenario. Rather, ethos holds 
a much greater sway over the outcome. Divine law, as well, supersedes manmade law.  
In contrast to Basil, the Devil is conniving, demanding, and angry. In his claim against the 
youth, he convinces no one through his argument. Rather, he uses magical powers to deceive 
others and force them to do his will. First, he tricks the young man into falling for the woman, 
then he consumes the young woman with longing for the young man in return; neither recipient 
of these tricks has asked for such acts to be done to themselves. Those tainted magical powers 
are not granted through devotion to God, so they do not carry the ethical weight of divine magic.  
6.3   Conclusion 
My close reading of these two texts, with attention to ethical authority and classical 
forensic rhetorical theory, discovers a new site of rhetorical history. My analysis offers 
innovative applications and strategies for theorizing and recognizing forensic rhetoric. The 
discursive scenes in both these works illuminate how at the time of these writings Anglo-Saxon 
society was in a liminal space that combined violence and inartistic forensic strategies with 
discursive strategies derived from forensic rhetoric, so readers can find evidence, sometimes 
overlapping, of the two traditions. For example, Elene, though she threatens violence by arriving 
with an army, calls for a moot rather than engage in battle. A moot is a legal gathering in Anglo-
Saxon society, where lords gather as a committee to decide on judicial issues. The moot was a 
historically Germanic cultural system. These heroic narrative elements are then followed by a 
lengthy, discursive process, resembling a trial, that reflects the classical forensic rhetorical 
tradition. 
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Both narratives clearly show a reliance on personal ethical authority in order to win an 
argument. Although the primary ethical authority of any of the characters is granted through the 
strength of their devotion and through divine interference, there are other ways they attract ethos, 
such a personal character and typological comparisons. Both Elene and Basil show moral 
character and good reputation, and they both show knowledge of and devotion to scripture, 
which lends them powerful divine ethical authority. In the stories, violence and inartistic 
rhetoric, e.g. oaths and contracts, are relied on less and sometimes excluded altogether, e.g. 
violence and oaths and torture. For example, Elene sees to the imprisonment and starvation of 
Judas, but “Life of Saint Basil” displays none of these rhetorical strategies as effective. 
 Carolingian Franks had used typological comparisons, analogies to distant mythical 
figures and narratives, a century earlier as a rhetorical strategy to persuade those they ruled over 
and those in other kingdoms that they were the legitimate heirs to not only Biblical salvation 
history but also the Roman Empire. These typological comparisons crafted mythical national 
heritages, a foothold from which one might have claimed a political and religious moral 
authority. In these two sources, the typological comparisons abound but are less Biblical in 
nature. Rather, they point to the formative centuries of the Christian Church.  
 In the story of the history of rhetoric, a new chapter now exists. Where there was a gap in 
the tradition, there is now a foothold from which to discover even more innovative strategies and 
new sources from which to climb out of the murky conception of a rhetorical Dark Age. There is 
no doubt that other overlooked genres of sources would illuminate further development of 
innovative strategies in forensic rhetoric and provide a more continuous and richer narrative of 
medieval forensic rhetoric.  
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7   CONCLUSIONS 
In On Rhetoric, Aristotle wrote, “And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be 
feared by those who can be so treated; for as a rule men do wrong whenever they can” (II.V 1-9). 
Herein, a fundamental realism rises over idealism. In Chapter 2, the many ways men evoke fear 
of acts of evil or retribution that have the potential to cause distress or great harm are listed. The 
structure to defend against this fear, through the evocation of justice, was established early on in 
Classical Athens and in many early law codes. Societal cohesion was maintained by the creation 
of law and the training of forensic rhetoric for law courts. Both of which prescribed constraints 
on conduct, knowledge, and participation against the populace to benefited the landed 
aristocracy.  
In classical Athens, law had been established to keep those who feared external penalty 
from transgressing. Scholars systematized rhetoric and taught it students who formed the very 
beginnings of a professional legal class. Rhetors crafted ethical and pathetical appeals, but great 
emphasis was placed on logical appeals especially stasis theory in order to rely on observable 
evidence and the decisions of rational juries. However, ultimately forensic rhetoric was applied 
to winning a case, and the purported search for truth or justice behind it forsaken. And although 
the state enacted an elaborate legal system that determined roles and responsibilities for the 
citizenry, the system in turn limited and controlled the manner and place of participation.  
Each chapter in this study has shown how successive periods in history used rhetoric in 
professing an idealism, couched as justice, morality, truth, legitimacy, or spirituality, to promote 
a realist agenda of dually maintaining societal cohesion through removing fear of harm among 
the empowered citizenry and increasing their confidence in the secular or sacred authorities.  
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Chapter 3 focused on the late Roman Empire and how rhetors moved the reliance on 
logical proof to ethical proof, but still a personal ethical proof. The strength of argument 
remained in the character of the actors.  Works on rhetoric took on a didactic form of discussing 
morality, in a veiled critique of the draconian society they lived in. First Cicero spoke out more 
directly against Caesar and Mark Antony and decried the immorality of the political system of 
the day. Later rhetors, such as Tacitus and Quintilian, developed additional ideas on education 
and instilling morality in into their students as an approach to improving their world. However, 
they still stressed an innate morality in preferred students, which gave preference to the elites. 
All the attention to good behavior preached more constraints on conduct, as has been discussed 
in Chapter Two. Forensic rhetoric continued in the law courts, stasis theory grew more elaborate, 
and the legal system remained a force of societal cohesion, if shaky. The education system did 
nothing innovative to expand the possibilities of argument beyond the privileged, and somewhat 
subdued citizenry. It is at this point that most history of rhetoric surveys and courses begin to 
lose their thread, saying the Roman Empire collapsed and classical learning fell away. 
Rather, in Chapter 4 we read how under the support of Constantine the early Christian 
Church, backed by secular authority, subverted rhetoric in order to dominate the pagan 
populations. Christians constructed the Bible as an authoritative text and transferred ethical 
power from the person to that text. The reliance on personal ethical proof had firmly shifted to a 
reliance on textual ethos. Then, actors such as Athanasius negotiated against internal factions in 
order to claim interpretive control of the text as well, securing sacred power and secular backing. 
Christian bishops crafted the strategy of gaining consensus in order to make these maneuvers. In 
heated synods, debated ensued, votes were held, majority winners declared, and then universal 
opinion enforced. Those who held onto differing opinions were declared heretics and their ideas 
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heresies. This systematic constraint on knowledge is reflective of the ultimate aim of forensic 
rhetoric, that of societal cohesion.  
Chapter 5 showed within the Carolingian Renaissance a secular grab of the textual ethos. 
Charlemagne used a typological comparison to Biblical heroes in order to gain popular backing 
and support from ecclesiastical groups.  He opened up the application of textual authority to 
profane texts. He also codified secular laws and promoted the availability of the sacred textual 
authority through the scriptoriums. Having the written laws of the state in place allowed for the 
type of authority that had been given to the Bible by the priests. In addition, he promoted the 
Rule of St. Benedict in order to keep the monks consistently under the affinity of his regal 
support and power. In these acts, there was a shift of the textual ethos from constraints of the 
mind to constraints of identity, from the personal to the social, but still with the realm of thought 
and language.  
Examining non-traditional medieval genres allows researchers to discover hidden 
rhetoric. In Chapter 6 a close reading of two hagiographical sources allowed for the discovery of 
Anglo-Saxon concepts of forensic rhetoric and rhetorical strategies such as typological 
comparison and great personal authority granted by textual ethos. During the ninth century 
Alfredian Renaissance., King Alfred, too, would expand on the typological metaphors that 
connected him to Biblical heroes to establish him as a type of savior from the threat to religion 
and civilization perceived. He established an educational program and codified laws as well to 
create textual authority. He also aided the movement from orality to literacy. Inartistic proofs 
were restricted and the reliance on textual ethos was increased.  It was from this condition that 
the continental cathedral schools of the twelfth century sprang. An early liberalism started to 
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form—not a movement towards equality but an increasing desire to be a fairer participant in the 
system. 
Much about rhetoric is prescriptive; rhetoric constrains conduct. In these movements over 
time, the notion of constraints experiences a corporeal shift from the personal to the social to the 
body. This can be viewed as increasingly restrictive, also envisioned as a prisonlike restraint, 
capturing the mind and imprisoning the body. The malleability of constraint moves from logos, 
personal ethos, and inartistic proof to textual ethos, since a text is fixed and nonresponsive to 
argument. So, over time, we see an increase in restraint coupled with an increase in inflexibility. 
The populace is held—and held tightly. Such a condition is a far cry from the intent purposed at 
the beginning stages in the formation of rhetoric, when stated claims by rhetors was to give the 
people a voice and techniques with which either to win their cases or find the truth.  
Bertrand Russell wrote, “Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the 
true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our 
thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom” (qtd. in Posner 4). I chose “the tyranny of 
custom” to use in the title of this study to emphasize two meanings: one, the expansion of 
thought that philosophy brings to problematizing the history of rhetoric, as I have applied 
throughout these chapters, and two, the unequal application of rhetoric, and specifically forensic 
rhetoric, that has subjugated democratic and imaginative argumentation. Here, in the conclusion 
I hope to show a few ways in which ideas from this work can be used in pedagogy, in surveys 
and in the classroom, to help students discover their own effective means of persuasion. 
7.1   Implications for Researchers/Scholars 
Further research could be done in any of the periods covered by focusing closer on the 
actors involved, be they the bishops, the monks, the rhetoricians, or the aristocracy. There is 
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easily an additional chapter about the Northumbrian Renaissance and Bede in England that could 
be placed between Chapters 4 and 5. This center was crucial to creating the persona and skillset 
of Alcuin, who was able to engineer such a vast attempt at cultural unity in Carolingian France. 
It was this region, and in Ireland, where the monastic centers of learning kept the dream of a 
Greco-Roman style system of education alive and certainly preserved canonical knowledge from 
those eras. I would also like to analyze the Anglo-Saxon literary texts to see how the authors and 
culture in mimetic way struggle with the competing strategies of justice, through artistic and 
inartistic means. And I would like to analyze the Anglo-Saxon literary texts to see how the 
authors and culture in mimetic way struggle with the competing strategies of justice, through 
artistic and inartistic means. Beyond Elene and Life of Saint Basil, an exploration of other 
hagiographic sources or other works from other genres of Anglo-Saxon writing, from the 
perspective of forensic rhetoric, would reveal more rhetorical strategies and usages. 
Surveys of historical rhetoric could include more works from medieval authors. More 
importantly, they don’t need to be strictly works on classical rhetoric, as we have seen that 
rhetoric is utilized in many other forms of narration. Also, different types of rhetoric could be 
explored in this period. Topics for inclusion in a survey book or course might discuss rhetoric 
and societal cohesion, the move to ethos at the beginning of the Patristic period rather than the 
disappearance of rhetoric, textual ethos, rhetoric and political legitimacy and how that interacted 
with the successive mini-renaissances, and inartistic rhetoric in the heroic cultures of Northern 
Europe. 
7.2   Applications for Teaching 
There is a wealth of assignments that could stem from readings and research in each area. 
In a college composition course, have students read some biblical exegesis so they can 
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understand typology. In classes, for example, students could go to a magistrate court to witness 
people misunderstanding the issue at hand so they can better understand stasis theory. This can 
be done with popular television court shows as well. Students could discuss how legal systems 
provide societal cohesion and benefit the educated and the propertied. Chapters 3 and 4 provide 
grounds for an insightful student discussion on ethos in the context of modern politics as well. 
Teachers could have students learn about and discuss textual ethos, in laws, the Bible, social 
media, “fake news,” etc., and discuss who has control of the message and its interpretation. Or an 
excerpt from Alfred’s Laws would provide students an excellent opportunity to discuss inartistic 
rhetoric. Appendix A includes a course design I created for a Medieval Rhetoric course that 
could help to fill some of these pedagogical gaps. 
Mostly, I would like to give researches and teachers more places to jump off from and to 
continue looking at how rhetoric was created and used in late antiquity and the early medieval 
period to shine some consideration into how these ideas and movements give voice to people or 
take it away. We should reflect on how modern voices are misdirected or constrained as well. 
Nowadays, we take for granted how the legal system works, and how lawyers are trained, and 
who is able to argue for themselves in court. But we must realize that these systems are not 
always in place for our benefit; they can provide as many constraints, on conduct, on the mind, 
and on one’s ability to participate in the system, as they provide opportunities to work within that 
system. The ability to argue for oneself might be considered a natural right, and only by breaking 
free from the tyranny of custom can one fully actualize that right.  
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A: MEDIEVAL RHETORIC COURSE SYLLABUS 
Books: 
Knowles, David. The Evolution of Medieval Thought. New York: Vintage Books, 1962. [or 
better, the 2nd edition from Longman Publishing Group, 1989] 
Miller, Joseph M. Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and 
Thomas W. Benson, eds. Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 1973. 
Coursepack. 
Assignments: 
 Undergraduates: two tests, leading class discussion, short paper 
 Graduates: research proposal, leading class discussion, research paper and presentation 
Calendar: 
•   Week 1: The Rhetoric of Late Antiquity, or “Hasten Down Rhetoric’s Highway” 
(Fortunatianus)  
o   Primary 
§   Epictetus’ Handbook 
§   Martianus Minneus Felix Capella. De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, 
V: “The Book of Rhetoric” (introduction and excerpt from The 
Marriage of Philology and Mercury), Miller, trans. Readings in 
Medieval Rhetoric, 1-5. 
§   C. Chirius Fortunatianus. Artis rhetoricae libri tres, I (introduction and 
excerpt) [in class reading as catechism] 
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o   Secondary 
§   George A. Kennedy, “Chapter 12: Christianity and Classical 
Rhetoric,” A New History of Classical Rhetoric. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton U Press, 1994, 257-270. [coursepack] 
§   Knowles, “Plato and Aristotle,” The Evolution of Medieval Thought, 3-
15. 
o   Concepts 
§   From the Second Sophistic 
§   Contribution of Stoicism to Christianity 
 
•   Week 2: Patristic Rhetoric 
o   Primary 
§   Tatian 
§   Eusebius 
o   Secondary 
§   George A. Kennedy, “Chapter 13: The Survival of Classical Rhetoric 
from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages,” A New History of Classical 
Rhetoric. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U Press, 1994, 271-284. 
[coursepack] 
o   Concepts 
§   Development of Apology 
§   Development of Panegyric 
§   Map study: 
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•   Week 3: Pagan Rhetoric 
o   Primary 
§   Porphyry’s Against the Christians 
§   Macrobius, Saturnalia. Small sample passage that demonstrates the 
application of rhetoric to literary analysis (Virgil). 
§   Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations 
§   David Knowles, “The Latter Platonists and Plotinus,” The Evolution of 
Medieval Thought, 16-31. 
o   Concepts 
§   Attacks on the Christian Church 
§   Competing Religions 
 
•   Week 4: Augustine of Hippo/Biblical Exegesis 
o   Primary 
§   Augustine 
§   Origen [small sample to explain biblical exegesis] 
o   Secondary 
§   “St Augustine,” The Evolution of Medieval Thought, 32-50. 
§   Etienne Gilson, “The Primacy of Faith,” Reason and Revelation in the 
Middle Ages, 3-33. 
o   Concepts 
§   Development of Exegesis 
167 
§   Reconciliation of rhetoric into Christian writing 
 
•   Week 5: Dark Ages? Sub-Roman? Early Middle Ages? (476/600 CE – 1000/1450 
CE) 
 
o   Primary 
§   Priscian the Grammarian. Fundamentals Adapted from Hermogenes. 
Joseph M. Miller, trans. Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Miller, Joseph 
M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, eds. 
Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 1973, 52-76. Adaptation of 
Hermogenes’ Progymnasmata composition exercises. 
§   Isidore of Seville. The Etymologies, II. 1-15: “Concerning Rhetoric.” 
Joseph M. Miller, trans. Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Miller, Joseph 
M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, eds. 
Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 1973, 79-95. 
o   People 
§   Boethius (Ravenna, c. 480 CE – c. 525 CE) 
§   Isidore of Seville 
§   Priscian the Grammarian 
o   Concepts 
§   Map Study: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b1/Europe_526-
600.jpg  
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§   Decline in Literacy 
§   Division of Roman Empire 
 
•   Week 5.5: The Irish 
o   Primary 
o   Secondary 
§   Cahill, Thomas. How the Irish Saved Civilization. Gives a historical 
account of the preservation of Greek and Roman thought through the 
collapse of the Roman Empire. [may want more current source] 
§   Thomas Duddy, A History of Irish Thought (Routledge, 2002) 
[selection] 
§   Henry Bett, Johannes Scotus Erigena: A Study in Medieval Philosophy 
(Hyperion, 1979) [selection] 
o   Concepts 
o   People 
§   Johannus Scotus Erigena (812-877) 
•   Bio: http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/phil/philo/phils/scotus.html  
 
•   Week 6: Anglo-Saxon Rhetoric 
o   Primary 
§   Wulfstan. Sermo Lupi ad Anglos.  
§   Bede. Concerning Figures and Tropes. Joseph M. Miller, trans. 
Readings in Medieval Rhetoric, 96-122. 
169 
o   Secondary 
§   Leslie A. Donovan, Women Saints’ Lives in Old English Prose 
[coursepack] 
§   “Women, Commerce, and Rhetoric in Medieval England,” by 
Malcolm Richardson, in Listening to their Voices: The Rhetorical 
Activities of Historical  Women, edited by Molly Meijer Wertheimer, 
U of SC P, 1997. 133-49. [need to read this to determine where it fits 
in] 
 
•   Week 7: Carolingian Renaissance 
o   Primary 
§   The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne. Wilbur Samuel Howell, ed. 
and trans. New York: Russell & Russell, 1965; reprint of 1941 edition. 
[need to choose selection] 
§   Rabanus Maurus. On the Training of the Clergy, III.19. (excerpt and 
commentary) Joseph M. Miller, trans. Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. 
Miller, Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, 
eds. Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 1973, 125-27. 
o   Secondary Source Readings 
§   David Knowles, “The Awakening of Western Europe,” The Evolution 
of Medieval Thought, 79-92. 
o   Concepts 
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§   Map Study: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Empire_de_Charlemagne_
et_son_d%C3%A9membrement_au_Trait%C3%A9_de_Vermont_843
.JPG  
 
•   Week 8: Byzantine Rhetoric 
o   Primary 
§   Michael Psellus, Didactic Poems on Grammar and Rhetorics 
[selections about rhetorics] 
o   Concepts 
§   Map Study: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Europe_map_998.PNG  
 
•   Week 9: Arabic & Jewish Influences 
o   Primary Source Readings 
§   Alfarabi’s “Plato’s Laws,” Medieval Political Philosophy. Ralph 
Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, Eds. Ithaca, New Rok: Cornell U Press, 
1995, 83-94. [coursepack] 
§   Averroës’ (Abu'l-Walid Ibn Rushd) “Three Short Commentaries on 
Aristotle’s “Topics,” “Rhetoric,” and “Poetics,” 57-78 (“Rhetoric” 
only):  http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/books/aver-shrt-com.pdf  
§   Avicenna’s The Cure, (Part 8 on Rhetoric?). Translates and discusses 
Aristotle’s “Organon,” which included “Rhetoric.” 
171 
§   Maimonides’ Guide to the Perplexed 3.43 
(http://www.daatemet.org.il/articles/article.cfm?article_id=97&lang=e
n) 
o   Secondary Source Readings 
§   Parens, Joshua S. Metaphysics as Rhetoric: Alfarabi’s “Summary of 
Plato’s Laws.” Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 
1995. Call Number: JC71.P264 P37 1995 (at GSU) [need to choose a 
selection] 
§   Islam and the Italian Renaissance. eds. Charles Burnett and Anna 
Contadini. Warburg Institute, 1999. [need to choose a selection] 
§   Commentary on Al-Baqillani’s Rhetorical Figures in Poetry and 
Qur’an. Joseph M. Miller, trans. Readings in Medieval Rhetoric, 129-
30. 
o   Concepts 
§   “Rehabilitation of Aristotle” 
§    “Defense of Greek philosophy against the Ash’arite theologians” 
(http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ir/index.html)  
o   People 
§   Averroës’ ((1126-1198) 
§   Alfarabi 
§   Avicenna (Abn Ali al Hosain Ibn Abdallah Ibn Sina) (Persia, 980-
1037) 
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•   Avicennism and existence/essence 
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/avicenna.htm)  
 
•   Week 10: The Monastic Schools, or “The Right to Speak” (Deutz) 
 
o   Primary 
§   Rupert of Deutz. A Dispute between a Monk and a Cleric about 
Whether a Monk Should Be Allowed to Preach. Joseph M. Miller, 
trans. Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Miller, Joseph M. Miller, 
Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, eds. Bloomington: 
Indiana U Press, 1973, 188-96. 
§   Honorius of Autun. Concerning the Exile of the Soul and its 
Fatherland; also called, About the Arts. Joseph M. Miller, trans. 
Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Miller, Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. 
Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, eds. Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 
1973, 198-204 (up to Chapter XI). 
o   Secondary Source Readings 
§   “Christine de Pisan and The Treasure of the City of Ladies: A 
Medieval Rhetorician and Her Rhetoric,” Andrea A. Lunsford, ed. 
Reclaiming Rhetorica: Women in the Rhetorical Tradition. Pittsburgh, 
U of Pittsburgh P, 1995, 73-92. [author unclear] 
§   David Knowles, “The Rebirth of the Schools,” The Evolution of 
Medieval Thought, 71-78. 
173 
§   “The Visionary Rhetoric of Hildegard of Bingen,” by Julia Dietrich, , 
in Listening to their Voices: The Rhetorical Activities of Historical  
Women, edited by Molly Meijer Wertheimer, U of SC P, 1997. 199-
214. 
o   Concepts 
§   Monastic Life 
§   Dominican versus Franciscan 
o   People 
§   Hildegard of Bingen (1098 CE-1179 CE) 
 
•   Week 11: The Masters of Dialectic, or “The Battlefield of Composition” (Alberic) 
o   Primary 
§   Alberic of Monte Cassino. Flowers of Rhetoric. (excerpt and 
introduction) Joseph M. Miller, trans. Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. 
Miller, Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, 
eds. Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 1973, 131-161. 
§   Anonymous of Bologna, "The Principles of Letter-Writing,” Three 
Medieval Rhetorical Arts 
o   Secondary 
§   David Knowles, “Peter Abelard,” The Evolution of Medieval Thought, 
116-130. 
o   Concepts 
§   Ars dictaminis (the art of letter writing) 
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§   Formulae 
o   People 
§   Peter Abelard 
§   Alberic of Monte Cassino 
 
•   Week 12: The Cathedral Schools 
o   Primary 
§   John of Salsbury? 
§   Alan de Lille’s Anticlaudianus, 96-104. 
§   Alan de Lille. A Compendium on the Art of Preaching, Preface and 
Selected Chapters (excerpts and introduction). Joseph M. Miller, trans. 
Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Miller, Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. 
Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, eds. Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 
1973, 228-239. 
o   Secondary 
§   David Knowles, “The School of Chartres and John of Salisbury,” The 
Evolution of Medieval Thought, 131-140. 
o   Concepts 
§   Separations into disciplines 
§   Scholasticism 
§   Categories of Narration 
§   Integumental Method 
§   11th and 12th Century Renaissance 
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•   Week 13: Late Middle Age Rhetoric, or The Universities 
o   Primary 
§   Poggo Bracciolini. Two Letters. Joseph M. Miller, trans. Readings in 
Medieval Rhetoric. (letters and introduction) Miller, Joseph M. Miller, 
Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W. Benson, eds. Bloomington: 
Indiana U Press, 1973, 280-85. 
o   Secondary 
§   David L. Wagner, “Rhetoric,” The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle 
Ages, 96-124. 
§   David Knowles, “The School of St Victor and St Bernard,” The 
Evolution of Medieval Thought, 140-149. 
§    
o   Concepts 
§   The Great Schism of 1378 
§   Rediscovery of Quintillian’s Institutio Oratoriae. 
 
•   Week 14: Renaissance Rhetoric 
 
o   Primary 
§   Erasmus 
§   Peacham, Henry. The Garden of Eloquence (the section on rhetorical 
schemes only) 
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§   Peter Ramus (Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian) [selections] 
o   People 
§   Erasmus 
§   Henry Peacham (London, 1546-1634) 
 
•   Week 15: Renaissance Rhetoric 
o   Primary 
§   Giambattista Vico (On the Study Methods of Our Time) 
o   Secondary 
§   “Women, Rhetoric, and Letter Writing: Marguerite d’Alencon’s 
Correspondence with Bishop Briconnet of Meaux” by Laurel 
Carrington, , in Listening to their Voices: The Rhetorical Activities of 
Historical  Women, edited by Molly Meijer Wertheimer, U of SC P, 
1997. 215-32. 
 
 
